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		<title>Flavescence dorée has devastated Hungary&#8217;s vineyards and quietly threatens those in Romania as well</title>
		<link>https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/flavescence-doree-hungarys-austria-romania/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Átlátszó Erdély]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 06:51:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American grapevine leafhopper]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Austria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[epidemic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[flavescence dorée]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[grapevine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[infection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[plant health authority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quarantine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Romania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Scaphoides titanicus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[subsidies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vineyard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[viticulture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wine region]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[winemakers]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://atlatszo.ro/?p=61848</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>“Neither the growers nor the authorities took it seriously enough. Everyone looked the other way a little, and that looking away is the reason we’ve ended up where we ended up,”&#160; says Ákos Molnár, a board member of the Hungarian National Council of Wine Communities and president of the Sopron wine region, speaking to Qubit. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/flavescence-doree-hungarys-austria-romania/">Flavescence dorée has devastated Hungary&#8217;s vineyards and quietly threatens those in Romania as well</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>“Neither the growers nor the authorities took it seriously enough. Everyone looked the other way a little, and that looking away is the reason we’ve ended up where we ended up,”&nbsp;</p>
</blockquote>



<p>says <strong>Ákos Molnár</strong>, a board member of the Hungarian National Council of Wine Communities and president of the Sopron wine region, speaking to Qubit. Flavescence dorée, a grapevine disease caused by a phytoplasma infection, has been plaguing Hungary’s wine regions for close to fifteen years. In all that time, neither the government, nor the authorities, nor the growers took it seriously or reckoned with the far-reaching consequences its spread could bring – and a <strong>lack of state capacity</strong> made containing it harder still. </p>



<p>The infection is spread by the American grapevine leafhopper, and although the disease poses no danger to humans, in recent years it has reshaped the regional wine market. In Austria, the authorities acted quickly against the disease, yet the infection has kept spreading, while in Romania it took years for the authorities to respond seriously to the disease spreading from one vineyard to the next.</p>



<ul>
<li class="has-medium-font-size">Flavescence dorée is present in 18 of <strong>Hungary</strong>’s 19 counties, and according to the most pessimistic forecasts, 30–50 percent of the country’s vineyards could be lost. The disease is also spreading in <strong>Austria</strong>, and it threatens <strong>Romania</strong>’s largest wine-growing area too. In this article, together with journalists from Austria’s DOSSIER and Átlátszó Erdély, we trace how we got here.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">The phytoplasma that causes flavescence dorée was first detected in Hungary in 2013, but the invasive American grapevine leafhopper that spreads the bacterium had already appeared in 2006. It took the combination of the two for the disease to take hold.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">In Austria, flavescence dorée was first detected in vineyards in 2009, and <strong>in Romania in 2021</strong>. That year, <strong>Romania carried out four laboratory tests.</strong> Today the disease is present in several Austrian states and in several parts of Romania.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">Through a freedom-of-information request, we obtained the number of tests carried out by the Hungarian National Food Chain Safety Office (Nébih). The figures show that few tests were done in 2023–2024, the period that proved crucial to the outbreak’s escalation.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">Diseased plants must be removed as soon as possible, yet for years no one actively looked for them in Hungary. In some cases, infected vines stayed in vineyards for months while the process moved from sampling to the issuing of a removal order.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">The disease can also spread through<strong> infected propagation material</strong>. A heat treatment could make the material disease-free, but it is very expensive, and no one wants to pay for it.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">For years, growers had no incentive to report outbreaks of flavescence dorée. The fragmentation of Hungary’s public administration and the previous government’s late involvement also held back the response. The new Tisza government led by Péter Magyar and the new parliament have tightened and accelerated measures against flavescence dorée and broadened eligibility for compensation.</li>
</ul>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="819" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-1024x819.png" alt="Flavescence dorée in Hungary" class="wp-image-61851" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-1024x819.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-300x240.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-768x614.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-1536x1229.png 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-750x600.png 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en-1140x912.png 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_hungary_en.png 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p></p>



<p>By August 2026, Nébih had confirmed the presence of flavescence dorée in 18 counties and 22 wine regions. Infection is severe in Zala County, on the northern and southern side of Lake Balaton – parts of Veszprém and Somogy counties – and, since this season, in the country’s northeast as well. </p>



<p>In response to Qubit&#8217;s freedom-of-information request, Nébih provided no information on either the size of the affected area or the number of vineyard holdings subject to officially ordered control measures, saying it did not have these data.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-1024x683.png" alt="Flavescence dorée in Austria" class="wp-image-61854" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-1024x683.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-300x200.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-768x512.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-1536x1024.png 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-750x500.png 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en-1140x760.png 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_austria_en.png 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p></p>



<p>Like Hungary, Austria has no national tally either. Asked by DOSSIER, the Austrian agriculture ministry said it had no specific data on how many hectares of vineyards are affected, because keeping track of them is the responsibility of the states and the regional plant protection bodies. Such figures are badly needed, because the disease, which spread out of southern and southeastern Styria in the late 2000s, now affects all of Burgenland and has also been detected for the first time in Lower Austria. </p>



<p>In Romania, according to the plant health authority, flavescence dorée<strong> has put pressure mainly on the Moldavian Hills</strong>, which produced more than half of the country’s grape harvest last year.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="740" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-1024x740.png" alt="Flavescence dorée in Romania" class="wp-image-61857" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-1024x740.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-300x217.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-768x555.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-1536x1109.png 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-120x86.png 120w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-750x542.png 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en-1140x823.png 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_romania_en.png 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p></p>



<p>Péter Gál, head of the viticulture and oenology department at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy, told Qubit that at the start of the year 17 percent of Hungary’s vineyard area lay within infected zones and 28 percent within buffer zones – the three-kilometre band surrounding infected areas. According to Gál, these zones may by now cover<strong> 50–60 percent of Hungary’s roughly 56,000 hectares of vineyards</strong>.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>“What we’re seeing is the tip of the iceberg,”</p>
</blockquote>



<p>said <strong>László Garamszegi</strong>, director general of the Centre for Ecological Research in Hungary, about the epidemic. Vines infected with the phytoplasma can go a long time <strong>without showing symptoms </strong>while the pathogen is still present, and PCR tests are not always sensitive enough to detect the infection. </p>



<p>Meanwhile, to support control efforts in Hungary and track where the infection is appearing, Nébih released a modern, interactive map on 2 June. In July, the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy, led by Szabolcs Bóna, amended a decree so that compensation can be claimed more than once. And a legal amendment passed by parliament in October makes it easier to <strong>grub up neglected vineyards</strong>, which can act as sources of infection.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Everyone thought it wouldn’t happen to us</h2>



<p>Flavescence dorée, which sharply reduces grape yields, is <a href="https://portal.nebih.gov.hu/documents/10182/362862982/18_IKEA_Grapevine_Flavesc_doree_phytopla_2022.pdf">caused</a> by phytoplasma – the bacterium <em>Candidatus Phytoplasma vitis</em>, a parasite of the plant’s phloem. In white-berried varieties the infection turns the leaves yellow; in red varieties it turns them red. It often comes with the leaves rolling downward into a roughly triangular shape, and with stunted fruit development.</p>



<ul>
<li class="has-medium-font-size"><strong>In Austria</strong>, the infection was <a href="https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20110117_OTS0070/ages-die-goldgelbe-vergilbung-der-rebe-breitet-sich-aus" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">first detected</a> in 2009 in Tieschen, in southeastern Styria near the Slovenian border.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">Nébih’s predecessor began looking for symptoms of flavescence dorée <strong>in Hungarian</strong> vineyards as early as the 1990s, and the pathogen was <a href="https://portal.nebih.gov.hu/nebih_wire_nyito/-/asset_publisher/hHkpthMAWS95/content/szolo-aranyszinu-sargasag-grapevine-flavescence-doree/maximized" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">first detected</a> in 2013 in Lenti, in Zala County.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">Local quarantine measures were imposed because of the phytoplasma, which probably came over from Slovenia. In June 2014 Nébih drew up a plant health <a href="https://portal.nebih.gov.hu/documents/10182/21468/FD_KeSZENLeTI_terv_Final_honlap.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">contingency plan</a> to stop the disease from spreading.</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size"><strong>In Romania</strong>, flavescence dorée was officially detected in vineyards for the first time in 2021, in Botoșani County in the country’s far northeast.</li>
</ul>



<p>The bacterium is spread by an invasive insect introduced to Europe, the <strong>American grapevine leafhopper</strong> (<em>Scaphoideus titanus</em>), <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0036882&amp;type=printable&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">first spotted</a> on the continent in 1958 in vineyards in southwestern France. In Hungary the leafhopper was found in 2006, and a nationwide survey of its populations was launched in 2007.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>“For the epidemic to take off, an introduced vector had to turn up alongside a native pathogen. It was like bringing together two components of an adhesive,”</p>
</blockquote>



<p>says <strong>Ferenc Samu</strong>, research professor at the Hungarian HUN-REN Centre for Agricultural Research. The result was a gradual, then increasingly conspicuous spread of the pathogen through Hungarian vineyards. The outbreak likely began to escalate around 2023, and weather factors, including a wetter spring, may have contributed to the wave of disease that drew so much attention in 2025. According to Ákos Molnár, Italy’s experience in the 1990s meant that all the information about the threat posed by the disease was already available. “But everyone in Hungary thought it wouldn’t happen to us,” he says.</p>



<p>In Europe, the leafhopper depends on the grapevine for both feeding and reproduction: it lays its eggs in cracks in the vine’s perennial woody parts. After hatching in spring, the young pass through five nymphal stages (L1–L5). The adults – far more mobile than the nymphs, and therefore more efficient at spreading the infection – appear in July.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="770" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-1024x770.jpg" alt="
59
American grapevine leafhopper, vector of the Flavescence dorée epidemic" class="wp-image-61772" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-1024x770.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-300x226.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-295x222.jpg 295w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-768x578.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-750x564.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca-1140x858.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/amerikai_szolokaboca.jpg 1320w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">American grapevine leafhopper on a grapevine leaf. Yerpo/Wikimedia</figcaption></figure>



<p>Climate change, along with changes in land use and farming practices, has created more favourable conditions in Hungary for non-native species such as the American grapevine leafhopper, László Garamszegi says, while tourism and trade make it easier for invasive species to enter the country.</p>



<p>At the same time, over the past 10–15 years<strong> insecticide use has disappeared</strong> from routine grape growing, and <strong>leafhopper numbers have climbed</strong>.</p>



<p>According to Gergely Tholt, an engineer at the Plant Protection Institute of the HUN-REN Centre for Agricultural Research, for much of the 2010s even mass appearances of leafhoppers caused no problems, because the insects were not infected. Once that changed, even a handful of infected individuals could do devastating damage. And because of the infection’s incubation period, the leafhopper could spread the phytoplasma from plant to plant as much as a year before symptoms appeared.</p>



<p>The long symptomless period may have lulled growers into a<strong> false sense of security</strong>: they did not see right away that trouble was coming, even as the infection was already spreading.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<div class="jeg_video_container jeg_video_content"><iframe loading="lazy" title="„Várod a darálógépet, hogy jöjjön legyalulni, ami még megmaradt“" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hVA5_FsqyYw?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
</div></figure>



<p>According to László Garamszegi, exactly how the phytoplasma spreads between vineyards is still an open question. It can be carried by the leafhopper itself, but also by other insects, and there are other host plants that may help it move between vineyards. The pathogen can also enter a vineyard through infected propagation material. In the current epidemic, Molnár sees infected vines and the leafhoppers as the bigger risks for the disease’s spread. </p>



<p>This year, Romania’s plant health authority <strong><a href="https://anfdf.ro/flavescenta-aurie-precizari-dupa-reactiile-viticultorilor/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">blamed infected propagation material</a></strong> for the disease reaching distant areas. Within the European Union, shipments of propagation material must carry a plant passport, but this certificate does not guarantee that they are free of infection.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The fight against flavescence dorée rests on three main pillars:</h2>



<ul>
<li class="has-medium-font-size">detecting and removing infected vines as early as possible,</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">killing the American grapevine leafhopper with insecticides,</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">guaranteeing that propagation material is free of infection.</li>
</ul>



<p>How well insecticides work depends heavily on how, and at what point in the year, <strong>spraying</strong> is done: Hungary’s Nébih considers it justified to start as early as May, when the first nymphal stage (L1) appears.</p>



<p>Because vines need to be sprayed precisely and at close range, experts say the helicopter spraying carried out in Hungary in autumn 2025 did not amount to genuine control.</p>



<p>According to Gergely Tholt, the response was also held back by the misconception that the epidemic could be managed by spraying alone, when <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/410878766_A_fitoplazma_ugyeben_-_Gyakorlatorientalt_kutatas-fejlesztesi_iranyok_melyek_hozzajarulhatnak_a_hazai_szolo-bor_agazatot_veszelyezteto_aranyszinu_sargasag_jarvany_megfekezesehez" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">spotting and removing diseased plants</a> as early as possible is just as crucial. </p>



<p>Most experts say <strong>abandoned or poorly tended vineyards</strong> act as reservoirs for the pathogen and therefore pose a significant risk of infection. Clearing and managing them has been a key priority since last year. In Austria, the authorities in Burgenland alone sent 300 notices in 2026 to owners who had neglected their vineyards.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="751" height="273" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fitoplazma_tunetek.jpg" alt="Symptoms of flavescence dorée" class="wp-image-61781" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fitoplazma_tunetek.jpg 751w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fitoplazma_tunetek-300x109.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 751px) 100vw, 751px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Symptoms of flavescence dorée</figcaption></figure>



<p>Plant pathologist <strong>Terézia Dula</strong>, speaking to Qubit, called for an assessment of how great a risk of infection abandoned vineyards pose.</p>



<p>Although the Austrian state provides no support for clearing infected areas, the authorities do take grubbing-up seriously. Under a Burgenland regulation in force since May this year, growers in areas declared infected zones <strong>must remove symptomatic vines</strong> and spray at least twice. Anyone who receives a notice to uproot their vines and fails to comply <strong>faces a fine</strong> of up to €6,000 per hectare.</p>



<p>“The authorities now have to enforce this strictly,” says Burgenland winemaker Mathias Jalits. “And maybe we also need a precedent – someone actually having to pay the fine.”</p>



<p>As of September 2026, no one in Burgenland had been fined, the state told DOSSIER. Even tougher measures were floated in Styria, where the state agriculture minister spoke in May of possible fines of €30,000.</p>



<p>DOSSIER found, however, that the fines actually imposed fell far short of that: in southeastern Styria, 21 fines were issued in 2025 and 2026, only one of which exceeded €1,000; all the others ranged from €100 to €350.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Hungary’s plant protection network was dismantled, and no one actively searched for diseased vines</h2>



<p>In Hungary, the authority can order the removal of vines in infected areas, and impose a 1-kilometre quarantine zone, only once a case has been confirmed by laboratory testing. Nébih says that even before the epidemic surged in 2025, it was actively monitoring the disease’s spread in Hungary through a trap network for assessing leafhopper infestation, official field inspections, laboratory PCR diagnostics and an inspection system for propagation material.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>“There was no active search for diseased vines,”</p>
</blockquote>



<p><strong>Gergely Tholt</strong> says of the 2013–2024 period, during which Nébih’s monitoring ran on low sample numbers. That was no accident.</p>



<p>“They dismantled the plant protection network. There aren’t enough specialists, and there’s no laboratory capacity either,” Terézia Dula told Qubit in the spring. Back in 2016, she had already sounded dire warnings in the trade magazine <em>Bor és Piac </em>about the threat posed by flavescence dorée.</p>



<p>According to Nébih’s response to Qubit&#8217;s freedom-of-information request, between 2013 and 2017 the number of samples tested rose from 377 to 2,889, and the number of positive samples from 37 to 401. The share of positive samples peaked in 2021, when 36 percent of the samples tested proved infected. The number of tests then fell considerably, hovering around 1,000 a year in 2022–2024, before rising sharply last year to a record 3,682.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="751" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-1024x751.png" alt="Flavescența dorée tests in Hungary" class="wp-image-61862" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-1024x751.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-300x220.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-768x563.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-1536x1126.png 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-750x550.png 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en-1140x836.png 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_hungary_en.png 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p></p>



<p>Although mobile laboratories in Gyöngyös and Miskolc were brought into the effort in autumn 2025, <strong>only one accredited laboratory in Hungary</strong> can detect the phytoplasma to this day: Nébih’s National Plant Health Reference Laboratory. (The Soil and Plant Testing Laboratory at the John von Neumann University’s Faculty of Horticulture and Rural Development is in the preparatory phase of accreditation, which it is expected to obtain early next year.)</p>



<p>According to Ákos Molnár, detecting flavescence dorée – from sampling through laboratory testing to the issuing of an official order – sometimes took several months. All the while, the infected plant stayed in the vineyard, where it could keep spreading the disease.</p>



<p>In response to our freedom-of-information request, Nébih said that in March this year its laboratory testing capacity was 400 samples a month. Since autumn 2025 it has expanded its PCR diagnostic capacity and has also brought in drones fitted with AI-based recognition systems to help find infected vineyards. Of the 56,000 hectares of officially registered vineyards, 8,000 hectares were covered by in-person inspection, while vineyards larger than 80 hectares were assessed by drone, Péter Gál told Qubit.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="751" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-1024x751.png" alt="Flavescența dorée tests in Austria" class="wp-image-61865" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-1024x751.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-300x220.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-768x563.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-1536x1126.png 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-750x550.png 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en-1140x836.png 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_austria_en.png 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p></p>



<p>In Austria, AGES (the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety) has been responsible for collecting and analysing samples since the disease was first detected in 2009. A sharp increase in the number of samples submitted was recorded in 2025, with<strong> a new record of 697 samples reached in 2026</strong>. However, FD was detected less frequently than in the previous year. How can this be explained given the disease&#8217;s continued spread?</p>



<p>According to the AGES, “surveillance has been extended to areas where the FD epidemic is still at an early stage and where only isolated cases have been detected so far.” In other words, no further samples were collected in heavily affected areas because the presence of FD was already well established. This means that the 2026 figures do not, in fact, reflect the actual situation on the ground.</p>



<p><strong>In Romania</strong>, in 2021 – the year the infection was detected – the national plant health authority <strong>(ANF) carried out four tests (yes, four)</strong>, one of which came back positive, according to figures Átlátszó Erdély obtained through a freedom-of-information request.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="751" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-1024x751.png" alt="Flavescența dorée tests in Romania" class="wp-image-61868" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-1024x751.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-300x220.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-768x563.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-1536x1126.png 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-750x550.png 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en-1140x836.png 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/fd_tests_romania_en.png 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p></p>



<p>The authority took on responsibility for monitoring flavescence dorée when Romania joined the EU in 2007. Its public reports suggest that it was tracking the disease in the 2010s, but it is unknown how large an area it inspected or how many samples it tested. In 2026 the authority stepped up not only its communications but also its testing: by early autumn this year it had carried out 476 tests, 44 of which were positive.</p>



<p>In 2025, <strong>Hungary tested eight times as many samples, even though its vineyard area is a third the size of Romania’s</strong>. The two countries do have one thing in common: like Hungary, Romania has only a single accredited laboratory, near Bucharest, that can detect flavescence dorée by PCR testing.</p>



<p>The Romanian authority said, however, that it has expanded testing capacity over the past three years and can now carry out 100 tests a month. In a country where <strong>grapes are grown on 165,000 hectares</strong> and the plant health authority’s local offices have 265 staff, suspected infected areas are inspected on foot; no drones or remote sensing are used. According to the latest agricultural census, more than half a million farms in Romania grew grapes, a third of them on less than half a hectare – meaning the overstretched authorities would need to get information about phytoplasma to at least half a million people.</p>



<p><strong>Romania’s rules set no penalties</strong> for growers who fail to report a suspected infection. According to Romania’s plant health authority, introducing them is not warranted, since growers cannot confirm the presence of the phytoplasma with a test themselves.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Neither nurseries nor growers want to pay for the treatment that guarantees infection-free propagation material</h2>



<p>Flavescence dorée can spread through infected propagation material, yet replanting the vineyards grubbed up because of the epidemic is sharply increasing demand for that material. Nébih regards the mandatory official inspections, laboratory tests and plant health certification in propagation material production as an important part of the epidemic response. </p>



<p>Others would go further. The method recommended by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for making propagation material infection-free is hot water treatment, an effective process that kills the phytoplasma. It is widely used across Europe but only sporadically in Hungary, and according to a statement Nébih made in May, suitable procedures for Hungarian grape varieties <a href="https://portal.nebih.gov.hu/-/beszamolo-a-szolo-aranyszinu-sargasagra-fokuszalo-nemzetkozi-konferenciarol" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">are still being worked out</a>.</p>



<p>Ákos Molnár, who is also vice-president of the Hungarian Association of Grapevine Propagation Material Producers, named two main reasons why the method has not caught on: <strong>few heat treatment machines</strong> are available, and the<strong> high cost of treatment</strong> falls on the producers of propagation material.</p>



<p>Ákos Molnár is also managing director of Teleki Kober Szőlőoltvány Kft., a grafted-vine nursery that owns one of Hungary’s two certified heat treatment machines. In his experience the method can work, but because of the risk of damaging the plants and the costs involved, he considers heat treatment justified only when the propagation material is at risk – for example, if it comes from a nursery suspected of infection.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="576" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-1024x576.jpg" alt="Vineyard affected by flavescence dorée" class="wp-image-61794" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-300x169.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-768x432.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-1536x864.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-750x422.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4-1140x641.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit4.jpg 1920w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">A vineyard plot with gaps on Szent György Hill. Photo: Zsuzsi Kun/Qubit</figcaption></figure>



<p>Terézia Dula would require all producers of propagation material to use hot water treatment, which the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO) also explicitly recommends for freeing material of phytoplasma and producing disease-free stock. The high cost of buying and running the machines pushes up the price of propagation material, but according to Ákos Molnár, growers are unwilling to pay the extra cost. Drawing on examples from abroad, he therefore proposes state subsidies for buying heat treatment machines, state-owned machines, or a system of machines bought and run jointly by producers.</p>



<p>According to Molnár, in recent years growers had no incentive to report the appearance of flavescence dorée because of the quarantine measures, the mandatory grubbing-up and the mountain of paperwork that came with them – and so the infection was able to spread from one vineyard to the next.</p>



<p>That is why, following Italian and French examples, they pushed for setting up <strong>inspection teams</strong>, which are organised and coordinated by the National Council of Wine Communities.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="576" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-1024x576.jpg" alt="Vines infected by flavescence dorée" class="wp-image-61812" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-300x169.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-768x432.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-1536x864.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-750x422.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3-1140x641.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/qubit3.jpg 1920w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Infected vines at the Gilvesy estate, on Szent György Hill. Photo: Zsuzsi Kun/Qubit</figcaption></figure>



<p><strong>In Romania, there is no comparably organised and coordinated framework</strong> for regional cooperation – and so none for fighting flavescence dorée either. Stefan Polgar, who runs the Cluj-Napoca agricultural university’s 65-hectare teaching vineyard in Sibiu County, told Átlátszó Erdély that</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>phytoplasma is already present all over Romania; growers are simply afraid to talk about it openly because they don’t know what will happen to their vineyards.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>Stefan Polgar himself called inspectors out to the teaching farm in August over a suspected infection, but by October he still had not been told the test results. Csaba Lengyel, a winemaker from Săcueni (Székelyhíd), also called in the plant health authority himself after symptoms of flavescence dorée appeared on his estate.</p>



<p>The lab test did not detect the phytoplasma, but he decided to grub up 250 vines anyway – and those plots will not bear grapes again for at least five years.</p>



<p>Romania’s ethnic Hungarian winemakers only sat up and took notice a year or two ago, when their counterparts in Hungary started telling them about flavescence dorée, said winemaker <strong>Géza Balla</strong>, head of the Association of Transylvanian Hungarian Winemakers – something a dozen winemakers confirmed to Átlátszó Erdély. In the spring, Dorin Popa, a retired agronomist from the University of Oradea, had not yet seen a similar sense of alarm among ethnic Romanian winemakers.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Tisza government has sped up the response; in Austria and Romania, growers get no meaningful compensation</h2>



<p>Around 50–60 percent of Hungary’s roughly 56,000 hectares of vineyards is now either infected or inside a buffer zone, Péter Gál said on <a href="https://qubit.hu/2026/10/03/veszelyben-a-magyar-szoloteruletek-fele-a-fitoplazma-ellen-minden-gazdara-szukseg-lesz" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Qubit’s podcast</a> in early October.</p>



<p>What’s more, the trend shows no sign of slowing: according to the most pessimistic forecasts, <strong>30–50 percent of Hungary’s vineyards could be lost to the infection</strong> and to poor management, says viticulturist and winemaker Bence Csizmadia, wine range development manager at the wine merchant Bortársaság.</p>



<p>The authorities began to take the fight against the disease seriously in 2024, and in autumn 2025 the then agriculture ministry set up a working group, coordinated by Péter Gál, to tackle the situation. Twelve years after the infection appeared, Nébih set up a working group of its own. Of its work, Róbert Tarsoly, president of the Zala Wine Region Council, said in the spring that</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>expert backed, issue-focused proposals routinely got stuck at the level of the authorities and the ministry’s political decision-makers.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>Based on <a href="https://hnt.hu/hirek/tajekoztatas-a-szolo-aranyszinu-sargasag-elleni-vedekezes-es-a-kapcsolodo-tamogatasok-szabalyainak-valtozasairol" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">proposals</a> drawn up jointly by the National Council of Wine Communities and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy, in July the threshold for mandatory removal of an entire vineyard was lowered from 30 to 20 percent, compensation for a given vineyard became claimable more than once, and the maximum area eligible for pesticide subsidies was raised from 20 to 40 hectares. </p>



<p>The Hungarian growers who spoke to Qubit are still not satisfied, but<strong> the Austrian state treats its grape growers even more harshly</strong>: according to DOSSIER, growers receive no compensation whatsoever for grubbing up infected vines.<strong> In Romania</strong>, meanwhile, small growers complain that the agriculture ministry has not announced any <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/romanian-farmers-subsidies-impact-agriculture/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">compensation scheme</a>, while in 2024 the lion’s share of <strong>replanting subsidies went to a single grape grower</strong>.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<div class="jeg_video_container jeg_video_content"><iframe loading="lazy" title="„Ha az elmúlt éveket veszem alapul, akkor ez egy Armageddon&quot;" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/iVKbhG-M12I?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
</div></figure>



<p>In Hungary, the ministry proposed a further legal amendment in August to tighten the fight against the phytoplasma, which parliament<a href="https://jogaszvilag.hu/napi/torvenygyar-az-orszaggyulesben-az-aranyszinu-sargasagtol-a-baszna-ugy-karrendezeseig/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"> passed on</a> 13 October. The amendment places particular emphasis on making it easier to grub up neglected plots that act as hotspots of infection. In practice, this means that infected vines on ownerless or state-owned vineyard holdings can be removed within about two months of being reported. The process remains lengthy: it begins with field surveys and continues with the testing of suspect samples – and the administrative apparatus that carries it out is fragmented and decentralised.</p>



<p>“There are nineteen government commissioners in the nineteen government offices. There are nineteen legal advisers, and despite Nébih’s professional oversight, nineteen different approaches to a single problem,” says Molnár.</p>



<p>Both Péter Gál and Ákos Molnár acknowledged that the authorities bore significant responsibility for the late start of the fight against the phytoplasma. Although the ministry has taken a more active role over the past two years, Nébih – which is responsible for testing infected vines and designating buffer zones – still suffers from a shortage of capacity and staff. Among the latest administrative developments is a mobile app developed at the initiative of the National Council of Wine Communities. It could be made available to users, but according to Molnár, the authorities first have to overcome the data protection hurdles that come with it.</p>



<p>The president of the Sopron wine region said the app would support the control process with two functions. First, uncultivated vineyards could be reported with a georeferenced photo, sparing the authorities a site visit. Second, symptomatic vines could be flagged and documented. Although the Tisza government tightened the response to flavescence dorée further after taking office, the disease’s consequences reach beyond politics and beyond any one government’s term in office.</p>



<p>The winemakers and experts Qubit spoke to were unanimous that <strong>growers who cultivate grapes as a hobby</strong> – or who do not supply the broader market – could easily be squeezed out by the extra costs and technical burdens flavescence dorée brings.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">We have to learn to live with it</h2>



<p>Based on last year’s experience, Gergely Tholt and Ferenc Samu believe Hungary may still be in the early phase of the flavescence dorée surge. They expect the situation to get even worse this year and next. In Burgenland, meanwhile, experts at the federal Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), which monitors the spread of the American grapevine leafhopper, found 262 leafhoppers in their traps at one monitoring site last year, but only 32 this year, and saw a similar downward trend in southeastern Styria. In Romania, it is not yet clear whether the greater attention flavescence dorée has received this year will spur growers to organise themselves and fight back more effectively.</p>



<p>According to László Garamszegi, given Hungary’s geographic position, nothing could have stopped the invasive American grapevine leafhopper – the phytoplasma’s vector – from arriving around 2006. The authorities could, however, have responded early: an effective monitoring system could have softened the impact. Yet even 20 years after the leafhopper was first found in Hungary, no such system has been built.</p>



<p>Terézia Dula believes control measures should have been made mandatory as soon as the American grapevine leafhopper became established in Hungary. In her view, this could have stopped flavescence dorée from getting out of hand.</p>



<p>The same factors that let the flavescence dorée epidemic worsen beneath the surface for years – from a lack of state capacity to the looking-away Ákos Molnár describes – resurface in how even more consequential threats are handled. Think of the Covid pandemic, the <a href="https://qubit.hu/2024/11/29/mar-magyarorszagon-is-nyomon-kovetik-hogy-fertoz-e-emlosoket-a-h5n1-madarinfluenza" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">global spread of H5N1</a> bird flu and its <a href="https://qubit.hu/2025/01/06/egy-kanadai-kislany-tulelte-a-h5n1-madarinfluenzat-de-az-amerikai-kormany-egyre-jobban-aggodik-a-virus-miatt" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">adaptation to mammals</a>, or climate change.</p>



<p>The goal is no longer to eliminate the pathogen – that is now definitely impossible – but to push it back as far as possible, says Róbert Tarsoly.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>“We’ll have to live with both the leafhopper and the phytoplasma for the long term,”</p>
</blockquote>



<p>says László Garamszegi as well. That calls for a new long-term vineyard management strategy, one that integrates the fight against flavescence dorée with defences against other risks. “Eradication is no longer possible,” agrees Helga Reisenzein of the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES). “Sooner or later, we’ll have to learn to live with it.”</p>



<p>The future of Hungarian, Austrian and Romanian vineyards now hinges on whether we can.</p>



<p><em>Cover photo: Edit Éva Pál</em></p>



<p><em>This article was produced in collaboration between Qubit, 444, Átlátszó Erdély, and DOSSIER, with the support of Journalismfund Europe. Contributing journalists: András Tóth, Sarolta Kuglics (Qubit), Albert Gazda (444), Tünde Szabó (Átlátszó Erdély), and Elisa Tomaselli (DOSSIER).</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="482" height="165" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Journalismfund-logo.jpg" alt="Journalismfund Europe" class="wp-image-57435" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Journalismfund-logo.jpg 482w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Journalismfund-logo-300x103.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 482px) 100vw, 482px" /></figure>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/flavescence-doree-hungarys-austria-romania/">Flavescence dorée has devastated Hungary&#8217;s vineyards and quietly threatens those in Romania as well</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why Is It Worth Subsidizing The Farmers?</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Szabó Tünde]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 14:21:58 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>„Hey you, there&#8217;s a bustard sitting by himself, beakunder wing in his dejection. Does he cower, or hashe croaked? Let&#8217;s see if he can fly. We&#8217;ve got to beatthe fence around him!&#8221; We are all familiar with this group provocation aimed at terrorizing Miklós Toldi; János Arany’s narrative poem was required reading in school. Many [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/romanian-farmers-subsidies-impact-agriculture/">Why Is It Worth Subsidizing The Farmers?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p></p>



<ul class="has-medium-font-size">
<li class="has-medium-font-size">Romanian agriculture is the most fragmented in the European Union in every respect: <strong>90% of farms cultivate less than 5 hectares</strong>. The remaining 10% of farms cultivate more than three-quarters of Romania’s total agricultural area.</li>
</ul>



<ul class="has-medium-font-size">
<li class="has-medium-font-size">Half of the 2.8 million farms are excluded from state and EU subsidies because they cultivate less than one hectare of land.</li>
</ul>



<ul class="has-medium-font-size">
<li class="has-medium-font-size">The fact that all subsidies depend on the size of the cultivated area demonstrably increases the number and size of medium and large farms. This also increases the amount of subsidies they receive each year.</li>
</ul>



<ul class="has-medium-font-size">
<li class="has-medium-font-size">Romania claims that it does not support farms with huge amounts of public money only to make them more profitable. However, the figures prove the opposite. They show that <strong>fewer and fewer farmers receive more and more money</strong>, small farmers receive less and less money, young farmers are only now beginning to be really encouraged and a lot of money is flowing into green projects that require little effort.</li>
</ul>



<p><em>„Hey you, there&#8217;s a bustard sitting by himself, beak<br>under wing in his dejection. Does he cower, or has<br>he croaked? Let&#8217;s see if he can fly. We&#8217;ve got to beat<br>the fence around him!&#8221;</em></p>



<p>We are all familiar with this group provocation aimed at terrorizing Miklós Toldi; <a href="https://magyar-irodalom.elte.hu/sulinet/igyjo/setup/portrek/arany/tharmadi.htm" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">János Arany’s narrative poem</a> was required reading in school. Many of us learnt fragments from it by heart. We are aware of the great bustard metaphor by which György Toldi referred to his younger brother Miklós. <strong>But we don’t really know what a bustard looks like.</strong> This large bird is almost extinct in Romania. Yet even at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was a common sight in the area around Salonta, where Arany lived and wrote Toldi 180 years ago.</p>



<p>Agricultural subsidies have led to the return of the great bustard to Salonta: a major farmer in Salonta <a href="https://www.dropia.eu/gb/articles/talking-with-a-bustard-friendly-farmer" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>noticed the potential</u></a> in the bustard protection program. He turned 90 hectares of poor-quality arable land into grassland and only mowed it after the bird’s breeding season ended. Together with the basic subsidy, this brought him 2000 lei per hectare, which was worth it for him.</p>



<p>As a result of years of effort by the Milvus Group, the Ministry of Agriculture launched a bustard protection program in 2018. The biologists with Milvus <a href="https://milvus.ro/hu/amikor-eltunik-a-tamogatas-es-vele-egyutt-a-tuzok-is/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">watched more and more birds</a> in this area. The ministry <a href="https://www.madr.ro/docs/dezvoltare-rurala/agro-mediu/2024/Ghid-M10-2024.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">announced</a> this subsidy in 2024 , but no longer in 2025. The farmer in Salonta who applied for it and was so proud that people could see bustards on his land, sowed the field with winter wheat.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="662" height="430" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Tuzok_Nagy-Attila_Milvus.jpg" alt="Great bustard near Salonta, left without subsidies" class="wp-image-58528" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Tuzok_Nagy-Attila_Milvus.jpg 662w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Tuzok_Nagy-Attila_Milvus-300x195.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 662px) 100vw, 662px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Great bustard near Salonta | Photo: Attila Nagy, Milvus Group</figcaption></figure>



<p>Compared to the others, this was a small subsidy package, but it highlighted the biggest problems with agricultural subsidies in Romania:</p>



<ul>
<li class="has-medium-font-size">few farmers could apply for it (it was launched only in 19 municipalities, near the birds’ habitat in Hungary),</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">it was worth applying for only by big farms,</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">and the ministry stopped it without even notifying the bird protection association that had worked out the professional background.</li>
</ul>



<p>However, Milvus put a lot of work into ensuring that its grassland conservation proposals were included in Romania&#8217;s new agricultural strategy, replied biologist Attila Nagy, working for Milvus, in response to our inquiry.</p>



<p>Since joining the EU in 2007, Romania has spent €45 billion in public funds on supporting farmers and rural development. This represents at least 44% of the EU funds received by the country. The agricultural subsidies from the EU are<a href="https://startupcafe.ro/fonduri-europene-cati-bani-pompat-uniunea-europeana-agricultura-romaneasca-pana-25786" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u> higher and higher</u></a>:</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-text-color has-link-color" style="color:#5d5959"><tbody><tr><td>Pre-accession funds:</td><td>€ 2,75 billion</td></tr><tr><td>Payments from the budget for 2007–2013 until 31 December 2023:</td><td>€ 14.9 billion</td></tr><tr><td>Payments from the budget for 2014–2020 until 31 December 2023:</td><td>€ 24.1 billion</td></tr><tr><td>Payments for 2024:</td><td>€3.3 billion</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total by the end of 2024:</strong></td><td><strong>€45 billion</strong></td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p>Subsidies for farmers amount to around <a href="https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/financing/cap-expenditure_hu" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>one quarter</u></a> of the overall EU budget according to the <strong>Common Agricultural Policy</strong> (CAP). The main goal of the CAP is to provide farmers with income support so that they continue to cultivate the land and produce food despite the constant fluctuations in harvests caused by weather and climate crises and despite the fact that they could earn much more elsewhere. Ten years ago, the average agricultural income in the EU was only 40% of the average income, but <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/policies/the-common-agricultural-policy-explained/#need" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">by 2022 it had risen to 60%</a>. In Romania, it is especially true that the rural population is <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099947310032221372/pdf/P1741810b9338a0440a09e01085e5ad116c.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">much poorer</a> than the urban population.</p>



<p>The CAP also aims to ensure that we eat better quality and healthier food that <strong>we can afford</strong>. It therefore seeks to compensate for the fact that producing tasty vegetables and fruit with fewer chemicals is more expensive. From 2021, its explicit goal will be climate and environmental protection, which is why it is now allocating a lot of money to soil-friendly cultivation, biodiversity conservation, and habitat protection and restoration.</p>



<p>Each Member State had to draw up a detailed plan setting out what it wanted to achieve with these billions from the Common Agricultural Policy during the seven-year budget periods. Romania developed a rural development plan, abbreviated as PNDR, for the 2014–2020 budget period, and <a href="https://apia.org.ro/planul-national-strategic-2023-2027-pns-al-romaniei/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>National Agricultural Strategy</u></a> abbreviated as PNS, for the 2023–2027 period.</p>



<p>Of course, there was some delay: the PNDR started in 2015 in terms of payments and even the 2023 payments were covered by the budget of this plan. Romania completed its new agricultural strategy by the end of 2022 and its name includes the period 2023–2027. After the transitional year of 2024, most of this year&#8217;s payments will already fit into the individual programs of this strategy.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why should we deal with agriculture</h2>



<p>besides being fond of good eats and excursions in the countryside? Because literally more than half of Romania’s surface is agricultural land. Of the country&#8217;s 23.8 million hectares, 14 million hectares are considered agricultural land, of which 12.7 million are considered agriculturally utilized.</p>



<p>We should focus on agriculture because <strong>millions of people in Romania still make their living from farming</strong>, while the entire sector is undergoing radical change before our very eyes. Fifteen years ago, one third of the population was directly involved in farming; now it is a quarter.</p>



<p>The agricultural census of 2010 counted 7.1 million people who were involved in some kind of agricultural work. Of these, more than four million worked less than 100 days a year, meaning that farming was not their main occupation, but they did participate in agriculture. In 2020, only <a href="https://insse.ro/cms/sites/default/files/field/publicatii/rga2020vol1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>4.5 million people</u></a> were farming, with three million working part-time: less than 100 days a year.</p>



<p>The <strong>mechanization</strong> <strong>of the agricultural sector, the depopulation and aging of rural areas</strong> are further reflected in the fact that the number of people actually employed in the sector has fallen by two-thirds. While the total number of employees in Romania fell by nearly 9% between 2013 and 2022, the number of employees in agriculture fell by nearly 66%, according to this <a href="https://managementjournal.usamv.ro/pdf/vol.23_4/Art39.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>agricultural study</u></a>, which summarizes the sector&#8217;s performance between 2013 and 2022. The 2.5 million people employed in agriculture shrank to 878,000 in ten years.</p>



<p>We often talk (and write) about education or healthcare as issues that concern society as a whole. We all went to school, many of us teach and many of us have children in schools. We have opinions about it and want to have a say in what happens in schools. Similarly, we all eat, which means we are customers of agriculture, and millions of people farm.</p>



<p>In the past years, the ministry of education only spent <a href="https://romania.europalibera.org/a/bugetul-educatiei-2023/32165896.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>two</u></a>, at best <a href="https://static.anaf.ro/rapfxb/LOT444/20231231_FXB-EXB-901_TREZ700_13729380_13729380_01_60322178.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>three times</u></a> more on our entire educational system than the amount the flowed into one productive sector, namely to agriculture and rural development (RON 30-46 billion <em>vs</em> RON 15-17 billion per year). The expenditures in education reached <a href="https://static.anaf.ro/rapfxb/LOT539/20241231_FXB-EXB-901_TREZ700_13729380_13729380_01_87776833.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>four times</u></a> the amount of agricultural subsidies in 2024.</p>



<p>Compared to education, we don&#8217;t talk about agriculture half as much or even a quarter as much, at least not as a matter of concern for society as a whole. Meanwhile, it is rapidly changing and transforming the landscape we call our homeland.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">There are one million less consumer. But how come?</h2>



<p>While in 2010 there were 20.1 million people living in Romania, in 2020 there were only 19 million, according to official census data. (We have written <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/politika/hirek/nepszamlalas-romania-elozetes-magyarok-romak-romanok-anyanyelv/"></a><a href="https://atlatszo.ro/politika/hirek/nepszamlalas-romania-elozetes-magyarok-romak-romanok-anyanyelv/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a> about why these figures do not reflect reality. But these are the official data, so we have to work with them.) This means that in the 2020s, there are at least one million less people eating in this country than in the 2010s.</p>



<p>At the same time, domestic agriculture is increasingly unable to meet our needs: we are importing more and more food, says Sorin Ionițescu’s aforementioned<a href="https://managementjournal.usamv.ro/pdf/vol.23_4/Art39.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u> study</u></a>. Let’s see how the Romanian agriculture performed between 2013–2022 when it was subsidized with roughly € 25 billion from public funds.</p>



<p>During this period, the total GDP grew by 121%, while the GDP generated by agriculture grew by 83%. Specifically, it grew from RON 34.42 billion to RON 63.04 billion, but at the same time, the share of the agricultural sector in the GDP fell from 5.4% to 4.5%.</p>



<p>In 2013, agriculture generated a GDP of RON 34.42 billion, with EU and Romanian <a href="https://www.apia.org.ro/files/pages_files/Raport_anual_de_activitate_2013.pdf">state subsidies amounting to RON 8.1 billion</a>. According to our calculations, EU and state subsidies contributed RON 15.5 billion to the 2022 GDP of RON 63.04 billion. <strong>This means that roughly a quarter of</strong> <strong>agriculture is financed by public funds</strong>.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron-1024x683.jpg" alt="We eat one million less, but we pay more for food in form of subsidies." class="wp-image-58536" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron-300x200.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron-768x512.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron.jpg 1350w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron-750x500.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Gulyas-Magyarokereken_Fetyko-Gabor-Aron-1140x760.jpg 1140w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Goulash at Alunișu, at the spring bioregional festival of ALPA Land for Life | Photo: Helga Tóth</figcaption></figure>



<p>Meanwhile the food prices in shops are high enough, so it is well worth importing many basic foodstuffs from abroad. While in the years following our accession to the EU, domestic products still accounted for over 80% of basic foodstuffs, by 2024 their share had fallen to 56% in grocery stores, according to<a href="https://cursdeguvernare.ro/raport-produsele-romanesti-au-o-pondere-de-521-in-retailul-modern-dar-si-un-adaos-comercial-mai-mare-evolutia-pietei-fmgc.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u> data</u></a> of the Competition Council.</p>



<p>Of the store chains’ own-brand products, which are typically the cheapest, less than half (48.8%) of food products were produced domestically. Even though transporting food from abroad inevitably increases its cost, it is still worthwhile importing staple foods into a country with a large and diverse agricultural sector.</p>



<p>In this increasingly competitive agricultural market, one thing has not changed in ten years: agriculture can produce four times as much with the public money flowing into it. The way food is produced and the food market itself have undergone a complete transformation. Production is much more concentrated: on increasingly large and sophisticated farms (as will be explained below), with a third of the number of legally paid workers. And we are exporting more and more food, but importing even more.</p>



<p>In the aforementioned period, between 2013–2022 the value of Romanian agricultural<strong> exports increased by 126%</strong>. Its share in total Romanian exports also increased from just under 11% to 13%. Meanwhile, however, the value of agricultural and food imports rose by 167% and their share in total domestic imports also increased from nearly 8.9% to 10.5%.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What are agricultural and rural development subsidies spent on?</h2>



<p>The Romanian agency that manages agricultural subsidies, APIA, paid EU subsidies to farmers in only ten different programs and packages in 2007, but now pays them in 109. The Romanian budget contributes around 5 percent to this.</p>



<p>The two major sources of EU subsidies are divided according to their intended use. The source of subsidies <strong>paid per hectare</strong> or based on the number of animals raised is called the<strong> Guarantee Fund</strong> (FEGA). This source accounts for about two-thirds of the subsidies paid nationally and is intended to supplement farmers’ incomes.</p>



<p>The other source is the <strong>Rural Development Fund</strong>, FEADR. Part of this is managed by APIA and part by AFIR. The AFIR acronym may be familiar from many rural investment information boards, as it covers a good third of payments, sometimes even more. This fund includes certain climate and environmental subsidies for farmers, but many food processing companies and rural guesthouses also apply for it.</p>



<p>In Romania, many rural companies receive development funds from this source even if <strong>they have nothing to do with food production</strong>. Many rural municipalities use this fund to pave roads or build sewage systems. Tourist information offices, which mushroomed in villages and then often closed down, were also set up with this fund.</p>



<p>The aim of the fund is to compensate to some extent for rural disadvantages: the lack of infrastructure, or its scarcity, or poor quality. As there are fewer and poorer consumers, rural companies are not as profitable and find it more difficult to obtain credit for development. The EU is trying to partially offset this with this fund.</p>



<p>The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development decides what yearly subsidies can be applied for in addition to the standard payments per hectare and per animal raised. Romania&#8217;s National Agricultural Strategy serves as a guideline in this regard: in principle, the programs announced are intended to promote the main objectives of the agricultural strategy.</p>



<p>The current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) encourages Member States to give equal weight to the economic, environmental and climate sustainability of farms when spending subsidies. Forty percent of subsidies for 2023–2027 <strong>must be spent on climate and environmental protection</strong>.</p>



<p>Member States must specify which funding programs (and the budget for each program) they intend to use to promote the profitability, modernization, environmental and economic resilience, and the size of the budget for each program has been largely left to the Member States by the European Commission in the CAP and budget period running until 2027.</p>



<p>The goals of environmental sustainability are shared: <strong>soil protection</strong>, <strong>water quality</strong> and <strong>biodiversity conservation</strong>. There are also many similarities in the good agricultural practices that preserve these important environmental conditions: crop rotation, ban on plowing permanent grasslands, and minimal disturbance of arable land.</p>



<p>To find out why it is not good to disturb the soil and how soil-friendly farming is related to biodiversity and crop yields, it is worth listening to Dutch teacher Marc Siepman, with whom we spoke this summer:</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<div class="jeg_video_container jeg_video_content"><iframe loading="lazy" title="Mit művelünk a lakható földfelszín felén?" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Ek660ujQ63Q?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
</div><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ek660ujQ63Q" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>What do we farm on half of the inhabitable face of the earth?</u></a></figcaption></figure>



<p>However, it is up to the Member States to decide, for example, what level of crop rotation or soil cover farmers must achieve in order to receive environmental subsidies. They also decide how much money to allocate to these funding programs.</p>



<p>These programs are usually announced for four to five years, depending on what the ministry has agreed with the European Commission. Our current agricultural strategy covers the period 2023–2027, but most of its funding programs were only announced in 2025.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How can farmers find out about what is fundable?</h2>



<p>Subsidies can be applied for during the spring months, from the first days of March until mid-May. APIA calls this the campaign period when its agents visit villages, meet with farmers at their county and local offices and inform them of any changes from the previous year, such as the discontinuation of an old subsidy line or the introduction of a new one. The most important information is also published in the daily and <strong>agricultural press</strong>.</p>



<p>However, <strong>meetings</strong> are also organized at various farmers&#8217; associations or public estates, where more farmers can be reached with this information, explained <strong>Florin Bota</strong>, deputy director of APIA in Cluj County. <strong>Leaflets</strong> summarizing the various subsidies are sent to all mayor’s offices where farmers can see, at least in principle, what they should apply for. The most important information about the announced funding and deadlines will be sent in a <strong>mass message</strong> to farmers whose phone numbers are listed in the payment agency&#8217;s system.</p>



<p>It is common for livestock farmers to obtain the important documents for their subsidy applications from a local livestock breeding association. Agricultural registrars at municipal mayor&#8217;s offices provide a great deal of assistance to crop farmers by helping them fill in the data and documents required for subsidies, so that farmers arrive at their nearest APIA office with a half-completed application, explained Florin Bota. This also helps APIA staff, because there are a lot of farmers in Cluj County, with about 600 farmers being assessed by one agency staff during the relatively short two to two-and-a-half-month application period, said the deputy director.</p>



<p>It is no longer very common in Cluj County for new farmers who have not previously been in the system to apply for subsidies for several hectares, replied Deputy Director Bota with an indulgent smile when asked how a new farmer can find out what subsidies they are eligible for.</p>



<p>However, Florin Bota acknowledged that the size, language and complexity of the guidelines detailing the conditions for various subsidies, which previously exceeded 100 pages, may limit farmers’ access to subsidies. Many of them probably do not have the patience to read and understand 30-60 such pages. In addition, there are <a href="https://www.madr.ro/masuri-si-interventii-de-mediu-clima-si-bunastarea-animalelor/materiale-de-informare/masuri-si-interventii-de-mediu-clima-si-bunastarea-animalelor-2024.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">dozens of such guides</a> for environmental and climate protection programs alone.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What do farmers need to be eligible for subsidies?</h2>



<p>In addition to the subsidy application, you will of course need to provide your ID card, proof of your bank account and, if you operate your farm as a sole trader or company, proof from the trade registry that the main activity of your business is agriculture. If you only cultivate your own land, you must provide an extract from the land register to prove that it is yours. If you also cultivate other people’s land, the mayor&#8217;s office will certify, based on its own agricultural records, which and how large a plot of land you also work on. The competent veterinarian will issue a certificate stating what kind of livestock a farmer keeps.</p>



<p>The mayor&#8217;s offices manage the <strong>agricultural record</strong>, which is not the same as the land register. This record does not contain ownership rights and history related to land, but rather who cultivates the plots belonging to the municipalities. If someone cultivates land that is not or not only their own, the clearest solution is to conclude a lease agreement with the owner of the land they cultivate and present this to the mayor&#8217;s office when requesting a certificate for the parcel in question.</p>



<p>In most mayor&#8217;s offices, this register is a paper-based list and there is great resistance to digitizing it and sharing it with other offices, according to a source who has previously worked with several offices.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">This is how you apply for public money</h2>



<p>Farmers applying for support take these certificates to their nearest APIA office, where the official who registers the application in the APIA system will tell the farmer what other types of support they can receive for that area and crop or pasture, in addition to the basic support per hectare, if they meet certain conditions, explained Florin Bota, deputy director of APIA in Cluj County.</p>



<p>They discuss with the farmer what conditions he meets and then check off in the system what subsidies the farmer is applying for on which areas of his land for that year. <strong>The basic subsidy per hectare</strong> ranged from € 85 to € 100. An additional amount of around €25 per hectare is available if the farmer running the farm is under 40 years of age and has been farming for less than five years. This can be claimed for a maximum of five years.</p>



<p><strong>Income support for small farmers</strong> has developed in a very interesting way in recent years. In the payment years of the previous budget period (2015–2023), an additional €5 per hectare was paid for the first five hectares, and nearly €50 per hectare for hectares between five and thirty. This means that if a farmer cultivated a maximum of five hectares, they received a maximum of €25 extra per year. However, if they farmed at least 30 hectares, they could receive up to €1,250 per year. Furthermore, this was not only available to small farmers, but to anyone for their first 30 hectares. The new agricultural strategy remedies this unfairness by allowing farmers to claim the extra €50 for between one and fifty hectares, and those who cultivate more than fifty hectares are not eligible.</p>



<p>For some of the climate and environmental subsidies, farmers must commit to meeting the conditions for one year and for others, for five years and sign these commitments in a separate document. If they violate any of the conditions during this period, they will be required to repay the subsidies received in previous years, clarified the deputy director of APIA in Cluj County.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="665" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-1024x665.jpg" alt="Florin Bota looking at subsidies" class="wp-image-58543" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-1024x665.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-300x195.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-768x499.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-1536x998.jpg 1385w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-750x487.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota-1140x740.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Florin_Bota.jpg 1386w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Florin Bota, deputy director of APIA in Cluj County. | Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>At least once a year, each farmer visits APIA to sign the subsidy application. But many already apply online on the <a href="https://kex1.apia.org.ro:8443/realms/EXTERN_PORTAL_FERMIERI/protocol/openid-connect/auth?client_id=fermieri-client&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fagi.apia.org.ro%2Fagionline%2Fstatic%2Fro%2Findex.html&amp;state=0f4f490b-f9c1-488a-8885-0495de9e00d6&amp;response_mode=fragment&amp;response_type=code&amp;scope=openid&amp;nonce=7d5f27ba-39d6-4c40-94d2-98cd6a145cf1&amp;code_challenge=AZyrnWyo5IhI-WQCPUf9DPrvqQHyNibwRDR60J4zqHw&amp;code_challenge_method=S256" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>AGI Online</u></a> platform where all farmers who have registered have access to the more important details about their land, said Florin Bota. Map data, crops grown, subsidies requested – farmers can see all of this on their own phones. They can also support their applications with photos and the system only accepts photos that the farmer has taken from a specific location and angle based on GPS data.</p>



<p>Approximately 40% of the more than 27,000 farmers in Cluj County already submit their subsidy applications online. If the system indicates any errors or if the officials request additional information from the farmer for one of their applications, the farmer can supplement or correct it until the autumn payment period, explained Florin Bota. The APIA officials do not aim to punish farmers, but to help them obtain as much support as possible.</p>



<p>They are aware that <strong>half of farmers</strong> <strong>are not eligible</strong> for any support because they cannot meet the basic requirement of farming: at least one hectare on plots of at least 30 ares. (According to the 2020 agricultural census, 1.5 million of the 2.8 million farms did not reach the one-hectare size.) Only those with 10-15 hectares can be considered real farmers, noted Florin Bota. In his opinion, a farmer with less than five hectares can only produce enough for himself and his family.</p>



<p>The chats I had at the market do not necessarily support this. There is a seller at the farmers&#8217; market who cultivates a total of one hectare of land with his family, does nothing else, and brings seasonal produce from there to the market in Cluj-Napoca twice a week. Of course, his goods are not the cheapest.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<div class="jeg_video_container jeg_video_content"><iframe loading="lazy" title="Közpénz a zöldségpiacon: így fizetünk az egészségesebb ételért" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/5RAZc3xaSgI?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
</div><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RAZc3xaSgI" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Public market in the vegetable market: this is how we pay for healthier food</a></figcaption></figure>



<p>Many larger farmers are dissatisfied with the one-hectare entry threshold and would like to see it raised to two or five, said Deputy Director Bota. They are dissatisfied because, in their opinion, many small farmers do not produce anything, but because of the subsidies, they do not lease their land to them either.</p>



<p>Several of my sources who used to work for APIA agreed that farmers with between one and five hectares receive such a small amount (often less than €1,000 per year) that it can easily be classified as welfare aid. Many use it to pay their land tax, buy fertilizer or seeds. They need it, but it is nowhere near enough to run their farms, let alone develop them.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The combined effect of public money and the market: the big fish eats the small</h2>



<p>Statistics contradict those dissatisfied with subsidizing the small farms: the small farms are quickly disappearing in Romania. In the ten years between the two agricultural censuses, half a million small farms under one hectare disappeared from the two million. Of the nearly one and a half million farms between one and five hectares, 400,000 disappeared in just ten years. Statistically, <strong>nearly 900,000 farms that disappeared</strong> during the ten-year period were all in the size category of less than five hectares.</p>



<p>The number of farms between five and ten hectares decreased by 20,000, while the trend reversed for farms larger than ten hectares. The number of farms larger than 10 hectares increased from 82,000 to 118,000 in ten years.</p>



<p><iframe title="Number Of Farms By Their Size in 2010 and 2020" aria-label="Split Bars" id="datawrapper-chart-fnM1V" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/fnM1V/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="502" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>Not only did the number of small farms decrease, but the total area they cultivated also declined. Small, practically backyard gardens have not lost as much land: a quarter of those under one hectare disappeared in ten years, but their total area decreased by only a fifth.</p>



<p>This shows the viability of farms under one hectare and people’s attachment to backyard farming. One and a half million such farms have survived in circumstances where, unlike their larger counterparts, they have received no subsidies and are under pressure from the larger farms to sell or lease their land.</p>



<p>However, the total area cultivated by small farms that can be considered self-sustaining, i.e., those between one and five hectares, has decreased dramatically from 3.2 million hectares to 2.3 million hectares. The <strong>loss of one million hectares of land by farms smaller than five hectares</strong> is reflected in the gain in land by farms between ten and one hundred hectares.</p>



<p>This larger size category cultivated only 1.6 million hectares in 2010, but by 2020 it had grown to 2.6 million hectares, even though the total agricultural area used in Romania decreased by half a million hectares during this decade. The total area, including arable land, pastures and hayfields, shrank from 13.3 million hectares to 12.7 million hectares.</p>



<p><iframe title="Total cultivated area by farm size in Romania (2010 and 2020)" aria-label="Split Bars" id="datawrapper-chart-Zl5W8" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Zl5W8/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="551" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>In the size category between ten and one hundred hectares, the <strong>number of farms increased by 50%</strong>, from 69,000 to 102,000. Meanwhile, the area they cultivated increased by 6%. In other words, not only did the number of farms of this size increase, but they also became larger. Farms between 20 and 50 hectares doubled their total area in ten years.</p>



<p>It is no coincidence that this is where the extra part of agricultural subsidies, which is 50% of the basic amount per hectare, was directed. <a href="https://www.apia.org.ro/files/news_files/CP_Final_Campania_2021_fara_penalizari_18.05.2021.pdf"><u>A message from the central management of APIA</u></a> dated 2021 also praised the farmers that they pooled land to improve productivity and competitiveness and it was visible in the smaller number of applications the Agency got for more hectares.</p>



<p>It is likely that some farms larger than 100 hectares have also grown, but this is not reflected in the statistics. This has happened partly because <strong>farms larger than 100 hectares</strong> are grouped into a single category in the 2010 agricultural census, even though there is a significant difference between a 101-hectare farm and a 1,000-hectare farm. The 2020 survey treats farms over 100 and 500 hectares, 500 and 1,000 hectares, and over 1,000 hectares as separate categories.</p>



<p>On the other hand, it is not possible to show farms over 100 hectares because, although the number of farms over 100 hectares increased from 13,000 to 16,000 in ten years, the total area they cultivated decreased from 6.5 million hectares to 6.1 million hectares. Now, more really large farms are cultivating less land than ten years ago.</p>



<p>Of course, this<strong> did not reduce the enormous inequality</strong> that characterized the Romanian agriculture. In 2010, 3.7 million farms under 100 hectares cultivated 6.8 million hectares and 13,000 farms over 100 hectares cultivated 6.5 million hectares. In 2020, 2.8 million farms under 100 hectares cultivated 6.6 million hectares, while 16,000 farms over 100 hectares cultivated 6.1 million hectares.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How much public money should a farm receive?</h2>



<p>No matter which decision-maker or expert I have listened to over the past year, everyone emphasized that farmers cannot be expected to work for free or even at a loss. Economic predictability and social security is important to them, and indeed, one of the main goals of the common agricultural policy in Romania is to make farms more profitable.</p>



<p><strong>But how profitable?</strong> Not only does the previous or current agricultural strategy not address this issue, but the question has not even entered the public discourse in Romania. Everyone agrees that farmers deserve a middle-class lifestyle. That, despite the constraints of farming, they too should be able to go on holiday once a year.</p>



<p>How much public money should we allocate for this, considering the size of the farms? The European Commission plans to limit the maximum amount that a single farm can annualy claim in agricultural subsidies in the budget period starting in 2028. This summer, it announced <strong>an upper limit of</strong> <strong>€100,000</strong>, which has already sparked opposition from farmers.</p>



<p>Environmental and small farmer protection organizations have long been calling for this cap, since the lack of it, i.e., unlimited payments per hectare, has clearly encouraged the disappearance of small farms and the growth of larger ones.</p>



<p>While smaller farms, by their very size, generate greater diversity with crops grown and natural boundaries between fields, larger farms are more prone to monocultures and to plowing under wooded, bushy patches, which, as plot boundaries, also provide shelter for pollinating insects, small animals and many plant species.</p>



<p>I spoke in more detail with plant ecologist Thomas Kuhn about how farm size and farming methods affect biodiversity:</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<div class="jeg_video_container jeg_video_content"><iframe loading="lazy" title="A gazdáknak sem ellensége a természetvédelem" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wFIGy4cJSBI?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
</div><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFIGy4cJSBI"><u>Environmental protection is not the enemy of farmers either</u></a></figcaption></figure>



<p>The biologist’s conclusions are clear: while industrial farming can feed more people at a lower immediate cost, <strong>small-scale farming preserves or even increases biodiversity</strong>, which is also beneficial to large farms. There are no longer enough people in rural areas to engage in traditional farming, but those who still farm or are planning to do so in the future must be given a financial incentive to preserve species diversity.</p>



<p>Romania has never debated what would be a fair amount of public money to support farms that are already financially successful. And now there are farms in the country that are more profitable than the EU average. The EU measures the performance of farms in terms of so-called standard output (SO). This expresses in euros how much value is generated per hectare, so to speak, at the farm gate, i.e. before taxation.</p>



<p>In Romania, due to the predominance of small farms, the average SO of farms is extremely low. In 2020, it was €4,029, compared to the EU average of €38,700. However, according to <a href="https://managementjournal.usamv.ro/pdf/vol.23_1/Art64.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Agatha Popescu&#8217;s study</a>, Romanian farms with an SO exceeding 100,000 have already reached the EU average, while farms with an SO between 250,000 and half a million have exceeded the EU average.</p>



<p>Nevertheless, we finance these large companies with the same average amount per hectare as small farms between one and ten.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Fewer and fewer farmers get more and more money</h2>



<p>Payments have been increasing, meaning that more large farmers receive support relative to the number of large farmers than small farmers do relative to the total number of small farmers cultivating the land.</p>



<p>However, neither APIA nor the Ministry of Agriculture mentions this. However, this is very clear from the payments if we categorize them a little and it is also clear from APIA&#8217;s annual reports if we read them together. These show that 20-30,000 fewer subsidy applications are submitted each year, but the number of hectares receiving subsidies is increasing.</p>



<p>The data for payments made in 2023 and 2024 comes <a href="https://plati.afir.info/Plati/AfisareListaPlatii"><u>from this online database</u></a>, while payments made between 2020 and 2022 were still available on <a href="https://www.afir.ro/rapoarte/beneficiari-de-fonduri-europene/date-deschise/"><u>this website</u></a> at the beginning of 2025. This allowed us to compare payments made over a five-year period. We found that in 2020, 3.5 million payments accounted for €2.5 billion in subsidies, while in 2024, only 2.3 million payments accounted for €3.3 billion in total subsidies. In just five years, <strong>the number of payments fell by a third, while the amount paid out increased by a third</strong>.</p>



<p>To get a clearer picture, we separated the payments made to family farms and those made to commercial farms and processing plants. The basis for the division is not whether the farm is operated by a private individual or a business because the subsidy system also encouraged farmers applying for support to register as sole traders or family businesses (abbreviated in Romanian as PFA, II, IF).</p>



<p>In the list of payments, we categorized the names as family farms where a personal name appeared, but also those where the name or abbreviation PFA, sole proprietorship (întreprindere individuală), or family business (întreprindere familială) appeared. This allowed us to roughly separate farms that are run only by the farmer and family members (probably with occasional day laborers) from those whose corporate form allows them to hire employees (limited liability company, joint stock company, commercial company, etc.).</p>



<p><iframe title="Total area cultivated by companies and family farms" aria-label="Small multiple pie chart" id="datawrapper-chart-Cc8Q6" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Cc8Q6/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="440" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>As it turned out, the National Institute of Statistics also categorized farms in this way in its agricultural censuses organized every ten years. These agricultural censuses also show that corporate farms cultivated nearly one million hectares less land in 2020 than they did ten years earlier. Meanwhile, <strong>family farms expanded their land area by 360,000 hectares</strong> in the same ten-year period, during which the total area under cultivation decreased by half a million hectares.</p>



<p>After 2020, however, <strong>subsidies shifted towards corporate farms</strong>. While they received half a billion euros less total support in 2020, in 2024 they received the same amount, 1.64 billion euros, as family farms.</p>



<p><iframe title="Total subsidies for family farms vs companies, 2020–2024" aria-label="Line chart" id="datawrapper-chart-SdgXm" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/SdgXm/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="396" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>This suggests that the statistically documented expansion of medium and large farms continued after 2020. It also reflects the fact that the 2014-2020 rural development plan (whose budget even covered some of last year&#8217;s payments) supported not only agricultural companies, but any company registered in rural areas in order to increase rural employment.</p>



<p>The fact that <strong>small farms have fallen even further behind in terms of subsidies</strong> this decade, with subsidies going mainly to medium and large farms, is clearly evident from the distribution of the number and amount of subsidies.</p>



<p>The number of small payments of less than €100 made to family farms has almost halved in five years. In 2020, APIA made 1.1 million such payments, but by 2024 this figure will have fallen to just 672,000. The number of payments between €100 and €1,000, which are still only on the level of social aids, has also fallen by more than a third, from two million to 1.3 million.</p>



<p><iframe title="Number of payments in 2020 by size" aria-label="Split Bars" id="datawrapper-chart-ac8gE" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ac8gE/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="195" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p><iframe title="Number of payments in 2024" aria-label="Split Bars" id="datawrapper-chart-0WPUO" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0WPUO/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="233" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>Family farms received even less than the payments of between €1,000 and €10,000 in 2024 than they did in 2020. This indicates that <strong>farms smaller than ten hectares receive virtually no realistic support</strong>, even though 2.7 million of the 2.8 million farms fall into this size category and this category cultivates one-third of Romania&#8217;s total agricultural area.</p>



<p>On the other hand, the number of payments over €10,000 increased by 50% by 2024, and the number of payments between €100,000 and €1 million doubled. The same trend can be observed among companies: the number of payments up to €10,000 decreased over the five years examined, while payments over €10,000 increased by at least 50%.</p>



<p>In fact, we are paying more than one million euros in public funds to companies: to 38 companies in 2020 and to 58 companies in 2024. In this millionaire category, at least the amount of subsidies has not increased at the same rate. While in 2020, the 38 companies received €91 million, or an average of €2.4 million per company, in 2024, the 58 companies received “only” €133 million, with an average of €2.2 million.</p>



<p><iframe title="Total subsidies paid to companies by size of payments, 2020–2024" aria-label="Split Bars" id="datawrapper-chart-lz8GY" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lz8GY/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="282" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>The shift towards higher payments is also reflected in the increase in amounts per category. The total amount of payments under €1,000 made by companies has fallen by more than half in five years. The amount of payments up to ten thousand euros has increased slightly, while their number has decreased, meaning that fewer companies are now receiving more money in this category.</p>



<p>The amount of payments between ten and one hundred thousand euros increased by 50%, as did their number. The amount of payments between one hundred thousand and one million euros almost doubled. While the number of supported companies increased by 76%, the amount of support increased by 85%.</p>



<p><iframe title="Total subsidies paid to family farms, by size of payments, 2020–2024" aria-label="Split Bars" id="datawrapper-chart-f0q0F" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/f0q0F/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="282" data-external="1"></iframe><script type="text/javascript">window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});</script></p>



<p>The amount of payments to family farms exceeding €100,000 tripled, while the number of such payments only doubled. The final amount of €38 million in 2020 exceeded €100 million several times in the following years.</p>



<p>We pay several times that amount to companies: whether they are farms operating as larger enterprises or processing plants. In 2020, companies received €337 million in subsidies in payments exceeding €100,000, and in 2024, this figure will rise to €627 million. The average amount per payment per company has increased to over €100,000 in the last five years.</p>



<p>It’s worth paying attention to these payments above € 10,000 and 100,000 keeping in mind that at present the average price of one hectare agricultural land <a href="https://kronika.ro/belfold/kulfoldiek-spekulansok-es-helyi-gazdak-kie-lesz-a-romaniai-termofold" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">amounts to € 8,000 – 9,000</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why is it important to know what we’re paying for?</h2>



<p>The APIA&#8217;s annual reports do not specify how much support each farm receives by size category. If we do not know how much public money we are using to support large farms that are already competitive and profitable, how much we are spending on developing medium-sized farms, and how much money we are allocating to maintaining the diversity, diversity, and resilience provided by small farms, then we cannot even begin to think about what is <strong>more beneficial to society</strong> and which goal we should spend more public money on.</p>



<p>We need to figure out what is most important to us here in Romania because the European Commission has already outlined how it envisions spending the large development funds in the new budget period beginning in 2028. The core of this idea, which has been vehemently attacked in Romania since its publication in the summer, is that the EC would merge the Cohesion Fund with agricultural subsidies and <strong>leave it up to the member states and regions</strong> to decide for themselves whether they want to use this money to develop industry, infrastructure or agriculture in each region.</p>



<p>Farmers felt that this would jeopardize their guaranteed, hectare-based subsidies and Germany, along with the Eastern European member states, opposed the idea. All Romanian politicians who have spoken out on the issue so far have criticized the consolidation of development funds. The President of the EC, Ursula von der Leyen refined her message in November and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_2673" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>said</u></a> the Common Agricultural Policy will continue to play an income-supplementing role worth almost € 300 billion from 2028 onwards, and will not be merged with the Cohesion Fund.</p>



<p>The EC also intends to give a role in decisions on rural development funds to those EU regions that have neither administrative nor political power in our country. In Romania, these regions have no decision-making powers; we are still trying to govern the country using the county system from 1968. In other words, the EC&#8217;s vision benefits countries that know themselves, know what they have, and know <strong>what they want to do at the regional level</strong>. They have a clear picture of their present and their future.</p>



<p>Romania does not have a clear, realistic, official and public understanding of itself in the field of agriculture. From the data collected in the agricultural censuses repeated every ten years, we can conclude how subsidies (along with market and demographic processes, of course) have influenced the agricultural sector.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga-1024x683.jpg" alt="Meeting and discussions on CAP and subsidies" class="wp-image-58555" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga-300x200.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga-768x512.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga.jpg 1350w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga-750x500.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Piros-hokedlik_Toth-Helga-1140x760.jpg 1140w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Who should have a say? Photo: Helga Tóth</figcaption></figure>



<p>However, this makes it difficult to understand and influence how public money should be spent from 2028 onwards in an agricultural sector as divided as Romania’s. For the time being, Transylvanian politicians are waiting to see what will be decided in Brussels in the discussions between the European Commission and the European Parliament on the next budget period. Meaningful consultations with agricultural organizations on their priorities after 2027 have not yet begun in Romania, according to Csaba Könczei, vice-chair of the Chamber of Deputies&#8217; Agricultural Committee.</p>



<p>The Ministry of Agriculture said it is in constant consultation with farmers&#8217; representative organizations, but reported only one meeting. Ten representatives of two major farmers’ associations visited in the Ministry on 7 October where<a href="https://www.madr.ro/comunicare/consultari-intre-ministerul-agriculturii-si-alianta-pentru-agricultura-si-cooperare-privind-reforma-politicii-agricole-comune-post-2028.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u> they talked about</u></a> how the agricultural subsidies should stay separated from the cohesion funds, the subsidy from the Romanian state should increase to 30% and the government should reject the EU&#8217;s proposal to set an upper limit on direct payments, as this would harm the competitiveness of medium-sized and large farms.</p>



<p>There are still two years left to ensure that other considerations are taken into account alongside the interests of large farmers. This is because the direct payment system</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">has so far given medium-sized and large farmers an advantage.</h2>



<p>Ten years ago, APIA recorded <a href="https://kronika.ro/erdelyi-naplo/gazdasag/unios-agrartamogatasok-a-fiataloke-a-vilag" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">1,1 million subsidized farmers</a>, stated the press of the time.</p>



<p>The APIA representatives I spoke to also interpret the figure published by APIA as the number of individual grant applications. It also publishes the number of hectares receiving support. This is how it looked over the past five years:</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table><tbody><tr><td>Year</td><td>Number of grant applications</td><td>Number of subsidized hectares</td></tr><tr><td>2020</td><td>826,964</td><td>9,814,938</td></tr><tr><td>2021</td><td>802,956</td><td>9,823,979</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>778,552</td><td>9,902,113</td></tr><tr><td>2023</td><td>759,976</td><td>9,986,928</td></tr><tr><td>2024</td><td>730,395</td><td>9,962,885</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Source of data: <a href="https://apia.org.ro/despre-apia/rapoarte/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">APIA&#8217;s annual reports</a></figcaption></figure>



<p>In other words, while the number of subsidy applications fell by 400,000 over ten years and by almost 100,000 over the last five years, the number of subsidized hectares increased by 150,000. The number of applications is decreasing by 20,000 to 30,000 per year, which is equivalent to the <strong>farmers of an entire county giving up subsidies each year</strong>, while the number of subsidized hectares is increasing. EU subsidies are going to fewer but larger farms.</p>



<p>Two other data sets show that the number of applications may not correspond to the number of individual farms receiving support. The 2020 agricultural census counted not 826,000 but only 648,000 farms that received EU subsidies in that year and the previous two years.</p>



<p>On the list of payments for 2020, we found only 808,546 unique identification codes, with payments going not only to farmers but also to rural companies and local governments for infrastructure development. This means that there must be more unique identifiers in the system than there are farms. But according to our data, there would have been an absurd situation where more farms received subsidies than there are farms and all other subsidized companies and municipalities combined.</p>



<p>In any case, my sources at APIA unanimously stated that the agricultural census data was incorrect, and that at that time, subsidies were definitely paid to more than 800,000 farmers. If this was indeed the case, it increases skepticism about public and official data, as well as about how well the Romanian state knows itself and how it can plan strategies based on contradictory data.</p>



<p>The system anomaly described above did not occur in the following two years, during which APIA still published the unique identification codes. From 2023, it will no longer publish these, even though it has completely reliable data on exactly</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">how many and what size farms it pays subsidies to and for exactly how much land.</h2>



<p>I saw this with my own eyes. One of my sources at APIA, who asked to remain anonymous, showed me what they see on their internal system: almost every bush, updated weekly. They receive <strong>fresh satellite images of the entire country every week</strong>, and with a couple of clicks, they can project onto any area to see which farmer received what kind of support in which part. All this goes back years. With two more clicks, they can bring up the land registry data, the old paper-based land registry names, and the new digital land registry land designations.</p>



<p>Two farmers cannot receive subsidies for the same area because the system immediately flags the overlap. Officials notify both farmers to clarify the overlapping areas, otherwise the subsidy applications cannot be finalized. The system also uses satellite images to verify that the farmer is actually growing the crops for which he applied for subsidies, that he is complying with various environmental conditions, and that he has not cleared his land by burning. If the system detects signs of burning, the farmer is notified and must obtain a certificate from the fire department confirming that he did not set fire to the vegetation on his land.</p>



<p>According to its own annual reports, <strong>APIA has at least 2.3 million farms listed</strong> in its database. The list of individual payments can be <a href="https://plati.afir.info/Plati/AfisareListaPlatii" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">searched by name and settlement </a>how much money someone got, but they have never published the area or the number of farm animals the individual got paid for. This is not disclosed even upon request, citing the GDPR.</p>



<p>The Ministry of Agriculture <a href="https://www.madr.ro/comunicare/romania-a-ajuns-la-un-grad-de-absorbtie-de-peste-95-pentru-programul-national-de-dezvoltare-rurala-pndr.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>boasts</u></a> every year that it managed to spend 95% or even 98% of the EU subsidies for agriculture.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">But what does APIA disclose then?</h2>



<p>Basically, accounting data on the total amount paid out to all farmers who applied for a particular subsidy program. In addition, it sometimes provides the average amount per hectare, most recently for 2022.</p>



<p>Let&#8217;s see how this works. APIA <a href="https://apia.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/RAPORT-ANUAL-APIA_2022_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">reported</a> that in 2022, it paid out €897,639,433 in basic subsidies per hectare. In theory, everyone who is included in the subsidy system receives the same amount, and all other types of support (if someone is young, an organic farmer, or a smallholder) are added to this basic support as extras. Of course, the amount paid for arable land and grassland is different, but let&#8217;s temporarily ignore that.</p>



<p>It also stated that the average amount per hectare was €96.28. If we divide the total amount by the average, we get that in 2022, APIA provided some form of subsidy for 9.3 million hectares, statistically speaking. However, APIA also stated in its report and press releases that it provided support for 9.9 million hectares in 2022.</p>



<p>This does not tell us how many individual hectares were subsidized, how many hectares received only basic support, how many received the more generous environmental subsidies, or how many hectares are cultivated by farmers who receive extra subsidies because they are under 40 or because they cultivate less than 50 hectares.</p>



<p>In other words, the official data does not tell us how public funds earmarked for specific purposes (farm succession, helping small farmers, operating cooperatives) are being used. Is it worth spending money on generational change and climate protection, or is everyone just chasing subsidies?</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">One third of the funds are spent on climate and environmental protection</h2>



<p>If we look only at the total amounts spent, Romania is doing very well. One third of all subsidies go to basic support per hectare (€800 – 900 million) and income support for farming on smaller areas (€100 – 180 million) per year. Another third of subsidies (€960 million – €1.1 billion) goes to programs related to climate and environmental protection and greening.</p>



<p>The third billion covers everything else: rewards for achieving and selling certain crop yields (around €250 million per year), livestock farming and animal welfare investments, attracting young farmers, extra support for less common crops or breeding animals to make them more marketable, etc.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table><tbody><tr><td>Year</td><td>Farmer assoc.</td><td>Farmer under 40</td><td>Small farms</td><td>Climate and envir. protection</td><td>Overall yearly payments</td></tr><tr><td>2020</td><td>1,923,248</td><td>21,523,851</td><td>176,497,671</td><td>962,355,360</td><td>2,577,229,235</td></tr><tr><td>2021</td><td>6,075,358</td><td>18,199,191</td><td>157,044,392</td><td>981,584,201</td><td>3,388,014,804</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>6,130,167</td><td>16,184,552</td><td>139,035,138</td><td>1,056,310,205</td><td>3,148,871,530</td></tr><tr><td>2023</td><td>11,872,183</td><td>17,179,994</td><td>125,992,154</td><td>1,102,166,193</td><td>3,406,864,269</td></tr><tr><td>2024</td><td>20,443,347</td><td>96,590,405</td><td>23,973</td><td>1,184,889,922</td><td>3,294,081,282</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Source of data: database of payments<a href="https://plati.afir.info/Plati/AfisareListaPlatii" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"> published by AFIR</a>. </figcaption></figure>



<p>The amount of climate and environmental payments is so exceptionally high that we took a closer look at <a href="https://apia.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ghid-EFA_2021.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">what it covers</a>. Applications can only be submitted for areas that are already included in the basic support and these green subsidies are also based on the number of hectares. In addition, multiple types of green subsidies can be applied for the same area if it meets the various conditions.</p>



<p>Half of the billion-euro amount was paid out for <strong>climate- and environment-friendly farming</strong> in the years examined. This basically means that permanent grasslands cannot be plowed, crop rotation must be practiced on arable land and extra money is paid if there are ecologically important landscape elements on or next to the arable land: nitrogen-fixing crops, field margins, tree rows, individual trees, bushes, hedges and buffer zones along rivers or standing waters. The Transylvanian landscape abounds in such features.</p>



<p>A quarter of the amount, €250 – 270 million, is paid for areas that are <strong>restricted in some way by nature itself</strong>, such as the usability of mountain grasslands due to altitude. Anyone who maintains at least one hectare of pasture and/or hayfield above 1,000 meters can claim compensation for harsh mountain conditions.</p>



<p>In addition, extra subsidies can be requested for areas where certain protected animal species live, if the farmer undertakes not to disturb the area during the species’ critical life stages and not to use any chemicals at all. This costs between €130 and €200 million per year. The state pays the highest compensation for pastures and hayfields where certain species of <strong>Maculinea butterflies</strong> live. In the part of the Mezőség between Kecsed (Alunis) and Magyarszovát (Suatu), if these pastures and hayfields are maintained by hand only, the state pays €410 per hectare, while if light machinery is used, it pays €331.</p>



<p>The second most profitable is the protection of the corncrake (Crex crex): the state pays €310 per hectare if the grassland in question is maintained only by hand and €231 if light machinery is used. The state rewards manual maintenance of the grassland feeding areas of the lesser spotted eagle (Aquila pomarina) with €269 per hectare and mechanical maintenance with €190. If this eagle hunts on arable land, the farmer can claim €151.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Organic farming and showcase greening</h2>



<p>It is clear that 85-90% of these<strong> green payments do not require any particular effort</strong>, whereas organic farming receives little funding, between €55 and €100 million per year. However, the reward for converting to organic farming is high, at €300-600 per hectare, and depending on the crop, farmers receive €280-450 per hectare if they maintain their land as certified organic. The transition, obtaining certification, and chemical-free production all require time and effort. The state finances the transition for two to three years and maintenance for five years.</p>



<p>The state&#8217;s ecological commitment is also undermined by the fact that, on the one hand, it offers funding for environmentally friendly farming methods (but does not disclose how many people have applied for subsidies for no-till farming and for how much land), and on the other hand, it still <strong>subsidizes the price of diesel fuel</strong> burned during heavy machinery cultivation from the state budget. By this scheme, the Romanian government reimburses part of the excise tax on hundreds of millions of liters of diesel fuel.</p>



<p>In December 2025, the government increased the fuel subsidy to 163 million euros for that year. This means it allocated 60 percent more to subsidize fossil fuels in agriculture than it did to organic farming in its best year, 2024. </p>



<p>The <a href="https://agrointel.ro/341904/subventia-apia-parloaga-scadere-emil-dumitru" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>wasteland scandal</u></a> also showed that greening funds could be obtained without any effort and that the Ministry of Agriculture had grossly underestimated the number of applicants seeking money without making any effort. In the spring, it promised €58 per hectare to farmers who left 2% of their land fallow or if they incorporate new landscape elements into their arable land. These two elements could be combined in any way.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="665" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-1024x665.jpg" alt="Subsidies also grow alfalfa near Alunișu, Cluj County" class="wp-image-58562" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-1024x665.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-300x195.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-768x499.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-1536x998.jpg 1385w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-750x487.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken-1140x740.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Lucernas-Magyarokereken.jpg 1386w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Weedy eco-corridor, behind it alfalfa, behind it a wooded pasture, behind it a mountain next to Alunisu, Cluj County. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>In early November, the ministry announced that so many people had applied for this subsidy that APIA would only pay €20 per hectare. No one knows what preliminary estimates were used to justify the €58 promised in the spring, but it is certain that the ministry set easy, not-so-green conditions. For example, <strong>stones could be included as new landscape</strong> features alongside trees, tree rows, and bushes.</p>



<p>What is more, no ecological conditions were imposed on the two percent of land left fallow, so that the uncultivated land would not be concentrated in huge plots. This means that if there is a wetland at the edge of a hundred-hectare arable field and the farmer does not cultivate the two hectares surrounding it, he will still receive the extra €2,000 for the hundred hectares without having to do anything. There is no requirement for the uncultivated area to form islands or ecological corridors within the huge cultivated plots for pollinators, small animals, and other plants. This means that farming the land does not become more difficult, it just brings in more money.</p>



<p><a href="https://agrointel.ro/341904/subventia-apia-parloaga-scadere-emil-dumitru" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>When announcing the correction</u></a>, state secretary Emil Dumitru declared that the farmers applied for this subsidy with 5.7 million hectares of ploughland. According to the 2020 agricultural census, arable land in Romania covered 8.5 million hectares. This means that the vast majority of farmers, who already receive subsidies, met the &#8220;greening&#8221; conditions and applied for the extra money.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The bigger the area, the smaller the subsidy should be</h2>



<p>Romania has just begun to introduce more serious restrictions on the environmental component of agricultural subsidies. The aim is to prevent people who own large areas of land from exploiting their agricultural land for ecological purposes, simply to pocket the high state subsidies. Previously, this was rarely the case.</p>



<p>In the rural development plan for 2014-2020 (but also in some of the 2024 payments), only compensation payments for mountain pastures and hayfields were limited by a so-called <strong>degressive reduction</strong>. In other words, only those who applied for this support for less than 50 hectares received the full amount of €97 per hectare. The amount gradually decreased to €25 per hectare at the 50, 100, and 300 hectare thresholds, but it was still possible to apply for support for areas larger than 300 hectares.</p>



<p>The current agricultural strategy for 2023-2027 appears to tighten this principle and extend it to all pastures and hayfields that are of high natural value or where the farmer undertakes to restrict mowing and grazing in order to protect the species mentioned. First, if the farmer cannot prove that they keep at least the minimum number of animals, they cannot claim these compensation payments. In other words, they must prove that they actually use the areas for farming for which they are requesting support. This is a realistic tightening of the previous conditions.</p>



<p>On the other hand, if we look at the specific amounts, they have increased. Although this type of support is being reduced in several stages, it starts at a higher amount per hectare and stops decreasing at 100 hectares. A farmer with 101 hectares of pasture receives half of the €142, just as a farmer with 302 hectares of pasture does. This means that those who have previously applied <strong>for large areas can now claim three times as much money</strong>: €71 per hectare instead of €25.</p>



<p>Nature conservation payments above this amount are reduced to 90% of the amount for areas of 10 hectares or more, and to 80% for areas of 50 hectares or more. Above 150 hectares, or 200 hectares for certain species, this type of compensation cannot be claimed at all. The clear message here is that at this size, the costs of maintaining such pastures and hayfields must be covered, whether it is hares that graze on them or eagles that come there for lunch.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The farmers’ trust is the hardest to cultivate</h2>



<p>Although all surveys show that farmers who have joined cooperatives are more successful on the market, one of the least utilized parts of the Romanian subsidy system is the money earmarked for the establishment of producer cooperatives. Due to forced collectivization, it is understandable that older farmers are resistant when they hear about cooperatives, but younger farmers also find it very difficult to come together. More than half of the approximately 4,000 agricultural cooperatives have been established since 2020.</p>



<p>However, there are more and more local examples and even in Cluj County, that show that the key to competitiveness and profitability in such a fragmented agricultural sector is not necessarily size, but rather consolidation into producer cooperatives. In the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CooperativaAgricolaLuncaSomeuluiMic/posts/pfbid02sViAHZXmDYVcsThEEL84YDj5CD8AN2ZtF4mrvtUSjXtieZJHPJP4RKxr4V6zErjDl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZW48aORkejmLA8sIVkA0FzFGyXSXxZzib65ki2ZpAEWVaN7MCjuhQndziygGkVFTHZKC1dtEovmpQKy9wGS73JS4OFd45IQuyHBfIu943RuQPJwYq0rrprhRWMnJUrkDtyHC2k4q2jxJFnHlXvHpi7ltqwBB1BVSw93vgvLayV5wA&amp;__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>Lunca Somesului Mic Cooperative</u></a> 11 farmers farm on 15 hectares and now they transport seasonal vegetables to the regional warehouses of two national retail chains with their own trucks. And it has its place by the Someș-Arieș Cooperative farming on thousands of hectares, breeding thousands of animals that <a href="https://listafirme.ro/somes-aries-cooperativa-agricola-28264568/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>produces millions as profit</u></a> from time to time.</p>



<p>Farmers did not exhaust the budgetary frameworks allocated for cooperation in previous periods, and payments only increased from €2 million to €6 million from 2021 onwards. <a href="https://www.crpe.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/sinteza-cercetare-Cooperativele-agricole-in-anul-2024-evolutie-si-perspective.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>The data from two years ago</u></a> show that the cooperatives at that time were mainly established to make more effective use of EU subsidies. <strong>More than half of them existed only on paper</strong> and did not submit balance sheets reporting on their economic activities. Even so, the share of cooperatives in total agricultural production increased from 2% in 2020 to 4% in 2022.</p>



<p>The amount paid for the operation of cooperatives in 2024 has already risen to twenty million euros, but the demonstrable results are yet to be seen.</p>



<p>The history of the twentieth century, with its land redistributions, imperial and regime changes, and then restitution, completely fragmented agriculture in Romania and Transylvania. Nowadays, the state hardly restricts the consolidation of plots of land; in fact, to a certain extent, it actively encourages it.</p>



<p>However, social trust has also fallen apart along with the plots of land, and the state is investing very little in rebuilding it. Encouraging cooperatives is one small and slow way of doing this. Transparency can structurally build the state&#8217;s credibility and trust in it. This can be achieved by openly stating, or at least openly discussing, what we are spending public money on in agriculture now and what we will spend it on in the future and how we can achieve a real balance between economic and environmental-climatic sustainability.</p>



<p><em>Anna Anghel was extremely helpful in downloading, cleaning, filtering and displaying the data in this article.</em></p>



<p><em>The opening image shows one of the renovated gates of Alunișu, Cluj County. Photo: Tünde Szabó</em></p>



<p><em>This article was produced as part of the <a href="https://berthafoundation.org/bertha-challenge/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">2025 Bertha Challenge Fellowship</a>.</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="500" height="257" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Bertha-Logo_kicsi.jpg" alt="Bertha Foundation" class="wp-image-56192" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Bertha-Logo_kicsi.jpg 500w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Bertha-Logo_kicsi-300x154.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 500px) 100vw, 500px" /></figure>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/romanian-farmers-subsidies-impact-agriculture/">Why Is It Worth Subsidizing The Farmers?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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		<authorId>15</authorId><authorUrl>https://atlatszo.ro/en/author/szabotunde/</authorUrl><authorId>15</authorId><authorUrl>https://atlatszo.ro/en/author/szabotunde/</authorUrl>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Investigations Bounce Off The Eternal Mayor Of Sic</title>
		<link>https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/investigations-bounce-off-the-eternal-mayor-of-sic/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Szabó Tünde]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 13:51:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[agricultural subsidies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cluj county]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[criminal investigations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DAHR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethnic autocracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungarian minority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ioan Sallai]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[János Sallai]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[local administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mayor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Romania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rural development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sóvirág Guesthouse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Transylvania]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://atlatszo.ro/?p=57470</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Police processed the scene at the Sóvirág Guesthouse in Sic for three days in April 2022. The guesthouse was built by János Sallai, who has been re-elected mayor for 33 years and then expanded by his son and daughter with EU funds in the mid-2000s. Three years ago, while digging a trench at the guesthouse, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/investigations-bounce-off-the-eternal-mayor-of-sic/">Investigations Bounce Off The Eternal Mayor Of Sic</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Police processed the scene at the <strong>Sóvirág Guesthouse</strong> in Sic for three days in April 2022. The guesthouse was built by <strong>János Sallai</strong>, who has been re-elected mayor for 33 years and then expanded by his son and daughter with EU funds in the mid-2000s. Three years ago, while digging a trench at the guesthouse, a gas pipe was broken. The pipe hadn’t been recorded by the company making the natural gas connection and gas supplier. As a result, the police began investigating on suspicion of classified fuel theft and illegal gas connection. The proceedings have been going on for more than three years without any noticeable results. This year, the prosecutor&#8217;s office hasn’t even responded to our questions sent every few months.</p>



<p>The authorities are equally silent on the issue of developments in the village, which have been under investigation for years. We will now take a look at these developments and show how a local construction contractor and the mayor&#8217;s family are profiting from them.</p>



<p>We shall also reveal the violation of the law by which the mayor and his office have effectively concealed important municipal documents, even though this obfuscation is not punishable by law. Mayor János Sallai gets both political and financial benefits from this:</p>



<ul>
<li>voters mainly know what he <strong>tells them in person</strong>;</li>



<li>his opponents have <strong>little insight </strong>into how the office operates and it is impossible to trace back even the decisions of the local council for years;</li>



<li>locally, people do not know <strong>how much agricultural subsidies</strong> the mayor and his family members receive in addition to their salaries and businesses although they hardly farm at all.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The pride of Transylvanian identity</h2>



<p>Szék / Sic is one of the most famous rural settlements of the Hungarian community in Romania, located about 30 km east of Cluj-Napoca. The people of Sic are rightly proud of their village’s past and its famous and rich folklore. Both of these features make it stand out among the villages of Transylvania, as do its tourist potential and the visible prosperity of its inhabitants.</p>



<p>The inhabitants of Sic supplemented their farming income with seasonal work in Cluj and Budapest as early as the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, many have remained in the cities or abroad, so despite relative prosperity and newcomers, the population of Sic has been declining <a href="https://statisztikak.erdelystat.ro/datasheets/sic/929" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">by 10% every decade</a>. According to the latest census data, more than 90% of its 2,234 inhabitants are Hungarian. János Sallai has been elected and re-elected mayor since 1992: before the informant scandal, he represented the Hungarian political party in Romania, the DAHR [Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania] and later ran as an independent, but with the tacit support of the DAHR.</p>



<p>Decades ago, Sallai already saw potential in rural tourism, according to <a href="https://digiteka.ro/adatbazis/a-romaniai-magyar-kisebbseg-torteneti-kronologiaja-19902017/kapcsolodo/290520" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>the press of the time.</u></a> He introduced piped drinking water and natural gas to Sic earlier than most villages in Transylvania, although sometimes such public utility projects took up to ten years to be completed. <a href="https://ziarulfaclia.ro/la-sic-toate-drumurile-sint-asfaltate/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>He had even the village’s smallest streets paved</u></a> more than ten years ago, but residents are able to connect to the sewage system this year. He established a country house and a tourist information centre with government support.</p>



<p>Several guesthouses are trying to make a living in the village. Two private initiatives are working to preserve folk culture: the dance house museum of Michel Van Langeveld, who has passed away this year, and the Blue House, which was purchased by the Sic Civil Circle Association to serve as a community centre and later as a village museum in the renovated farmhouse.</p>



<p>We wrote <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/kozpenzek/szek-szennyviz-illegalis-patakbetonozas-sallai-janos/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">more about Sic</a> and the mayor last fall, when we detailed the developments for which the mayor did not seek permission from the authorities and controversially initiated or terminated them. These include the establishment of the salty bath spa in Sic that dries and pollutes the reed by the village, the paving and covering of the brook bed running through the village and the paving conducted after the sewerage works.</p>



<p>At that point, we were forced to point out Mayor János Sallai’s <strong>strange relationship with the facts</strong> and his own past. He even went to the Constitutional Court to have the information proven by documents and made public since 2008 deleted, namely that he had been<strong> an informant for the Securitate</strong> before 1990. Then, in an interview with us, he denied not only that he had reported to the Securitate, but also that <a href="http://cnsas.ro/documente/hotarari/definitive/Sallai%20Ioan.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">he had appealed</a> for years to have his past as an informant erased. But in vain.</p>



<p>However, by doing so, he calls into question the credibility of all the information that he himself is the source of.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The scandal didn’t crush the mayor</h2>



<p>During our interview conducted with him, he repeatedly stated that he believed his local rivals were inciting people against him and that he had been expecting us to show up even before last year&#8217;s municipal elections. Sallai has been <a href="https://digiteka.ro/adatbazis/a-romaniai-magyar-kisebbseg-torteneti-kronologiaja-19902017/kapcsolodo/290520?oldal=120" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">claiming</a> since 2007 that he has been the victim of political smear campaigns. He explained this by saying that the police had launched an investigation against him for the unlawful payment of social benefits and for informally carrying out road repairs and procurements, such as supplying stone for certain road repairs through his son’s company. To our knowledge, nothing came happened with the case, but it was at this point that Sallai gained more serious local rivals.</p>



<p>Although Béla Markó,then the president of DAHR, campaigned in Sic in person during Romania’s first EP elections, in November 2007 more people in the village voted for the rival László Tőkés, who was running as an independent, than for the DAHR’s European Parliament candidates. In the spring of 2008, the local branch of the Hungarian Civic Party was formed, which supported <strong>Márton Csorba</strong>, the deputy mayor at the time, in the summer municipal elections.</p>



<p>In this election, Sallai was put under the most pressure, as his past as an informer was revealed. The DAHR distanced itself from him and appointed a rival candidate, but Sallai and Csorba, both running as independent, made it to the second round. Sallai won this round with 57% of the vote. Since then, he has been winning with an increasingly high percentage of the vote, with no opposition from the DAHR, only tacit support.</p>



<p>Márton Csorba ran for mayor once more in 2016, unsuccessfully. In 2024, his son, Szilárd Csorba, youth vice president of the Alliance of Hungarians in Transylvania, ran against Sallai, admitting that he did so to prevent personal conflicts and passions from dominating the local campaign, and won 30% of the vote.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Not a grain of sand was seen in the ditch</h2>



<p>Personal conflicts arose between Csorba sr. and Sallai between 2004 and 2008, when they jointly managed the village. Márton Csorba told us that they stirred things up when, as deputy mayor, he refused to sign off on the contractor&#8217;s claim that they had laid the required amount of sand under the gas pipes that were being laid at the time, when he could not see a single grain of sand in the trenches. However, he did see the<strong> scandalous investment in the never-used retirement home</strong>, which also fell through and the mayor&#8217;s son is now profiting from the building.</p>



<p>Over the past ten years, matters concerning Sic have disappeared from the daily press. There are no regular reports on the once popular dance camps, Sic Days, village development and even the annual Bartholomew’ Day celebrations are rarely mentioned. The image of the former model Hungarian village has faded.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="650" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-1024x650.jpg" alt="Megyei méltóságok Bertalan-napot ünnepelnek Széken" class="wp-image-56145" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-1024x650.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-300x191.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-768x488.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-1536x975.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-750x476.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar-1140x724.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Csorba-Antal-Csoma-Grezsa-Vakar.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">From left to right: the deputy mayor from twenty years ago, Márton Csorba, in dark glasses, Géza Antal, the executive director of the DAHR in Cluj County, Botond Csoma, the president of the DAHR in Cluj County, Consul General Csaba Grezsa, István Vákár, the vice president of the Cluj County Council at the 2024 Bertalan Day celebration. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>Sallai himself does not consider it his duty to disclose every detail of the matters we asked him about. ‘I&#8217;m not bound to reveal everything, am I?’ he cut in when we tried to clarify how long he had owned the company that operates the Sóvirág Guesthouse.</p>



<p>Three years ago, an excavator broke through the presumably illegal gas connection at this guesthouse while digging a trench for the next phase of public utility works. Márton Csorba, who runs a sawmill nearby, learned about the investigation that was launched at the time. He often visited the site during the three-day investigation, was stopped by the police and after learning from them what had happened, he notified the local press.</p>



<p>Only <a href="https://gherlainfo.ro/firma-bransata-ilegal-la-gaz-la-sic-s-a-descoperit-o-conducta-de-75-de-metri/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">GherlaInfo</a> in Gherla reported that the police, together with employees of the gas company, had identified an illegally connected, approximately 75 m long gas pipeline. The Hungarian press in Cluj County has been silent. The prosecutor’s office in Gherla, leading the investigation, has not provided any substantive information for three years and does not appear to be working on the case. Yet the family and background interests surrounding the guesthouse are not that complicated.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gas at the mayor’s guesthouse</h2>



<p>During the period when natural gas was introduced, the Sóvirág Guesthouse and the adjacent wedding hall were operated by two separate companies. One of them was founded in 2005 by the mayor&#8217;s daughter, Zsuzsi Pap (Sallai) and less than ten years later it merged into the family business, Tipca. <strong>Tipca Import Export Ltd</strong>. was founded by János Sallai in 1993, just under a year after he was elected mayor.</p>



<p>Sallai couldn’t remember exactly when he opened the guesthouse, but according to a description on an accommodation booking website, it all started in 2000. Tipca Import Export, which operates the guesthouse, switched to hospitality in 2007, but animal breeding, carpentry and joinery, electrical installation and painting and decorating also appear in the <a href="https://membri.listafirme.ro/istoric-mof.asp?cui=3879487" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>company’s business profile at the time.</u></a></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="705" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-1024x705.jpg" alt="Sóvirág Panzió Széken" class="wp-image-56148" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-1024x705.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-300x207.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-768x529.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-1536x1058.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-750x517.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1-1140x785.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag1.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="601" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-1024x601.jpg" alt="Sóvirág Panzió lombtalan fákkal" class="wp-image-56151" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-1024x601.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-300x176.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-768x451.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-1536x902.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-750x440.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2-1140x669.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag2.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Advertising billboards and outbuildings on the side, and trees in front, ensure discretion at the guesthouse. Photos: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>2007, the year we joined the EU, brought about another important change to the company:<strong> the mayor had to leave the business</strong>. His wife, who had been Tipca&#8217;s company director, also left. The company was taken over by the mayor’s son, János Sallai, who has the same name. His sister, Zsuzsi, received a 30% share in the company in 2014 when her company merged with Tipca, according to the company database.</p>



<p>The benefit of having two companies behind the two units of the guesthouse was that both could apply for EU funding. Both were built with pre-accession funds: one under the Phare program and the other under the SAPARD program, according to the mayor’s first 2008 asset declaration, which we downloaded from the databases of the Integrity Agency (ANI). The mayor confirmed during the interview that the two units were built with Phare and SAPARD funds.</p>



<p>When, well over three years ago, they found the gas pipe that shouldn’t have been there, even though his son had owned the guesthouse for 14 years, the mayor referred to it as <em>my guesthouse</em> at that heated council meeting, where the local opposition, the then councillors of the MPP [Hungarian People’s Party], <a href="https://www.facebook.com/polgarihirekszek/posts/pfbid02NLHnwfMidyejE76MfuG1ywNM3SNmAgF5ymE7cHgEmo7orpRaFHa9QhfyhkSmtDC7l?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZX0YM07W1RUVuMSSt2MLq-glgMXD2_cfG9SVJbf2YuB7e4rqb6l9zD1YWwNMVdhCtEaeZWTC7eZOlUavqzfBfkn-a2iHF-FwQUjogO-XgPmOAAbY_39CDVGTvxCQe9doA0sbNzon3ECLyo6v8epdKEibfOoSg-QihjKo_y5EQw-acH4sBm8vhehS9806J6KLfc&amp;__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>called for his resignation</u></a>. They objected that the gas theft case was cast over the entire village.</p>



<p>“Sometimes I say &#8216;my guesthouse&#8217;. It doesn&#8217;t mean anything. So they [his children – ed.] run it, it’s all theirs,&#8221; was one of the mayor’s responses when we asked him about his choice of words. His other response was that he also refers to it as <em>our guesthouse</em> and that he and his wife also go to help out at the guesthouse when the children ask them to.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The pipe and the gas</h2>



<p>We spoke with János Sallai and his son about the gas issue a few weeks apart. The only thing they agreed on was that the guesthouse definitely did not steal gas as it was supplied via a legally installed pipe.</p>



<p>The mayor said that the gas pipe found three years ago does lead to the guesthouse, but he assumes that the company that built the gas network left something unfinished there. According to him, the contractor wanted to connect the gas when the Sóvirág buildings did not yet exist. This contradicts the mayor’s 2008 declaration of assets, according to which the later-built unit of the guesthouse had already completed in 2006. The gas connection works began around that time, and according to several sources, the actual gas supply only started years later.</p>



<p>János Sallai Jr. said that the gas pipe, subject to investigation, is not even connected to the later-built unit of the guesthouse. Since that building was also built with grant money, Sallai Jr. said it is possible that a separate gas connection was part of the project, but in the end, they did not connect a separate gas pipe to that building, but instead connected it to the first one.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Even the name of the suspected crimes contradicts their explanation:</h2>



<p><strong>illegal gas connection</strong> and <strong>classified fuel theft</strong>. In response to our question, the prosecutor’s office pointed out these two suspicions a few weeks after the investigation began. The suspicion of fuel theft would not have arisen if the pipe had not been connected to the guesthouse and the gas supplier had not suffered any losses. The <a href="https://gherlainfo.ro/firma-bransata-ilegal-la-gaz-la-sic-s-a-descoperit-o-conducta-de-75-de-metri/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">first article</a> reporting on the investigation concludes by saying that the damage will be assessed, but for years we have been asking the prosecutor’s office in vain whether the damage has been assessed and how much it is estimated to be.</p>



<p>In the meantime, however, we learned that Sallai Jr. had paid the damages to the gas supplier, CPL Concordia. We received some very interesting answers when we asked about this. The mayor declared he didn’t mediate between his son and the gas supplier.</p>



<p>“I have nothing to declare on the matter. No… Let’s not get into it; they didn’t conduct any investigation whatsoever, nothing” ‒ replied Sallai Jr. when asked whether he or Tipca had paid the damages to the gas supplier CPL Concordia. He then repeated that he did not wish to comment on the matter.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="693" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-1024x693.jpg" alt="Szék tábla panziós reklámmal" class="wp-image-56158" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-1024x693.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-300x203.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-768x520.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-1536x1040.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-750x508.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno-1140x772.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-reklampanno.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Billboard advertising the Sóvirág Guesthouse. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>The manager of CPL Concordia stayed silent. First, I visited the company’s headquarters in Cluj-Napoca, where the Italian director, Andrea Gualdi, sent word through his secretary that he did not wish to discuss the matter. An hour later, I sent my questions by email, in case he changed his mind. In addition to the damage and possible compensation, I was also interested in whether someone could join their network without the network builder knowing or Concordia noticing the gas loss.</p>



<p>The director opened the email containing nine questions within a minute. Then twenty more times in the next hour. At least, that’s what the email tracker program I use showed.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why has the investigation been dragging along for over three years?</h2>



<p>Last autumn, both János Sallai Sr. and János Sallai Jr. said that they had not yet been called in to testify in the case. In other words, in the two and a half years since the investigation started, the prosecutor’s office has not questioned János Sallai Jr., who runs the guesthouse, either as a witness or as a suspect.</p>



<p>Over the past year, I have regularly asked the prosecutor’s office in Gherla why this case is so complicated that they are not making any progress: they are <strong>not pressing charges, but they are not closing the case either</strong>. The prosecutor’s office did not respond. I argued in vain that the case was of public interest due to the involvement of the mayor and his family, the prosecutor’s office repeated that it could only provide information about the investigation to those who had some kind of criminal status in the case.</p>



<p>Citing the same reason, the prosecutor&#8217;s office in Gherla is also keeping quiet about two other cases, which are entirely public matters. It has not even disclosed whether the investigation is still ongoing and, if so, what crimes are suspected. We know from the DNA [National Anticorruption Directorate] and private individuals that they investigated two otherwise justified public investments, but there is no official information about the closure of the proceedings.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">No one ages in Sic anymore</h2>



<p>More than ten years after the retirement home was ready, the DNA was still investigating, confirmed <strong>Márton Sallai</strong>, pastor of the Reformed Church congregation in Sic. The Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office questioned him as a witness around 2016 because the building in which the local authorities in Sic established a retirement home with government aid is owned by the Reformed Church. <strong>However, the retirement home never operated.</strong></p>



<p>The church-owned building in the centre of the village used to be a denominational school before nationalisation, then a cultural centre during the communist regime, and later a warehouse. In the years following the change of regime, it fell into complete disrepair. Since the building was listed in the municipality’s inventory, the mayor said, Sallai spent years looking for ways to have it rehabilitated. When the National Investment Company (CNI) announced government subsidies for retirement homes, the mayor seized the opportunity and applied for financing.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="692" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-1024x692.jpg" alt="Öregotthonból családi vállalkozás Széken" class="wp-image-56161" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-1024x692.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-300x203.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-768x519.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-1536x1039.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-750x507.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel-1140x771.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-papirtekerccsel.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The partially renovated buildings of the nursing home that never operated. Summer of 2024. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>The building was renovated and furnished in 2004 with 300,000 lei received from the CNI, according to the mayor’s recollections. Some beds were even donated, confirmed the mayor and Márton Csorba, who became deputy mayor in 2004. However, the retirement home never opened because the municipality did not have the money to pay for cooks and caregivers, explained János Sallai.</p>



<p>Although the call for tenders stated that additional funds would need to be raised to operate the retirement home, the tender itself did not cover this, nor did it stipulate any obligation to operate the facility, said Sallai.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Márton Csorba and the minister remember it otherwise.</h2>



<p>According to Csorba, the rehabilitation tender did indeed stipulate that the building renovated for this purpose should then operate as a retirement home. He said that inspectors even visited the site when he was deputy mayor. He specifically remembers the mayor sending the office caretaker to the basement to fetch the sign that had to be hung on the retirement home before the inspectors arrived.</p>



<p>The inspectors did not speak to him, he was not in office at the time and he does not know how the mayor handled the situation. He also does not understand how the office could have received <strong>government funds and a permit for the rehabilitation works</strong> when the building was not owned by the local authority. The mayor rejected his assumption that the application had included the cadastral number of another building, one that was actually owned by the town hall.</p>



<p>According to him, only the renovation financed by the grant was inspected, and everything was found to be in order, as was the case ten years later during the police investigation. However, the latter investigation also covered the ownership of the building, but it is not known whether it was closed due to the absence of a criminal offense or possibly due to the statute of limitations. In any case, the prosecutor’s office did not press charges, said the mayor.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">If its function is social, it cannot be maintained</h2>



<p>Minister Márton Sallai recalls that when he arrived in Sic in 2008, the presbyters at the time told him that the building belonged to the parish and that, if they wanted, the local council would return it to the church’s management.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="alignright size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="350" height="489" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-boszorkannyal.jpg" alt="Boszorkány a sosemvolt öregotthonnál" class="wp-image-56164" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-boszorkannyal.jpg 350w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthon-boszorkannyal-215x300.jpg 215w" sizes="(max-width: 350px) 100vw, 350px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Warehouse and witch&#8217;s quarters next to the family business. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure></div>


<p>‘I said at that time that we didn’t want it since the retirement home was not operating (nevetherless it was fully furnished: there were beds, nightstands, there was a kitchen as well as central heating) and I didn’t want the state to hold us accountable for not having started the retirement home five years earlier, as it was the purpose for which it had been rehabilitated,’ said the minister. And the parish did not have the means to care for the elderly and pay for healthcare staff.</p>



<p>Márton Sallai understands that the earlier nationalisation of the building was never entered into the land registry, so the building legally remained in parish ownership. During an investigation in the mid-2010s, the police asked him to find the parish’s decision that transferred the building to the local council for renovation. However, he could not find such a document.</p>



<p>Meanwhile, the parish won more than two million euros for the renovation of the church. The works were carried out between 2013 and 2015, with the parish providing accommodation for the workers at the contractor’s request. This is why they asked for and eventually got back the building of the nonexistent retirement home, which had previously been vacated by the town hall.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A retirement home turned into a family business</h2>



<p>The building was already structurally unstable at that time, explained the minister. According to the mayor, it is structurally sound, but because it was not in use, rain leaked in, causing the walls to crack. During the renovation of the church, the minister sought the opinion of a structural engineer, who advised that it would be best to have the building demolished.</p>



<p>The building, which was constantly decaying, was not demolished even after it was no longer needed as a workers’ hostel. The parish was unable to make use of it, explained the minister, and no entrepreneur in Sic was interested in it. So when the mayor’s son applied to rent it in 2022, they gave it to him. More precisely, <strong>the mayor&#8217;s new family company moved into it </strong>to start a new business with more public funds.</p>



<p>In 2020, János Sallai Jr. took over Chicibalazs Const Ltd., which had been involved in construction until then. In 2021, he handed it over to his mother, the wife of Mayor Sallai. According to the company’s new profile, it will manufacture household products from paper and cardboard. To start production, the company received €160,000 from the AFIR rural development fund. It only had to contribute 10% of its own funds.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="704" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-1024x704.jpg" alt="Kőfal és gyalogos sétány Széken" class="wp-image-56167" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-1024x704.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-300x206.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-768x528.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-1536x1056.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-750x516.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal-1140x784.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/oregotthonhoz-vezeto-tamfal.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The retaining wall that also supports the mayor&#8217;s wife&#8217;s business and protects the walkway. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>According to the tender panel, production should have started by 2024 at the latest. When we visited it in the spring of 2023, the building was still in ruins, but by the summer of 2024, the central part had been repaired and a huge roll of paper was put behind its glass door. They will manufacture lightweight paper products, which the building can handle, replied János Sallai Jr., who said that it was not a problem that the building could be accessed only by a pedestrian walkway. Trucks cannot drive up, but smaller cars can.</p>



<p>According to Márton Csorba, production has not yet started this year, but the site has been closed off. For decades, residents of the upper part of Csipkeszeg street have been using the path next to the building to reach the village centre. This year, however, the grassy courtyard of the building was fenced off along with the path, eliminating this well-trodden shortcut.</p>



<p>Csorba was bothered by the fact that the parish did not call for tenders in the case of the building, but instead allowed the mayor’s family to rent it immediately. According to the minister, they were constantly looking for tenants, but János Sallai Jr. replied that the building had not been advertised. He negotiated with the Cluj church district because they wanted to rent it for a longer period of time in exchange for having it renovated against a very low rent. We finally learned from the minister that the church had rented the building for 11 years for fifty euros a month.</p>



<p>After publishing the Hungarian version of this article, we received the lease agreement itself from János Sallai Jr. This shows that Chicibalazs Const Ltd. pays fifty euros of the monthly rent of € 200 to the parish, and undertakes to maintain the building for eleven years from the remaining € 20,500.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Farming money not the land</h2>



<p>Over the past three years, other companies owned by members of the mayor’s family have also received rural development subsidies. According to the <a href="https://plati.afir.info/Plati/AfisareListaPlatii" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>public database</u></a> where data are available on the platform only for two years, the mayor’s daughter&#8217;s beauty parlour received €14,000 in 2022 because it operated in a rural area while the overall yearly <a href="https://www.listafirme.ro/szsmachior-srl-37355983/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>turnover</u></a> of the company hardly exceeded €5,000 that year.</p>



<p>Tipca Import Export Ltd., which is now owned by the mayor’s son, received €26,000 in public funds in 2023, with a turnover of €110,000. These amounts are not out of line with the rural development subsidies received by other limited liability companies in the region, most of which receive between €14,000 and €26,000. After publishing the Hungarian version of this article, the rural development agency revealed that <strong>it payed €118,680 to Tipca</strong> out of a total €220,000 payed in the village in 2023.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="alignright size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="350" height="566" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-kalapos-ferfiak-kekhaz-allo.jpg" alt="Széki kalapok" class="wp-image-56154" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-kalapos-ferfiak-kekhaz-allo.jpg 350w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-kalapos-ferfiak-kekhaz-allo-186x300.jpg 186w" sizes="(max-width: 350px) 100vw, 350px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Celebrating men at the opening of the Blue House of the opposition Sic Civic Association in August 2024. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure></div>


<p>In addition to these grants, the mayor and his family also get significant income from agricultural subsidies <strong>on an individual basis</strong>. Much more than the mayor has ever admitted. For much more than they have declared to farm.</p>



<p>Mayor János Sallai has a duty, as part of his position, to declare and publish his own assets and those of his family members living in the same household. He did not bother with the publication: neither his nor the local councillors’ asset declarations can be found on the local website. We downloaded them from the ANI databases, as it is unrealistic to expect voters to know where to find these documents.</p>



<p>In his asset declaration, the mayor listed his children’s income and real estate until 2013, presumably because they lived together until then. After that, he only listed his own and his wife&#8217;s salaries as income. He only listed agricultural subsidies from 2019 onwards, and even then, he listed much less than the actual amount: RON 10,000 per year, rising to RON 16,000 lei in 2023.</p>



<p>Therefore, we requested the APIA payment agency to provide information on the annual agricultural subsidies received by János Sallai since 2007 and the subsidies received by his family members since 2015. Between 2007 and 2023, the mayor declared a total of RON 553,000 as salary and RON 46,000 in agricultural subsidies. In reality, however, he received <strong>RON 170,000</strong> from APIA during this period, nearly four times the amount he declared. In 2013-14, for example, he received almost as much as his annual salary at the time. Meanwhile, he listed 14 hectares of land as his own.</p>



<p>Together with his close family, he has received a total of RON 700,000 in agricultural subsidies since 2015. His family members have also earned well from &#8220;farming&#8221;: his wife received RON 122,000, his daughter RON 175,000 and his son RON 224,000 in agricultural subsidies between 2015 and 2023. It is also worth marrying into the Sallai family: the mayor’s son-in-law, Zsolt Pap, has been the deputy mayor&#8217;s advisor for years. And, of course, he too has been receiving RON 30,000 in agricultural subsidies annually since at least 2022.</p>



<p>The mayor’s office keeps track of how much land each farmer cultivates (whether on their own or leased land). The mayor&#8217;s office issues certificates to farmers stating how much land they farm, i.e., how much land they can claim agricultural subsidies for from APIA.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Not a hobby sum for hobby farmers</h2>



<p>We compared the average per capita subsidies received by the immediate family in 2022-23 with the average amount received by private individuals in the village during the same period. The average agricultural subsidy for family members was RON 53,000, while for village residents it was RON 37,000 for two years. (We did not include subsidies received by companies in this calculation.)</p>



<p>An even bigger problem is that <strong>the state generously supports the welfare of people</strong> who demonstrably do not make a living from farming. Sallai himself has been mayor for 33 years, his children run businesses in other fields and his wife will manufacture household paper products even though she is on disability pension, according to her husband’s latest asset declaration.</p>



<p>János Sallai Jr. answered with a clear ‘no’ when asked if any of them were farmers by trade. He said that the family members only had a few hectares and a small farm and none of them were involved in large-scale production or animal husbandry.</p>



<p>During the interview, Mayor Sallai tried to give the impression that he and his wife were some kind of hobby farmers who spent a few hours each afternoon working on their land. But he also said that &#8220;<strong>we don&#8217;t really produce much</strong>.&#8221; He ultimately justified the large sums we confronted him with by saying that most of them were the so-called butterfly subsidies.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Soaring amounts</h2>



<p>Although <strong>butterfly subsidies</strong> seems like a fairy tale phrase, they are very real and substantial support. As it turns out, part of the Sic area also falls within the protected area of the large blue butterfly (Maculinea). This rare butterfly species only lives in chemical-free meadows and pastures as untouched as possible. To minimize disturbance to these areas, the Romanian government pays up to four times the standard subsidy for ploughed fields and hayfields to those whose private or leased land falls within such areas. Mowing is only allowed in these areas during certain periods, but according to the mayor, the shrubs must be cleared.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="768" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-1024x768.jpg" alt="Sóvrág" class="wp-image-56170" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-300x225.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-295x222.jpg 295w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-768x576.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-1536x1152.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-750x563.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag-1140x855.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovirag.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Salt flower (sóvirág) in the meadows of Sic. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>The clearing of the hayfields from bushes came up when we asked why he had only declared a quarter of the actual support he had received personally until last year. ‘I don&#8217;t think so&#8230; Did I forget?’ ‘I don&#8217;t know. I&#8217;ll look into it.’ ‘I usually report what I receive.’ After we got through these rounds of disbelief and denial, Sallai said he thought he only had to report the amount remaining after the cost of clearing the field.</p>



<p>We explained to him that he had to report his income on the form, not just the profit he made from it, but as an experienced filer of asset declarations, he should have known that. In any case, the fact that we brought up transparency had a positive outcome: in his asset declaration at the end of 2024, he listed RON 66,000 in APIA subsidies.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Does transparency corrupt the elections?</h2>



<p>However, he has not yet fulfilled his promise to publish all documents of the local administration on the website, as required by administrative law. Examples of such documents include</p>



<ul>
<li class="has-medium-font-size">his own as well as the counsellor’s and the registrar’s declaration of assets and interests;</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">agenda items, draft resolutions, resolutions, and minutes of local council meetings;</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">the agenda and date of the meetings of the specialist committees, so that anyone from the community who wishes to do so can attend;</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">mayoral decrees, building permits;</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">the civil servants’ salary scale;</li>



<li class="has-medium-font-size">the draft budget and the adopted budget.</li>
</ul>



<p>All this should go back years, so that anyone (local residents, former inhabitants of Sic, newcomers, political supporters and opponents, even journalists) can trace who said what, what they decided and did in the affairs of the community and with its assets. Currently, <a href="https://szek-sic.ro/"><u>only fragments from last year and the year before</u></a> are available on the website and even those are not necessarily logically ordered. As a result, everyone mostly relies on the mayor’s verbal statements.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="693" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-1024x693.jpg" alt="Széki alpolgármester és polgármester ünnepel" class="wp-image-56186" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-1024x693.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-300x203.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-768x520.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-1536x1040.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-750x508.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai-1140x772.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sos-Sallai.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Deputy Mayor Csaba Soós and Mayor János Sallai in front of the office building on last year&#8217;s Bertalan Day. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>‘I’m aware that it’s not working; it’s not that I’m unaware. I’ve asked two or three times <em>guys, did you make it, did you post it? I wouldn’t like to get in trouble because of it, because it’s not the way it’s supposed to be.</em> There are shortcomings, but we will fix them, that’s for sure. So my plan is not to hide it, or that everyone would say or think that we have made it disappear or wanted things to disappear; that&#8217;s not true. [&#8230;] It’s not our goal to make everything unclear and non-transparent’, said the mayor, when we confronted him with the fact that while previously a few years&#8217; worth of local decisions and minutes had been posted on the local website,</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">by the beginning of 2024 the website got completely empty, all documents were removed.</h2>



<p>There were at least three reasons why the mayor’s promise was not credible even then. We knew that his local political rivals had been trying for eight years to obtain the minutes of council meetings, which should be public by default, by submitting separate requests for information. After that, the office began to publish the minutes.</p>



<p>We were also aware that a few weeks before our interview, János Sallai and the office he manages had received a warning from the prefect of Cluj County that the village registrar must comply with his legal obligation and publish the documents of the local council and the office on the village&#8217;s website. When we asked about this, the prefecture told us that, unfortunately, <strong>the administrative law doesn’t stipulate any penalties</strong> for incompliance.</p>



<p>The <a href="https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/256836" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>2022 methodology </u></a>of the information law lists several types of documents that must be published on the town hall’s website. <a href="https://legislatie.just.ro/public/detaliidocument/31413" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>This law</u></a> at least gives citizens the opportunity to sue the public institution that failed to provide them with information. However, it is still up to the mayor to decide whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee who failed to disclose or send the requested documents to the applicant.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="707" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-1024x707.jpg" alt="Szék falu" class="wp-image-56173" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-1024x707.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-300x207.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-768x530.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-1536x1061.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-750x518.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2-1140x787.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/falu-templommal2.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Prosperity and opacity in Széke. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>We knew from the public procurement database that three months before last year&#8217;s local elections, the mayor’s office in Sic commissioned a company to update the local website. Neither the amount of RON 934 allocated for this purpose nor the prefect’s warning had much effect on the project and six months later the website was still completely empty. The website has been updated this year, but it contains far fewer official documents than before it was emptied last year.</p>



<p>The mayor communicates with residents via Facebook. He posts public information on the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/primariasic" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>SIC Info</u></a> page. He regularly announces council meetings, but no longer reports on decisions. However, he posts the annual expenditures and planned budget items in an easily understandable manner. He no longer reports on specific payments, even though some of the larger items have interesting, even family-related connections.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Money farming on the local hayfields</h2>



<p>One source of revenue for the local budget of Sic comes from the leasing of communal pastures. Several individuals and companies are involved in livestock farming and about two dozen of them have established a <a href="https://membri.listafirme.ro/cooperativa-agricola-crescatorii-de-animale-31577921/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">livestock farmer cooperative</a>. The cooperative was established in 2013 by Dániel Gergely Márton because at that time it was necessary to bid for municipal pastures. As a large-scale farmer, he outbid everyone else, but he did not need all of them and did not want to antagonize the other breeders, he explained when we asked him about it.</p>



<p>However, he had to admit in the cooperative people who he knew did not keep animals, otherwise the mayor&#8217;s office would not have signed the lease agreement with the cooperative. The cooperative was used, Dániel said quite openly, to receive the APIA subsidy, which was used to pay the rent for the pastures. Dániel left in 2016, unable to tolerate the grumbling of the other members, even though he had put the pastures and the cooperative in order by then.</p>



<p>From then on, APIA has also tightened the conditions for receiving subsidies: some of the sheep had to be transferred to cooperative ownership so that the cooperative itself could farm, rather than just receiving state subsidies. In 2016-17, there was a minimal amount of business turnover. However, there has been no sign of farming since then. <a href="https://www.totalfirme.ro/cooperativa-agricola-crescatorii-de-animale-31577921" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>The public balance sheets</u></a> reveal that the cooperative has had a yearly RON 200,000-400,000 revenue and <strong>zero business turnover</strong>.</p>



<p>In other words, the cooperative does not sell animals or dairy products and most or all of its income comes from state subsidies. Half to two-thirds of the income remains as profit.</p>



<p>Sándor Filep has been running the cooperative since 2017. He said they sell lambs, but explained that sales are weak and the cooperative is weak. He could not say why their sales do not appear in the accounts. He confirmed that the only members of the cooperative now are those who actually keep animals.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A rock solid business from public money</h2>



<p>Sándor Filep is not only a livestock farmer, but also a construction contractor. Several of his companies have signed contracts worth substantial sums with the mayor&#8217;s office. For example, he received RON 1.5 million between 2020 and 2022 for concreting the stream bed without a water permit, as we reported in our article exposing <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/kozpenzek/szek-szennyviz-illegalis-patakbetonozas-sallai-janos/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">unauthorised investments</a>.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="814" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-1024x814.jpg" alt="Kibetonozott patakmeder Széken" class="wp-image-56176" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-1024x814.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-300x239.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-768x611.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-1536x1221.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-750x596.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil-1140x906.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Betonfil.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Betonfil concreted the stream with stagnant water. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>We saw for ourselves that his company continued the concreting works on the stream bed even after the water authority had stopped the work but had not yet issued the flood protection permit. When we suspected that he was <strong>building one of his houses without a permit</strong>, as we did not see an information board at the construction site, he replied that he had been working on rebuilding that house for three years and that the board must have disappeared during the process.</p>



<p>We compared the public balance sheets of his two companies, Filbeton and Beton Fil, with the data available on the public procurement portal. These show that <strong>Filbeton Sic Construct Ltd</strong>.’s annual revenue between 2019 and 2023 is consistently lower than the amounts won in public procurement. It is highly likely that it had no orders other than municipal works. (The price of these was not always paid in the year in which the company won the contract, hence the discrepancy.) Beton Fil is a company with much lower sales, where no such clear correlation was apparent.</p>



<p>András Zsoldos is also a member of the management of the livestock farming cooperative. His company, Zsoldos Farm, has signed a contract with the mayor&#8217;s office this year for various earthworks worth around RON 150,000, as revealed by the <a href="https://www.e-licitatie.ro/pub/direct-acquisitions/list/1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>public procurement portal</u></a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">It had to be propped up, yet investigated</h2>



<p>Mayor János Sallai admitted that he likes to hire Sándor Filep because <strong>he works cheaply</strong> and does not ask for an advance payment. Sándor Filep said that the town hall paid him for all the work he contracted to do. Sallai, however, wanted to illustrate how careful he is with public money by not paying in full for the small retaining wall that holds back the slippery ground on the alley leading to the old retirement home that has never existed, where his wife’s company now theoretically operates.</p>



<p>Sándor Filep’s companies have built several concrete and stone retaining walls and parking lots in Sic over the past five years. No one questions the need for parking lots near churches and parishes, but an investigation has been launched because of the retaining wall around the Reformed parish. Márton Csorba filed a complaint because, in his opinion, the local government spent public money on private property.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="566" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-1024x566.jpg" alt="Támfal parkolóval" class="wp-image-56179" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-1024x566.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-300x166.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-768x425.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-1536x849.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-750x415.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul-1140x630.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/tamfal-parokia-korul.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The retaining wall with the parking lot around the parish. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>The older retaining wall was constantly cracking and had become dangerous, explained minister Márton Sallai. The county road winds between the Reformed church and the parish in the centre of Sic, where the parish house is a few meters higher than the road level. The at least one hundred meter long retaining wall holds the ground below the parish so that it does not collapse onto the county road.</p>



<p>The parish did not have the money to replace the crumbling retaining wall, but the municipality let it know that it would build the retaining wall with public funds if the parish requested it and if it could be built 2.5 meters further in to create a parking lot for the congregation members.</p>



<p>Márton Sallai took the relevant parish documents with him when he went to be questioned by the National Anticorruption Directorate. The investigation was still ongoing in the summer of 2022, but he has not received any further information since then. When we contacted the National Anticorruption Directorate, they replied that they had handed the case over to the prosecutor&#8217;s office in Gherla, which has not provided any information either.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Márton Csorba has been fixated on him for years,</h2>



<p>because even though he wanted to be mayor, he wasn’t elected, says Mayor Sallai about every official matter we brought up. János Sallai Jr. and Sándor Filep also accused Csorba of hindering every investment out of envy.</p>



<p>Both Sallai Jr. and Sr. accuse him of other things, but when we asked them why they didn’t report these matters to the authorities if they were criminal offenses, they just kept repeating that they would then have to deal with Csorba all the time. According to Csorba, they are making things up and spreading rumours about him that they cannot prove.</p>



<p>Csorba gives him enough work, says Mayor Sallai, as he has had to search for documents for several investigations, which the office sometimes gets back from the police and the prosecutor’s office and sometimes does not. He says that the authorities do not even notify him when they close a case in which he has no criminal liability.</p>



<p>‘I&#8217;m not the kind of person who is constantly thinking about reporting this or that. Maybe the time will come. And it will definitely come because he&#8217;s been doing this for thirty years,’ said the mayor about Csorba and his own intentions.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Pride and justice</h2>



<p>Csorba accuses the mayor of wrongdoing in a gazillion other cases. Here, we have only written about those cases in which the mayor&#8217;s handling of public funds and other public assets is truly questionable, and about which we have been able to obtain information from official and other local sources.</p>



<p>We took the same approach with Márton Csorba, whom the mayor mentioned in connection with a tax fraud case and a case involving public debt.</p>



<p>Unlike János Sallai, Márton Csorba described both incidents in detail. He received a suspended sentence of one and a half years in the VAT fraud case because his accountant had transferred fictitious invoices through the eight companies she worked for, including Csorba’s and then reclaimed the VAT. None of the company managers knew about this, Csorba said, but they had to pay the fine because a company manager is responsible for everything that happens in his company and must know everything. The mayor’s lawyer attended every hearing in this case, Márton Csorba noted.</p>



<p>The other case began when Csorba was still a local councillor. According to Sallai, he was absent a lot, so they removed him from the council. Csorba says he did not attend the meetings because at that time they did not send them the agenda items in advance, so he did not know what he would have to decide when he went there. The council voted to have him removed and he challenged this decision in court.</p>



<p>Csorba lost the lawsuit, so he was ordered to pay the court fees, which he has refused to do ever since because he considers the decision unfair. He says that if the office needs the money, it should initiate enforcement proceedings against him, which the office has not done so far.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="732" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-1024x732.jpg" alt="Széki néni széki viseletben" class="wp-image-56182" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-1024x732.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-300x214.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-768x549.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-1536x1097.jpg 1536w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-120x86.jpg 120w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-350x250.jpg 350w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-750x536.jpg 750w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony-1140x814.jpg 1140w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/szeki-ruhas-neni-templomtorony.jpg 1800w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Elderly lady in traditional Sic folk costume. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>In addition, Márton Csorba celebrates Bartholomew’s’ Day every year on 24 August at the monument in Sic together with the mayor, local councillors and county leaders of the DAHR. </p>



<p>The festive speeches are, of course, about new beginnings because although the Tatars ravaged Sic on Bartholomew’s’ Day in 1717 and killed almost all of its inhabitants, the community was able to get back on its feet, among other things by mining the salt beneath its feet. How to face and overcome the moral crisis caused not by an external enemy but by the decisions of its own leaders is a question that the proud community of Sic still has to answer.</p>



<p><em>This article was produced as part of the <a href="https://berthafoundation.org/bertha-challenge/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">2025 Bertha Challenge Fellowship</a>.</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="500" height="257" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Bertha-Logo_kicsi.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-56192" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Bertha-Logo_kicsi.jpg 500w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Bertha-Logo_kicsi-300x154.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 500px) 100vw, 500px" /></figure>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/investigations-bounce-off-the-eternal-mayor-of-sic/">Investigations Bounce Off The Eternal Mayor Of Sic</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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		<authorId>15</authorId><authorUrl>https://atlatszo.ro/en/author/szabotunde/</authorUrl><authorId>15</authorId><authorUrl>https://atlatszo.ro/en/author/szabotunde/</authorUrl>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Does the Mother Tongue Cost Too Much?</title>
		<link>https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/minorities-language-rights-romania-public-administration/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Szabó Tünde]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2022 16:07:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bilingualism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DAHR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[language rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[minorities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[minority rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mother tongue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Romania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Transylvania]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dev2.atlatszo.exot.hu/?p=38508</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Minorities in Romania fought hard for the right to use their native tongue at the local level, but more than 20 years after the law changed, its implementation is patchy, BIRN and Átlátszó Erdély have found. “Tough” and “brutal” is how Béla Markó recalls his battle on behalf of ethnic minorities like him to use [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/minorities-language-rights-romania-public-administration/">Does the Mother Tongue Cost Too Much?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Minorities in Romania fought hard for the right to use their native tongue at the local level, but more than 20 years after the law changed, its implementation is patchy, BIRN and Átlátszó Erdély have found.</p>



<span id="more-38508"></span>



<p>“Tough” and “brutal” is how Béla Markó recalls his battle on behalf of ethnic minorities like him to use their mother tongue in dealings with Romania’s public administration at the local level.</p>



<p>It was 2001 when ethnic Hungarians like Markó, then leader of the ethnic Hungarian DAHR party, and 18 other officially recognised minorities won the right to use their native languages in public administration in those regions where they account for more than 20 per cent of the population, overcoming fierce opposition from Romanian nationalists.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-atlatszo-erdely wp-block-embed-atlatszo-erdely"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="D5PlgbNMg1"><a href="https://atlatszo.ro/legfontosabb/nyelvi-jogok-kozigazgatas-anyanyelv-nyelvhasznalat/">Túl drága az anyanyelv?</a></blockquote><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" title="&#8220;&lt;strong&gt;Túl drága az anyanyelv?&lt;/strong&gt;&#8221; &#8212; Átlátszó Erdély" src="https://atlatszo.ro/legfontosabb/nyelvi-jogok-kozigazgatas-anyanyelv-nyelvhasznalat/embed/#?secret=u1P8gLm01J#?secret=D5PlgbNMg1" data-secret="D5PlgbNMg1" width="500" height="282" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe>
</div><figcaption>The longer, Hungarian version of the current article</figcaption></figure>



<p>Yet two decades later, with Markó now 71 years old and retired from politics, a joint investigation by BIRN and Átlátszó Erdély has found that those language rights are rarely upheld, in part because the financial burden of implementing the law falls “exclusively” on often cash-strapped local authorities.</p>



<p>István Horváth, professor of sociology at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj, northwestern Romania, said few minorities are ready to risk the red tape that comes with asserting their language rights.</p>



<p>“At present, many minority citizens prefer not to assert their language rights in public administration if this means a longer administrative procedure or if it jeopardises the success of their application,” Horváth told BIRN.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Court challenges</h2>



<p>Ethnic Hungarians are the largest minority group in Romania, accounting for a little over six per cent of the total population of 19 million people, or some 1.2 million. Most of them live in Transylvania, which was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire until 1918. Other ethnic minorities, such as Roma, Ukrainians, Germans, and Serbs, are less numerous and scattered throughout Romania.</p>



<p>Under the law, the names of towns, villages and public institutions in areas where a certain ethnic minority represents at least 20 per cent of the population must be displayed in Romanian and the language of that minority.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/varosnevtabla-vagott.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>The nameplate at the entrances to Cluj-Napoca, written trilingual after a lengthy lawsuit on the condition that it can be added a sign in Latin, saying that the city was founded by Roman Emperor Hadrian. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>In practice, this applies to 523 localities across the country, most of them places where ethnic Hungarians live in compact communities.</p>



<p>Hungarian-language signs are often vandalised or challenged in court.</p>



<p>In Miercurea Ciuc [Csíkszereda in Hungarian], eastern Transylvania, for example, the mayoralty recently announced it must put up new bilingual street signs because a Romanian national organisation had challenged the current signs in court for placing the Hungarian name above the Romanian. The change will cost some 20,000 euros from the local budget.</p>



<p>Deputy mayor Béla Bors said the law was unclear, but “we have to respect the decision of the court.”</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Lack of funds, staff</h2>



<p>Cases like Miercurea Ciuc are rare, for the very fact that most local authorities in Romania complain they cannot afford to implement the law on minority languages.</p>



<p>A 2021 study by the government-supported Department for Interethnic Relations, DRI, found that in many towns and villages where ethnic Hungarians represent more than 20 per cent of the population, the proceedings of the local council are not translated into Hungarian due to a lack of funds and staff.</p>



<p>The situation is even worse in Roma communities, where neither the decisions of the local council nor correspondence of the public administration are translated into Romani.</p>



<p>The only example where, on the whole, the law is respected is in eastern Transylvania, in the counties of Harghita and Covasna, where ethnic Hungarians, known locally as Szeklers, account for between 70 and 80 per cent of the population. There, the local administration is staffed mainly by ethnic Hungarians.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/tablak-vagott.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>Information for tourists in Cluj-Napoca, middle of Transylvania, mostly visited by tourists from Hungary. There is a theater and opera for the local Hungarians, but the sign post lacks the Hungarian language. Photo: Tünde Szabó</figcaption></figure>



<p>The problem is particularly acute in the justice system, where ethnic minorities are frequently denied the right, enshrined in law, to use their mother tongue in legal proceedings. Translation is often unavailable in courts. If it is available, it comes with a fee.</p>



<p>The DRI told BIRN it has no legal authority to punish violations of the law on minority languages. County prefectures should monitor the use of minority languages in public administration, but it is questionable how often they really do.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">‘Significant’ costs</h2>



<p>The cost of implementing the law has still to be clearly regulated, and it is “significant,” said István Horváth, the Cluj professor, citing data from a recent study he co-authored. “It is unfair that they [the costs] should be borne exclusively by local administrations,” he told Átlátszó Erdély.</p>



<p>Some Romanians are suspicious of greater language rights for Hungarians, fearing a push for autonomy for Transylvania. More widespread official use of Hungarian will discourage ethnic Hungarians from learning Romanian, they say.</p>



<p>Sociologist István Gergő Székely said such fears were unfounded. “It is unlikely that the wider and better-funded use of minority languages in local government will affect people’s learning of Romanian,” he said.</p>



<p>Romania, he said, should work on decentralisation and digitalise access to public services, meaning translation could be automatic.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-sinopsis wp-block-embed-sinopsis"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper">
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="vgvRoWNwbs"><a href="https://sinopsis.info.ro/2022/05/26/drepturile-lingvistice-ale-minoritatilor-costuri-ascunse-si-o-legislatie-care-nu-este-respectata/">Drepturile lingvistice ale minorităților. Costuri ascunse și o legislație care nu este respectată</a></blockquote><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" title="&#8222;Drepturile lingvistice ale minorităților. Costuri ascunse și o legislație care nu este respectată&#8221; &#8212; Sinopsis" src="https://sinopsis.info.ro/2022/05/26/drepturile-lingvistice-ale-minoritatilor-costuri-ascunse-si-o-legislatie-care-nu-este-respectata/embed/#?secret=F9MVR4asv7#?secret=vgvRoWNwbs" data-secret="vgvRoWNwbs" width="500" height="282" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe>
</div><figcaption>The longer, Romanian version of the current article</figcaption></figure>



<p><em>Illustration: András Szén</em></p>



<p><em>This article was co-produced by BIRN Romania and Átlátszó Erdély and supported by the&nbsp;NewsSpectrum Fellowship&nbsp;through its programme to strengthen cooperation between majority and minority language press publications. This shortened English version was originally published on <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/15/two-decades-on-romanias-minority-language-law-often-ignored/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Balkan Insight</a>.</em></p>



<p></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/minorities-language-rights-romania-public-administration/">Does the Mother Tongue Cost Too Much?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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								<title>mothertongue-costs-ki</title>
								<link>https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/minorities-language-rights-romania-public-administration/</link></image><authorId>15</authorId><authorUrl>https://atlatszo.ro/en/author/szabotunde/</authorUrl><authorId>15</authorId><authorUrl>https://atlatszo.ro/en/author/szabotunde/</authorUrl>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Marriage of convenience sweetened with millions – how Fidesz persuaded the largest Hungarian party in Transylvania</title>
		<link>https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/marriage-of-convenience-sweetened-with-millions-how-fidesz-persuaded-the-largest-hungarian-party-in-transylvania/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sipos Zoltán]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2021 08:03:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DAHR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fidesz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungarian government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hunor Kelemen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Romania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[School Foundation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UDMR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Viktor Orbán]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zoltán Nagy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zsolt Semjén]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dev2.atlatszo.exot.hu/?p=32115</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At first Fidesz attempted to bleed to death the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Transylvania (DAHR). After they realized that DAHR cannot be replaced, they forced the party into a loyalty competition. The once freezing relationship between Fidesz and the DAHR evolved to close cooperation, allowing the Hungarian government unprecedented influence in Transylvania. Meanwhile, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/marriage-of-convenience-sweetened-with-millions-how-fidesz-persuaded-the-largest-hungarian-party-in-transylvania/">Marriage of convenience sweetened with millions – how Fidesz persuaded the largest Hungarian party in Transylvania</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><b>At first Fidesz attempted to bleed to death the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Transylvania (DAHR). After they realized that DAHR cannot be replaced, they forced the party into a loyalty competition. The once freezing relationship between Fidesz and the DAHR evolved to close cooperation, allowing the Hungarian government unprecedented influence in Transylvania. Meanwhile, the opposition of DAHR that was once a “strategic partner” of Fidesz became a “traitor of the nation”.</b></strong><span id="more-32115"></span></p>
<p>“We cannot simply look away from László Kövér’s politically irresponsible raid in Transylvania” – stated Hunor Kelemen, president of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians (DAHR) in July 2012, after the Fidesz politician had campaigned for the Hungarian Civic Party in Romania (political opponent of DAHR).</p>
<p>Eight years later, during the Parliament election campaign in November 2020, scrolling through the DAHR campaign videos on Facebook, it is not easy to decide whether it’s Fidesz or DAHR politicians we see campaigning.</p>
<p>As the election day was closing in, Facebook posts increasingly showcased members of the Hungarian government and the investments achieved with the help of the Hungarian government, while the issues connected to Bucharest were gradually pushed to the background.</p>
<p>How has the relationship between the two parties evolve from the initial „cold war” to these days, when it seems completely natural that phone messages from Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó are urging Hungarians to vote for DAHR?</p>
<p>How has it come to be normal by now that one of the foundations of the DAHR actively helps Hungarians from Romania register for the Hungarian parliamentary elections, and leading DAHR politicians publicly back up Fidesz in the campaign?</p>
<p>What does it mean that the NGOs in the backyard of the DAHR have received in recent years Hungarian public funds for largely the same amount as the Romanian governmental funding for the Hungarian minority of Romania?</p>
<p>The 1,2 million Hungarian minority living in Transylvania is by far the largest community living outside the borders of Hungary, with a complex institutional system.</p>
<p>This article offers an overview of the relationship of the largest political party of the community, DAHR with the Hungarian governing parties from 2010, the inauguration of the second Orbán  government, to December 2020, when the new Cîțu government was formed with the participation of the DAHR.</p>
<div class="et_pb_module et_pb_text et_pb_text_4 et_pb_text_align_left et_pb_bg_layout_light">
<div class="et_pb_text_inner">
<h2><strong><b>What are we talking about precisely?</b></strong></h2>
<p>When I’m speaking about the relations between the Hungarian governing party and the DAHR (henceforth simplified to Fidesz-DAHR relations), I mean primarily the relations, decisions and public communication of Viktor Orbán and high officials of the Hungarian government in areas of national politics on the one hand, and leading politicians of the DAHR on the other hand.</p>
<p>It is clear to me that the material presented here is by far not the full picture of the matter. This is due to a particular feature of Hungarian national politics: in addition to the leading politicians, many other political and business actors give declarations, seek and build partnerships more or less independently, and initiate projects with various Hungarian politicians from Romania, non-governmental organisations, businessmen and churches.</p>
<p>Some of the relations between leading Fidesz politicians and Hungarian public figures from Romania go back a long way, even as early as the 1980s. The presentation of several decades-long careers, complicated and often burdened relationships and disputes extends well beyond the scope of this article, so these will only be referred to briefly if relevant for the topic.</p>
<p>I will not present the geopolitical context and the Hungarian and Romanian political contexts due to lack of space. I will only mention the political events in Hungary or Romania or the Hungarian political stage in Romania insofar as they are relevant for the Fidesz-DAHR relationship.</p>
<p>The participation of the DAHR in the Cîțu-government will likely influence the Fidesz-DAHR relationship. But since this is a relatively recent development, I will not endeavour into prophecies.</p>
<p>It also needs further research to reveal how the Romanian model of minority accommodation and the negotiation position of the DAHR in Bucharest was influenced by the expansion of Hungarian national politics, the ever growing Hungarian funding, and the Fidesz-DAHR relationship which became stronger by the year.</p>
<p>The effect of national politics on an individual level greatly defines the political options of the DAHR as well. The nation is being, or has already been institutionalised into a virtual community by procedures like the simplified naturalization and the like. However, I will not dwell on these at too much length either.</p>
<p>The conceptual framework of my interpretation of the events is defined by the works and lectures on national politics of Nándor Bárdi, Levente Salat, Tibor Toró, István Gergő Székely and Tamás Kiss.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Press reviews completed with background interviews</b></strong></h2>
<p>This article builds on the press review on the abovementioned period based on the chronology of Frigyes Udvardy and the archive of the MTI (Hungarian Press Agency). The advantage of these sources is that the press reports accurately mirror the events and declarations of the given period.</p>
<p>Their disadvantage, however, is that they mostly focus on leading politicians and events readily accessible to a wide audience and rarely on what happened behind the scenes.</p>
<p>For instance, the reports published at the time only allowed for guesses about the atmosphere on Viktor Orbán and Hunor Kelemen’s first private meeting in July 2011 at Băile Tușnad/Tusnádfürdő (in the future, we will refer to both Romanian and Hungarian versions of Transylvanian geographical names – editor’s note). We have nothing more than speculations on how politicians from both parties were conveying messages during the “cold war” period.</p>
<p>My interviews with active or retired politicians of the DAHR, or officials, journalists or social scientists who have inside knowledge about the political relations and system of funding also yielded uneven results.</p>
<blockquote><p>“There’s full information blackout. Even those working inside the system are told only the essential information needed for their jobs.” – explained one of my sources, who used to be employed by a foundation close to the DAHR.</p></blockquote>
<p>Very few people have access to the entire picture, on the things said at the private meetings, or the background of certain events. I have asked for interviews from some of the leading DAHR politicians – DAHR president Hunor Kelemen and his chief of staff, Zoltán Nagy among others. With a few exceptions, my letters of request have not been answered. I was still able to conduct about a dozen interviews – most of my sources requested anonimity.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>“Shall we kick the DAHR apart?”</b></strong></h2>
<p>“You have to understand, I can’t make national politics here in the Carpathian basin without the DAHR” – Viktor Orbán used to say in private meetings in the 1990s. However, the president of Fidesz did not necessarily had in mind the close cooperation that has formed in recent years between the Hungarian government and the DAHR.</p>
<p>“In 1998, when Viktor Orbán came to Tusványos (a summer camp/university in Transylvania in Băile Tușnad/Tusnádfürdő known to be a meeting point to people interested in politics and Hungarian minority issues, later used by Viktor Orbán as a platform to promote his illiberal ideas) for the first time as Prime Minister, he asked in a private meeting: shall we kick the DAHR apart? Should we start investing into an alternative DAHR or not? We told him back then that there was no need for that, but instead we needed to strengthen the opposition within the DAHR” – recalled a politician who was a member of the Reform Group, once the inner opposition of the DAHR.</p>
<p>Although during the first Orbán government the relations with the DAHR then under the presidency of Béla Markó were normalised, there were tensions and frictions on a daily basis. The relationship between a hot headed Viktor Orbán, always two steps forward, and a level headed Béla Markó (the president of the DAHR at that time) who always consulted with everyone is best documented by the debate around the foundation of the Sapientia private university.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Why nobody consulted Markó?</b></strong></h2>
<p>“In 1999, Viktor Orbán – on his way to Tusványos – meets Béla Markó at the airport in Marosvásárhely/Târgu Mureș. During the approximately ten minutes long meeting Markó says that DAHR managed to change the law of education and although there is no possibility of a Hungarian university financed by the Romanian state, nothing stands in the way of founding a private university.</p>
<p>At a dinner in Tusványos, the topic of a private university with Hungarian funding comes up. Viktor Orbán goes home, then in August there comes the government decree about the foundation of the university, with a yearly funding frame of 2 billion forints. Markó is outraged by the news, why didn’t anybody ask him? The Fidesz raises its eyebrows and can’t figure out what’s going on” – recalls one of our sources.</p>
<p>Béla Markó confirmed, and also gave further details about this. Markó said that the idea of an elite postgradual university came up in 1998, during a discussion with Viktor Orbán, and he thought that was a good idea. They agreed that they will develop the idea in the future.</p>
<p>In 1999, there was indeed a meeting with Viktor Orbán on the Marosvásárhely/Târgu Mureș airport. They travelled together into the city, where Orbán had to meet Romanian PM Vasile Radu. „Yes, on the way from the airport, we talked about a private university that could be established with the help of the Hungarian government (this was different from the original idea of a small, elite postgradual university. We were talking about a broader educational spectrum) – explained Markó.</p>
<p>According to the former DAHR president, they had disagreements on two points: according to the Hungarian government, the university would have faculties in Kolozsvár/Cluj-Napoca and Csíkszereda/Miercurea Ciuc, and not also in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely. The other debate was about the study programs: initially, they only offered complementary programs (programs that did not exist in Hungarian language at other state universities). “For me, this was a very important principle. At first, they kept themselves to this principle, but later they did not” – said Béla Markó.</p>
<p>There’s little we know why Béla Markó and Orbán’s relationship has deteriorated in time. A frequently mentioned story claims that the final break was caused by the fact that after the first turn of the 2002 Parliamentary elections in Hungary, when it wasn’t yet very clear who the winner was, Markó hurried to congratulate Medgyessy, the socialists’ candidate for prime minister.</p>
<p>Since Viktor Orbán considered the DAHR to be on his side, he thought it was betrayal.</p>
<blockquote><p>“When I go out before the frontline and the enemy shoots at me, I’m prepared for that. But when they shoot at my back from my own camp, I cannot defend myself from it” – Orbán said once in Tusványos.</p></blockquote>
<p>Another source recalls that Orbán stated once: no one had ever offended him as much as Béla Markó did. But he did not say then what this offence was.</p>
<p>„After elections, it is a custom to congratulate the winner. I said something like I congratulate the parties that were elected into the Parliament, especially MSZP, (the socialist party) that got the most votes. But I did not mention any names, and said that we should wait for the second round” – remembered Markó Béla. The former politician said that Fidesz tried to influence DAHR with various methods many times, including decisions regarding its cadre policy. „They soon found out that their wishes are not granted, and from that point, we had ups and downs in our relationship, despite the fact that we met the leaders of Fidesz often” – Markó said.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31776" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31776" style="width: 600px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31776" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/210114_Tokes_Semjen_Marko_Kolozsvar_SzentesZagon.jpeg" alt="" width="600" height="399" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/210114_Tokes_Semjen_Marko_Kolozsvar_SzentesZagon.jpeg 600w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/210114_Tokes_Semjen_Marko_Kolozsvar_SzentesZagon-300x200.jpeg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31776" class="wp-caption-text">From left to right: László Tőkés, president of the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania, Zsolt Semjén Hungarian deputy prime minister and Béla Markó DAHR-president in the summer of 2010 in Kolozsvár/Cluj. Photo: Zágon Szentes</figcaption></figure></p>
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<h2><strong><b>Why should you relate the same way to those who love you and those who don’t?</b></strong></h2>
<p>The then president of the DAHR formulated the principle of equal distance – or equal closeness – meaning that the DAHR must maintain good relations in both Bucharest and Budapest and with both rightist and lefties parties. However, this does not mean subordination, the DAHR takes all its decisions autonomously, in accordance with its own interests.</p>
<p>“Equal closeness is stupid. Why should you relate the same way to those who love you and those who don’t?” – thinks one of our sources, a politician of the DAHR, who also adds that it never happened after the fall of Fidesz in 2002 that Hungarian politicians from Slovakia or Serbia would visit Gyurcsány and not pay their respects in the Fidesz headquarters located in the Lendvay Street. Our source claims that Markó never made this gesture towards Orbán.</p>
<blockquote><p>“I can’t remember a principle about visiting courteously everybody when we go to Hungary. We had discussions with the people we had business with, and it was natural we had more business with the government. But we maintained the relations with the opposition as well, this is not only natural, but also useful” – explained Markó Béla.</p></blockquote>
<p>Whatever happened, following Senator Attila Verestóy who was the first to be blacklisted in the Fidesz, Béla Markó was also added to this list after 2002. So it became clear already during the socialist government that as long as Markó is the president of the DAHR, the relationship of the Alliance and the Fidesz would always be tensioned.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>What does Markó think? Ask Hunor Kelemen!</b></strong></h2>
<p>Markó’s carefully singled out successor, Hunor Kelemen, whose image was minutiously constructed in the second part of the 2000s, did not have an easy job. The Fidesz saw him for a long time merely as a poor imitation of Markó.</p>
<p>In addition to their physical resemblance, this view also had its foundation in the fact that Kelemen very carefully tried in this period to always say exactly what the DAHR president said. “If you wanted to know what Markó thinks about one thing or another, you had to talk to Hunor Kelemen.” – a DAHR politician remarked ironically.</p>
<p>Another interviewee reported that Orbán “talked mockingly, contemptuously (about Hunor Kelemen) if his name came up. Zsolt Németh (a high ranking Fidesz politician with very good relationships in Transylvania) had to warn him that soon Kelemen could be the boss in Transylvania.” Kelemen only became interesting for the Fidesz and Viktor Orbán after his election, before that he had no relations with Orbán, and the Fidesz also didn’t seek contact.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_29448" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-29448" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-29448" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/172114_194803657215920_1490584_o-1-1024x582.jpg" alt="Olosz Gergely (balra) és Orbán Viktor. Fotó: nol.hu" width="885" height="503" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/172114_194803657215920_1490584_o-1-1024x582.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/172114_194803657215920_1490584_o-1-300x171.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/172114_194803657215920_1490584_o-1-768x436.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/172114_194803657215920_1490584_o-1.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-29448" class="wp-caption-text">Gergely Olosz (left) together with Viktor Orbán. Photo: nol.hu</figcaption></figure></p>
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<p>The big change came in February 2011, at the DAHR congress in Oradea/Nagyvárad. Three candidates competed for the presidency of the DAHR: Hunor Kelemen with the most chances, the liberal-minded Péter Eckstein-Kovács and Zsolt Semjén’s protegee, Gergely Olosz.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Olosz, the total mistake</b></strong></h2>
<p>“Olosz was a total mistake. We told Viktor Orbán and Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén not to invest in Geri, because he is corrupt, incompetent, and stands no chance.” – recalled our source.</p>
<p>Semjén, who had know Gergely Olosz since childhood as he attended the Benedictine high school at Pannonhalma, rejected the warning of the Transylvanian politicians saying that his protegee was denigrated by the Sekler politicians of the DAHR, Sándor Tamás and Árpád Antal, and that in reality it was precisely the other way round, Tamás and Antal were corrupt.</p>
<p>This episode highlights one of Viktor Orbán’s weaknesses: he takes important decisions without really researching the problem, and he is inclined to blindly follow the advice of people in his entourage.</p>
<p>And it is a strange irony of fate that Gergely Olosz, sentenced for three years of prison with execution for traffic of influence, is now hiding in Hungary, and his protector, Zsolt Semjén, is a frequent guest of Sándor Tamás and Árpád Antal.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Nasty and offensive speech at the congress</b></strong></h2>
<p>Back to the congress in Oradea/Nagyvárad: Ildikó Pelczné Gáll, who brought the message of the Fidesz to the congress, quite openly threatened the participants preparing for the election of the DAHR  president. The vice-president of the Fidesz said that a political organisation can get tired too, just like the human organism: they may become sluggish and sickly. “You have reached this level today – she said. – If you vote for change today, we will offer you a helping hand in the future.”</p>
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<p>We did not expect this speech to be so nasty and offensive – remarked one of our conversation partners – but there had been signs from Orbán’s environment that the Fidesz planned to make peace with the DAHR, if the organisation elected a president who was to Viktor Orbán’s liking.</p>
<p>One of the main duties of the newly elected President of the DAHR, Hunor Kelemen, was clear from the very beginning: he had to settle the relationship with Viktor Orbán.</p>
<p>After the congress, in an interview for the Hargita Népe newspaper, Zsolt Semjén stated very clearly the expectations of the Hungarian government: “The DAHR must change its principle of equal distance.” The Deputy Prime Minister responsible for national politics added: “the new start is open for everyone”.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>DAHR politicians go to Hungary very often</b></strong></h2>
<p>We know little about what happened behind closed doors, but we do know that the number of trips to Hungary of the DAHR politicians continuously increased after 2011. Átlátszó Erdély obtained information on the trips abroad of DAHR politicians via freedom of information requests, although the DAHR offered no names or details. The data reveal that in 2009 – the last year of the socialist/Bajnai government – the DAHR officials had 11 trips abroad, and ten of these was to Hungary.</p>
<p>In 2010, in the year when the Fidesz came to power again, the number of trips increased to 38 (most of them also to Hungary). In 2011, the first year of Hunor Kelemen’s presidency, they reported 49 trips. This means that officials of the DAHR travelled to Hungary almost every week.</p>
<p>The number of trips abroad increased every year. 2017 is the last year that we have data from, in that year DAHR politicians reported 130 trips abroad. In the vast majority of the cases, the destination was Hungary, and the trip lasted for 2 or 3 days, or even a week. And although the data do not show whom they visited, it is most likely that their did not spend this time with the Hungarian opposition parties.</p>
<p>Despite more conciliatory press declarations and frequent meetings, the war between the DAHR and the Fidesz was still very much on in 2011. In April 2011, the Hungarian diplomats left the room at a DAHR Council of Representatives meeting, when MP Péter Lakatos mockingly criticised the Orbán government.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>The bleeding of the DAHR</b></strong></h2>
<p>A much more serious offence than this incident for the DAHR was that in May 2011 the Hungarian government withdrew the handling of the educational support grants from the Iskola Alapítvány (School Foundation) founded by the DAHR.</p>
<p>The main reason why this measure affected the DAHR was not so much the financial gains from this programme, but the loss of all up-to-date data on Hungarian families from Romania, our sources explained. These data were invaluable for the political marketing of the DAHR in election campaigns. Let’s not forget, these were pre-GDPR times.</p>
<p>At the same time, the Progress Foundation, another foundation close to the DAHR, was also informed that it was no longer authorised to handle the administration of the Hungarian certificates (a program run by the Hungarian government that allowed Hungarians to have preferential treatment when traveling to Hungary). The closing down of these offices affected the DAHR because they worked in the same office with the territorial organizations of the DAHR, therefore they could pay for part of their operating costs and some of their employees from Hungarian government money.</p>
<blockquote><p>In July 2011, in the EU camp from Izvorul Mureșului/Marosfő, Hunor Kelemen said: “we need Budapest’s advice, but we don’t need one thing: the Hungarian capital to tell us what is good for the Hungarians from Transylvania.”</p></blockquote>
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<h2><strong><b>A carefully orchestrated rendezvous at Tusványos</b></strong></h2>
<p>According to our knowledge, the first private meeting between Hunor Kelemen and Viktor Orbán took place a few weeks after the EU camp, on 23 July, at Băile Tușnad/Tusnádfürdő. We know little about this meeting, apart from one detail. The organizers left nothing to chance: to ensure that nobody disturbs them, they organised a different programme for the other politicians who attended the Tusványos summer university (among others, László Tőkés, Csaba Sógor and Péter Eckstein-Kovács) in the other end of the town.</p>
<p>The meeting wasn’t public, the news that it took place appeared in the daily newspaper Evenimentul Zilei. “I feel that the deadlock with the Hungarian government was broken (…) in the following period we can keep on amending this relationship, because both parties expressed their openness and will to cooperate (…)”, – stated Kelemen.</p>
<p>In parallel, the opposition of the DAHR was organising itself. On 15 September 2011, they registered the Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania (HPPT) in Bucharest. “In this period before the registration of the party we received no support from the Fidesz. Orbán said, if they want to do this, let them. Let’s see what they are capable of, let’s support them, but not a lot.” – a politician of the opposition who took part in the collection of signatures and the registration process told Átlátszó Erdély.</p>
<p>It is true, however, that the Democracy Centres operated by the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (HNCT), whose main activity was to assist with simplified naturalisation, also functioned as territorial organisations of the HPPT.</p>
<p>Just like the offices of Progress Foundation, the Democracy Centre, the HPPT and the HNCT all used the same offices and partly employed the same team. This practice is documented here.</p>
<p>We also revealed how Hungarian state companies supported the newly founded NGOs of HPPT politicians with approximately 1 million euros during the local government elections in June 2012 and the Parliament elections in December 2012.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31757" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31757" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-31757" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3-1024x766.png" alt="310121_kelemen_orban-Szen_andras" width="885" height="662" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3-1024x766.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3-300x225.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3-295x222.png 295w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3-768x575.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3-101x75.png 101w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_3.png 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31757" class="wp-caption-text">Graphics by András Szén</figcaption></figure></p>
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<h2><strong><b>Let them run and see what comes out of it</b></strong></h2>
<p>“While it was clear that the DAHR was cut off from the funds, it wasn’t clear in what way and with how much money the Hungarian government would support the HPPT” – political scientist Tibor Toró explained.</p>
<p>Another source claimed that the money was transferred with delay, and although Fidesz campaign guru Gábor Kubatov trained them, they received no political support from Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister never campaigned for them.</p>
<blockquote><p>“2012 was an experiment: is it possible to shatter the political monopoly of the DAHR? Not even Viktor Orbán himself could be sure that it would work, so he didn’t engage fully into it. It was much rather a thing like let them run, and see what comes out of it” – said Tibor Toró.</p></blockquote>
<p>While HPPT hoped for 30-40% of the Hungarian votes, the results of the 2012 local government election helped clarify the power relations: the newly registered HPPT received 44,000 (0.45%) of the votes, and the other opposition party, the HCP 36,000 (0.37%). It was clear that neither of the two parties could really threaten the DAHR, which had 490,000 votes.</p>
<p>In July 2012, Viktor Orbán had meetings with the presidents of all three parties. “[Viktor Orbán] does not want to tell us in Transylvania what to do. He gave us no advice about the parliamentary elections in the autumn.” – the President of the DAHR declared.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Orbán does not want to get in conflict with DAHR voters</b></strong></h2>
<p>Orbán made a somewhat more balanced declaration at Tusványos that year: “we have strategic relations [with László Tőkés and the HPPT], and I wish them success, but I do not mean to get in conflict with the 80 percent of Hungarians who voted for the DAHR.”</p>
<p>The parliamentary elections held in December 2012 yielded a result similar to that of the local government elections: the chamber of deputies candidates of the DAHR received 380,000 votes (5.13%), the senate candidates 388,000 (5.23%). The chamber of deputies candidates of the HPPT gathered 48,000 votes (0.64%), and the senate candidates had 58,000 votes (0.79%).</p>
<blockquote><p>“During the European Parliamentary elections in 2007, we saw that while the candidates of the DAHR won 283,000 votes, the independent László Tőkés got 176,000 votes. It was clear that there was a strong dissatisfaction with the DAHR, so the question was whether the votes for Tőkés could be moved over to the parties opposing the DAHR. The message of later elections is that this doesn’t work.” – a politician source assessed the situation.</p></blockquote>
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<h2><strong><b>Somehow “the shirt needs to be rebuttoned”</b></strong></h2>
<p>“It’s a hazard to keep the DAHR a few decimals below or above the 5% parliamentary threshold, you must not take this risk anymore” – declared Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén to the public media after the elections. The politician also said that the Hungarian political parties from Transylvania had to overcome their personal offences in the future and needed to cooperate in order to have a parliament representation.</p>
<p>“There are personal conflicts, but these are not personal questions but a set of actual or perceived offences caused by different political views” – said Semjén, who also thought that these conflicts had to be overcome, everybody must examine themselves, and somehow “the shirt needs to be rebuttoned”.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31779" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31779" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-31779" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/4006696_e4bebd4c5ecae030ee2f7a5f3727ec83_x-1024x683.jpeg" alt="Semjén Zsolt huszár-hagyományőrzőkkel vonul be Kézdivásárhely főterére 2013 március 15.-én. A háttérben Olosz Gergely képviselő látható. Fotó: MTI" width="885" height="590" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/4006696_e4bebd4c5ecae030ee2f7a5f3727ec83_x-1024x683.jpeg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/4006696_e4bebd4c5ecae030ee2f7a5f3727ec83_x-300x200.jpeg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/4006696_e4bebd4c5ecae030ee2f7a5f3727ec83_x-768x512.jpeg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/4006696_e4bebd4c5ecae030ee2f7a5f3727ec83_x.jpeg 1300w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31779" class="wp-caption-text">Zsolt Semjén rides along with hussars in the centre of Kézdivásárhely/Târgu Secuiesc on 15 March 2013. Behind him Gergely Olosz can be seen. Photo: MTI</figcaption></figure></p>
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<p>Several meetings took place in 2013. There were some carefully optimistic declarations, but Hunor Kelemen still said in an interview to <i>Erdélyi Riport</i> in December 2013:</p>
<blockquote><p>“We cannot speak about a compromise. We can say that our relationship has improved, has changed. And a great part of this is due to the fact that they see, they know, they feel that the DAHR is unavoidable in Transylvania. (…) In the past three and a half years the DAHR and the foundations close to the DAHR received no support whatsoever from the Fidesz-KDNP government. We did not ask for, and did not receive any. This has not changed even when our relationship with Orbán improved and we often met in 2013.</p></blockquote>
<p>A milestone in the evolution of the Fidesz-DAHR relationship was the interview with Zsolt Semjén in the beginning of 2014, in which he said: one should avoid the situation that, because of a 85-92 percent of DAHR support, the Hungarians from Transylvania would not vote for the Fidesz during the elections in Hungary.</p>
<blockquote><p>István Székely, executive vice-president of the DAHR, took this thought further, saying: “if I reverse this sentence, then the DAHR’s most important interest in this relationship becomes obvious: 95-96 percent of Hungarians from Transylvania are Fidesz voters . It is our interest that anyone should be able to support the DAHR and the Fidesz at the same time, and the bad relationship between Fidesz and the DAHR should not be an obstacle for how people vote.</p></blockquote>
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<h2><strong><b>The EP election campaign has brought the change</b></strong></h2>
<p>The DAHR offered a helping hand already in the registration process for the 2014 parliamentary elections. During the campaign, the second-row politicians of the DAHR – among them Sándor Tamás and Csaba Borboly, presidents of the territorial organizations of Covasna and Harghita counties, respectively – openly sided with the Fidesz.</p>
<p>“We consider that it is important that everybody used their voting rights, because it is our duty as citizens. I, for one, vote for this government, because their results are tangible. My expectation for this government is that it continues its strong politics in Hungarian communities outside Hungary.” – said Csaba Borboly.</p>
<p>On 6 April, expecting the results of the election in which the Fidesz again secured two thirds of the votes, 30-35 Hungarian politicians from Romania congratulated the winners. Amongst these, DAHR politicians like Hunor Kelemen, Árpád Antal, Sándor Tamás and István Székely. However, it is important to note that DAHR politicians had also waited for election results with the Fidesz before, the only novelty was in fact Hunor Kelemen’s attendance.</p>
<p>The breakthrough came in May 2014: Viktor Orbán and Hunor Kelemen campaigning together during the EP election campaign. On these elections “the DAHR and the Fidesz-KDNP mutually support each other (…) the Fidesz, the KDNP and the DAHR work for a strong European People’s Party fraction in the next five years. This can only happen if both the Fidesz and the DAHR have good results, and this needs that Hungarian people go to vote.” – declared Viktor Orbán in the park of the Roman Catholic Episcopal Palace in Satu Mare.</p>
<p>László Tőkés, MEP for seven years back, got a new mandate on the Fidesz list, and not on any Transylvanian one.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Presidential elections with cartoons and weather forecast</b></strong></h2>
<p>While two years previously, Viktor Orbán saw it as a kind of experiment that the representatives of the HPPT also ran on the elections as opponents of the DAHR, his opinion seemed to have radically changed by the 2014 presidential elections, despite the fact that this election had no weight compared to the parliamentary elections.</p>
<p>The HPPT proposed that Zsolt Szilágyi, Vice-President of the party, would also run for the election; at a meeting, the Prime Minister answered this proposition with a strange example about cartoons and weather forecasts, a HPPT politician informed.</p>
<blockquote><p>“Guys, if you ask me, this is like the cartoons and the weather forecast. Neither of them is interesting, everybody wants to see the news, but if you don’t want to be late for the news, you have to watch the cartoons too. The weather forecast might probably interest a little more people than the cartoons.” – our source quoted Viktor Orbán.</p></blockquote>
<p>“We were supposed to read it as guys, don’t run. We read it like it’s all the same for Orbán whether we run or not.” – our source reported.</p>
<p>However, this decision was a mistake: Viktor Orbán wished good luck for the DAHR president, which clearly proved that the Fidesz was not happy about Zsolt Szilágyi’s running for office against Hunor Kelemen. Not even Zsolt Németh, the traditional friend of HPPT took part in the campaign.</p>
<p>However, the presidential elections did not alter the power relations: Hunor Kelemen received 3.47% with 329,000 votes, and Zsolt Szilágyi 0.56% with 53,000 votes.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Nobody’s cut off completely</b></strong></h2>
<p>Although it looks like Viktor Orbán has lost interest in the HPPT ever since, there’s no sign that any of the yearly 250 million HUF (about 700,000 EUR) support for the HNCT for the simplified naturalisation programme, or the funds for different projects of the HPPT and its entourage would significantly decrease.</p>
<p>“Nobody’s cut off completely: in the last minute everyone receives a small gesture, some money, and this way they keep everyone inside the system.” – a political science expert source explained how the system works. In his opinion, the reason behind this is that it is cheaper to keep an unsuccessful project on a ventilator – and if needed, give it some job – than completely eliminate it.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, things happened in Bucharest as well: on 13 December 2014, the DAHR Council of Representatives decided that the DAHR should leave the third Ponta government. These were the last eight months of the DAHR as a governing party during our examined period.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>A short theoretical overview</b></strong></h2>
<p>We need to make a short theoretical digression in order to understand how the position of the DAHR changed after it was forced in opposition, and in parallel the amount of Hungarian funds sent to Transylvania significantly increased.</p>
<p>A useful concept in this respect is the Hungarian ethnic pillarisation in Transylvania: this means that the minority community creates institutions of its own, in parallel with the social institutions of the majority, which makes the members of the minority community able to live their daily lives without interacting with majority institutions except on rare occasions.</p>
<p>The institutions working within the Hungarian community of Transylvania can be seen as a kind of asymmetric pillarisation. Not symmetric, because the Hungarian institution network of Transylvania is embedded within the Romanian society, which however is not another pillar, but the mainstream.</p>
<p>The DAHR is one of the key operators of the Hungarian institution network in Transylvania.</p>
<p>Tamás Kiss’s theory explained on several occasions helps to understand how the DAHR, after it became an opposition party in 2015, was used by the Fidesz.</p>
<p>For this, we need to introduce a new concept, the asymmetric minority accommodation. This means that in Romania there is no legal guarantee for ethnic power division, the division of resources between the majority and the minorities – in this case, the Hungarian community. This needs to be re-negotiated from case to case with the majority owners of the power.</p>
<p>Kiss thinks that the legitimacy of the DAHR within the community must be determined by its capacity to allocate resources, that is, how much resources it can negotiate for its own institutions and Hungarian-inhabited territories.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>When the national politics of Hungary outbids the Romanian state</b></strong></h2>
<p>Before the first part of the 2010s, the amount of the funds coming from Hungary was relatively small, therefore the DAHR was primarily concerned with obtaining resources from Bucharest, which were much higher. It also managed to successfully monopolise these resources, meaning that the money from Bucharest always came via the DAHR. But after 2015, the DAHR was no longer a factor in the government, and the anti-corruption drive made it impossible for the party to go on with its strategies in Bucharest based on individual interests and negotiations.</p>
<p>In parallel with this, the financial support coming from Hungary started to grow exponentially after 2016. They were no longer complementary, but generated and modified institutional processes. The Hungarian national politics “outbid” the Romanian state. According to Kiss’s interpretation, this is the context in which the DAHR-Fidesz relationship must be seen.</p>
<p>I must add to this that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no record about the exact amount of the sources that the Romanian state secures for Hungarian-inhabited territories, and how much of that money is due to the DAHR’s governmental activities. In the absence of such a record, it is difficult to assess whether the biggest resources come from the Hungarian or the Romanian state.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>The end of the DAHR monopoly</b></strong></h2>
<p>It is for certain that the position of the DAHR fundamentally changed with their weakening presence in Bucharest and the spreading of the Hungarian national politics: it was forced into a competition of loyalty. What does it mean?</p>
<p>While in the negotiations with the Romanian government the DAHR and its leadership was always in a monopoly situation (the Romanian parties almost never tried to directly address the Hungarian community, going around the DAHR), the Hungarian national politics has a different way of working.</p>
<p>In the Hungarian System of National Cooperation (SNC), the control happens through overlapping authorities and functions, and this is also valid for national politics. This field is formed by half a dozen leading politicians in addition to the prime minister, and 15-20 institutions of national politics, where the actors build networks in Hungarian communities outside Hungary seemingly independently and in competition with each other.</p>
<p>The decisive criterion in this competition is not the measurable efficiency, but loyalty. The result is that the actors not only follow Viktor Orbán’s wishes, but often try to “anticipate” it and want to accomplish something that the Prime Minister didn’t actually ask for.</p>
<p>In this context the earlier monopoly position of the DAHR has vanished. There are reports that in the time of the Socialist governments Béla Markó had access to decision lists and could change them as he wished. Now the top leadership of the DAHR is just one of the actors competing for the graces of the Hungarian government and trying to prove its loyalty.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31760" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31760" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-31760" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1-1024x766.png" alt="Orbán Viktor és Kelemen Hunor. Szén András grafikája" width="885" height="662" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1-1024x766.png 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1-300x225.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1-295x222.png 295w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1-768x575.png 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1-101x75.png 101w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AE_KHOV_2.1.png 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31760" class="wp-caption-text">Graphics by András Szén</figcaption></figure></p>
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<h2><strong><b>“Be aware of everything, decide almost nothing”</b></strong></h2>
<p>Our sources claim that although Hunor Kelemen can suggest projects for financial support, but has no say in who gets the money and how much. Politicians of the DAHR are often directly related to one or another of the patronage networks built by some member of the Hungarian government, independently from the DAHR leadership. This is a further limitation of the influence of top DAHR politicians.</p>
<p>Although Hunor Kelemen managed to consolidate his position, the DAHR under his leadership no longer resembles the highly centralised organization which it used to be in Béla Markó’s time. Markó insisted to make his own decisions about the tiniest details, as many anecdotes show.</p>
<p>One of these goes that the DAHR press releases had to be sent over to him, he printed and proofread them before being released. Another story is that, allegedly, he personally decided not to have ketchup and mustard in a cafe at a congress, for fear the attendees would stain their suits.</p>
<p>Kelemen let go of the peripheries and built a much less centralised DAHR. “I want to be aware of everything, but decide almost nothing” – he often says. It was unthinkable in Markó’s time that a territorial organization should get into the naturalisation process, or that a local DAHR politician should put forward their opinion on autonomy or Romanian-Hungarian cohabitation which the top leaders of the DAHR cannot share. However, this has become natural by now, our sources claim.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>The DAHR is controlled with never-before-seen amounts of media funding</b></strong></h2>
<p>The weakening positions of the DAHR were also caused by the never-before-seen amount of media investments of the Hungarian government. If our overview is complete, then the Transylvanian Media Space Association (Erdélyi Médiatér Egyesület) with Szilárd Demeter behind it received 5.25 billion HUF (around 15 million EUR) funding since December 2017 and bought the overwhelming majority of Hungarian media from Transylvania.</p>
<p>[irp posts=&#8221;26651&#8243; name=&#8221;Media funding record in Transylvania: a network of businesses, covered in mist&#8221;]</p>
<p>Although two years ago many were afraid that the strictly centralised Fidesz-propaganda would appear in Transylvania together with the money as well, there are no perceivable traces of it just yet. Our sources say that the important part is not what they write about, but much more what they don’t: the publications published by this media outlet cannot contain any views critical towards the Hungarian government.</p>
<p>Although examples have existed for materials critical of the DAHR, the latest election campaigns have eliminated those too. “This conglomerate has one function only: it controls the DAHR” – said one of the sources, who claims that the DAHR would be in trouble if this media outlet suddenly switched to a critical voice during an election campaign. Another source, a politician of the opposition, explained the logic of Fidesz behind this overall purchase: “we buy it ourselves so that no one else can buy it.”</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31763" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31763" style="width: 960px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31763" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1393905_670792516277918_910885757_n-1.jpeg" alt="Demeter Szilárd és az Erdélyi Médiatér Egyesület elnöke, Mohácsi Árpád László. Fotó: Facebook" width="960" height="660" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1393905_670792516277918_910885757_n-1.jpeg 960w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1393905_670792516277918_910885757_n-1-300x206.jpeg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1393905_670792516277918_910885757_n-1-768x528.jpeg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1393905_670792516277918_910885757_n-1-351x241.jpeg 351w" sizes="(max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31763" class="wp-caption-text">Szilárd Demeter (left), the “unofficial ambassador” of the Transylvanian Media Space Association (Erdélyi Médiatér Egyesület), and Mohácsi Árpád László, the president of the association. Photo: Facebook</figcaption></figure></p>
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<h2><strong><b>Money taps opened for the DAHR</b></strong></h2>
<p>Back to the timeline: while Hunor Kelemen still declared in December 2013 that the DAHR and the foundations close to DAHR did not receive any funding from the Fidesz-KDNP government, this has changed since 2015.</p>
<p>It was in February 2015 that one of the foundations of the DAHR, the Eurotrans Foundation, signed an agreement with the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade which entitled it to take part in preparing the documents for the simplified naturalisation, a process that enables Hungarian nationals to obtain Hungarian citizenship in a simplified process. It receives a yearly 250 million HUF for this end (790,000 EUR on the rate of 31 December 2015. Henceforth, I will use the European Central Bank’s exchange rate for the last day of the given year to transform sums from HUF to EUR).</p>
<p>Eurotrans Foundation uses this money to operate a series of offices across Transylvania (addresses here). If we corroborate these addresses with the addresses of territorial organizations of the DAHR, we see that many overlap. It raises the suspicion that the maintenance expenses of the DAHR territorial offices are – at least partly – covered from this Hungarian money.</p>
<p>We have reached out to Zoltán Nagy, President of the Board of the Foundation, we did not get any answer to our questions about how they separate the activities of the Eurotrans Foundation and the territorial offices of the DAHR.</p>
<p>A new step in the Fidesz-DAHR relations was July 2016: it is quite a gesture that Hunor Kelemen was the only Transsylvanian leader that Viktor Orbán invited for dinner at a meeting in Tusnádfürdő with the leaders of Hungarian organisations in the Carpathian basin. László Tőkés, long-time ally of the Fidesz, was only invited to meet the PM the next morning, at a work breakfast.</p>
<p>The reason is that the relationship between Orbán and Tőkés had deteriorated in the meantime. At a book launch in May 2015, Tőkés called the national politics of the Hungarian government “impossible to follow” and “non-transparent”, while at a MÁÉRT [Hungarian Permanent Assembly where leaders of all Hungarian parties from the Carpathian basin get together] meeting he refused to take the stage and sign the closing declaration.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Uprooting all critical voices</b></strong></h2>
<p>At the end of 2016, another foundation of the DAHR, the Progress Alapítvány (Progress Foundation) responsible for publishing the organisation’s media projects, discontinued one of the smaller online media platforms with a decreasing number of users, the <i>Erdélyi Riport</i>. As a publisher, it also fired some of the leftist journalists of one of the most viewed portals of the Hungarian press in Transylvania, the maszol.ro.</p>
<p>Although the publisher claimed that they only took these measures for cost efficiency purposes, and there is no direct evidence that the Hungarian government asked the DAHR to silence the critical voices, a DAHR politician, one of our sources, explained:</p>
<blockquote><p>“The Fidesz is an extremely centralised party. If a critical voice appears in any media close to the government, it carries a message. They think the DAHR also works this way. If some criticism is published on the maszol.ro, the Transindex or the Erdély TV (media outlets close to the DAHR), they call Hunor Kelemen and ask him what happened. And he asks: why, what happened? Imagine that the Hungarian government media publishes materials like the ones usually published in the Hungarian media in Transylvania. The Fidesz only knows that these outlets are operated on DAHR money, so it assumes that these materials somehow mirror the DAHR’s views, and the DAHR tries to send a message with these”.</p></blockquote>
<p>The “streamlining” of media outlets close to DAHR did not stop here. In May 2017 the Transindex had to move its offices located in the attic of one of the buildings of the Iskola Foundation after it had published an article about the L’Alchimiste scandal (a chic restaurant in the center of Cluj/Kolozsvár owned by the wife of Nagy Zoltán. The restaurant was opened using public money). Later, in April 2019, the Erdély TV’s Fidesz-critical presenter, Attila Gáspárik, was fired without explanation.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>The DAHR can use the economic development programme in its campaigns</b></strong></h2>
<p>According to declarations in March 2017, the economic development programme which had already been active in Hungarian-inhabited parts of Serbia (Voivodina) and Ukraine for some time, would start in Transylvania as well. After a discussion with Viktor Orbán in Budapest, Hunor Kelemen declared to Erdély TV:</p>
<p>“We talked about the Transylvanian programmes which are supported by the Hungarian government, and which will start in 2017 and 2018, including the economic development programme which had already been tried out in Voivodina and Ukraine and works excellently. It will start in Transylvania as well in 2017, first on a smaller territory, then from 2018 on everywhere from the Seklerland to the Partium.”</p>
<p>The programme is initiated by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The first model programme was introduced in Mureș County in 2017, with a budget of 1 billion HUF (3.2 million EUR).</p>
<p>The economic development programme is another unfriendly gesture to the HPPT. To our knowledge, the basis of the programme is actually a plan of the opposition, the Mikó Imre Plan, which is based on a strategy of economic development elaborated by Transylvanian economists employed by the HNCT, and experts of the VÁTI urban planning and development company. They had been trying to present and sell the plan for the Hungarian government for years.</p>
<p>“We asked them to include us into the board of the Pro Economica Foundation which handles the funds, employ our experts in the assessment process, let us take part in the promotion campaign” – said one of our sources, a politician of the HPPT. None of their requests were heard.</p>
<p>However, the DAHR may use these development projects in its promotion materials during campaigns. Attila Balázs, Economic Director of the DAHR, and Levente Novák, Vice-President responsible for territorial organisations, are both members in the Board of Directors of the Foundation.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31783" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31783" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-31783" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/53625644_1490529994414015_9026730919167262720_o-1024x684.jpeg" alt="Az RMDSZ vezetősége egyeztet a Szijjártó Péter külügyminiszter által vezetett küldöttséggel a gazdaságfejlesztési támogatásokról. Fotó: Pro Economica Alapítvány Facebook-oldala" width="885" height="591" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/53625644_1490529994414015_9026730919167262720_o-1024x684.jpeg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/53625644_1490529994414015_9026730919167262720_o-300x200.jpeg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/53625644_1490529994414015_9026730919167262720_o-768x513.jpeg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/53625644_1490529994414015_9026730919167262720_o.jpeg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31783" class="wp-caption-text">The leadership of the DAHR meets the delegation led by Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó. They talked about the economic development programme. Photo: the Facebook page of the Pro Economica Foundation/Tamás Gönczy</figcaption></figure></p>
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<h2><strong><b>Hunor Kelemen encourages votes for Fidesz</b></strong></h2>
<p>While the Eurotrans Foundation with the HNCT were offering their help in the registration process preceding the Hungarian parliamentary elections, another premiere took place in September 2017: the DAHR President publicly supported the Fidesz.</p>
<p>“It is in our interest that Hungary should be led by a government which proved that Hungarians from Transylvania have an important place both in its national political visions and everyday practices” – he said.</p>
<p>The final breakup with Markó’s principle of equal distance happened in February 2018. Gyula Molnár, President of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), and Gergely Karácsony, candidate of the HSP and the Párbeszéd for Prime Minister, invited Hunor Kelemen for a dinner after a public forum in Cluj/Kolozsvár.</p>
<p>“They asked me what we think they should do in Transylvania during the election campaign. I told them very frankly: nothing. This is a completely superfluous waste of time and energy, because I think: Hungarians from Transylvania know very clearly who to vote for” – Kelemen recalled the conversation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Eurotrans Foundation eagerly helped the registration of Hungarians from Transylvania for the elections in Hungary: by the first days of February 2018 they mediated the recording of 35 thousand Hungarian citizens living in Romania on the electoral lists. More than that, the foundation also played a role in collecting the postal votes and sending them forward to the Hungarian foreign representations (the Democracy Centres had the same task).</p>
<p>While Csaba Borboly, President of the Harghita County Council, said that Hungarians from Transylvania had not only the right, but the duty to vote in the parliamentary elections in Hungary, the Pro Economica Foundation which handled the economic development programme signed financial support agreements with 521 persons for an amount of 1.5 billion HUF for equipment or breeding stock acquisition, or the cadastral registration of agricultural lands.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Twice as many postal votes for the Fidesz-KDNP</b></strong></h2>
<p>The Fidesz-KDNP won again at the parliamentary elections on 8 April 2018 with a two-thirds majority of the votes. The governing party received 96 % of all postal votes, a total of 225 thousand votes from outside the borders (we do not know the distribution by countries). This was nearly double of the number of votes in 2014, but while the 122 thousand votes in 2014 resulted in one or two mandates, this time they were not enough to get a mandate.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31843" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31843" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31843" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/porcsalmi_balint.jpg" alt="Porcsalmi Bálint, az RMDSZ ügyvezető elnöke. Fotó: RMDSZ" width="1024" height="682" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/porcsalmi_balint.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/porcsalmi_balint-300x200.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/porcsalmi_balint-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31843" class="wp-caption-text">Bálint Porcsalmi, the executive president of the DAHR. Photo: DAHR</figcaption></figure></p>
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<p>The 2018 referendum in Romania about the constitutional definition of the family somewhat altered the image that the DAHR – while becoming more and more cooperative with the Hungarian government – followed the rhetoric of this government in all its undertakings. Although many leading politicians of the DAHR supported the referendum about a constitutional definition of the family based on the marriage of a man and a woman, and this was indeed congruous with the anti-gay rhetoric of the Fidesz-KDNP, Bálint Porcsalmi, Executive President of the DAHR, declared in an interview for maszol.ro before the referendum:</p>
<blockquote><p>“I do not agree that marriage can only happen between a man and a woman. Although gay marriages are not permitted in Romania, but I am convinced that the opposite is also not something that should be condemned: in 15 member states of the EU people of the same sex can marry. I also do not agree with the opinion of my Senator colleagues that the new draft submitted now has a better content than the current constitutional regulation. Because it is no better: either legally, or spiritually. On the one hand, it maintains the restrictive, bad definition of the family, on the other hand it discriminates in the long run an important community, citizens who should have the same rights as the heterosexuals.”</p></blockquote>
<p>In November 2018, Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared at Cluj Napoca the economic development programme which offered support to farmers and small enterprises in parts of Maros County would be extended to the Seklerland. The 2019 budget secured 50 billion HUF for economic development programmes, and the Seklerland programme would have a budget of 25 billion.</p>
<p>At the DAHR Congress in February 2019, Zsolt Semjén said that Viktor Orbán and Hunor Kelemen shared a trusted cooperation, which was forced by the Hungarian voters from Transylvania. He added: “Nothing can be accepted which weakens the DAHR”, because if the Alliance became weak, the strong representation of the Hungarian interests in the Transylvlanian local governments and the Parliament in Bucharest would come to an end.</p>
<p>In March 2019, the Fidesz was about to be suspended from the European People’s Party (EPP). However, Hunor Kelemen told the Romanian public television that the two MEPs of the DAHR would vote against the suspension.</p>
<p>During the EP election campaign which started in the meantime, Viktor Orbán took a two-day tour in Transylvania on the invitation of the DAHR. He inaugurated two establishments built from Hungarian support: the feed mixer in Sânpaul / Kerelőszentpál and the Ice Hockey Academy of Seklerland. He said that the Hungarians from Transylvania who want to strengthen the overall Hungarian representation in Brussels, must vote for the DAHR.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>“Who thinks that the price of the grants must be paid is wrong”</b></strong></h2>
<p>On a press conference, Hunor Kelemen was asked about the Hungarian government grants for foundations close to the DAHR. He said that the DAHR never received any support from Hungary and whoever thought that the price of the grants must be paid somehow was wrong.</p>
<p>The carefully balanced formulations of the early years were officially over. In September 2019, Kelemen told at a Romanian-Hungarian youth meeting at Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy that Viktor Orbán should not be criticised but copied. “Romanians should do the same for the Romanian communities living outside the borders what the Hungarian government does for Hungarians outside their borders. We can feel on our own skin what it is like when the Hungarian government stands up for us.” – the DAHR President said.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>The election race is a “national treason”</b></strong></h2>
<p>Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the local government elections were postponed in Romania from March to September 2020. Once again, the Fidesz brought the ammunition for the DAHR campaign. They announced a new stage of the economic development grants, inaugurated various projects paid by the Hungarian government, and Hungarian politicians sent several Facebook messages.</p>
<p>Zsolt Semjén said that the counter-candidates of the DAHR “had no chance”. Árpád Potápi went even further: he said that to nominate Hungarian candidates who had no chance of success on settlements where the Hungarians are not the absolute majority was “an act that comes against the interest of the Hungarian community”. Even on settlements where the Hungarian majority is over 80%, “the competition between Hungarians and Hungarians is not a good solution” – he said, “because it causes people to jump at each other”.</p>
<p>Despite the objection of the opposition parties, after the elections, on 12 October 2020, Potápi went further with his statement before the National Cohesion Committee of the Parliament: to set another candidate on the DAHR candidate in Bihor/Bihar and Satu Mare/Szatmár is national treason.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>From government formation negotiations in Bucharest directly to Viktor Orbán’s office</b></strong></h2>
<p>Arguably the most telling way to end our timeline on the Fidesz-DAHR relations is the event of 19 December 2020, when right after the government formation negotiations in Bucharest – after reaching an agreement on the composition of the coalition but before clarifying the operative details – Kelemen left for Budapest for discussions with Orbán. Bertalan Havasi, Deputy State Secretary in charge of the Prime Minister’s Press Office, failed to communicate the nature of the urgency that justified the DAHR President’s hasty trip to Budapest.</p>
<h2><strong><b>How does the current grant system work?</b></strong></h2>
<p>“The socialist governments also favored their own of course, but there always was a more-or-less transparent board, the support policy had a well-defined form, a framework. The Fidesz gradually eliminated these forms, everything is decided based on informal relationships and agreements” – said one of our sources, a politician of the DAHR’s opposition.</p>
<p>Although in the first years of the second Fidesz government, in 2011-2013, the projects were still collected and coordinated by Transylvanian politicians – István Székely for the DAHR, and Balázs Gergely for the HPPT –, by now every decision is taken in Budapest.</p>
<p>Although our interview partners couldn’t give a precise answer to all our questions regarding the functioning of the grant system, they unanimously claim that the main source of the financing, the Bethlen Gábor Alap (Bethlen Gábor Fund) has become nothing else than a place for payouts. It provides the institutional framework for political and personal decisions negotiated with various entities, ensuring the formal agreements are signed, and the paperwork connected to the handling and financial reporting of the grants is dealt with.</p>
<p>They also agreed that the major projects with budgets amounting to billions of forints are decided by Viktor Orbán personally, the Gábor Bethlen Fund only executes the government decree. At present, two people from Transylvania can pitch major high-budget projects to the Prime Minister: Béla Kató, Bishop of the Reformed Diocese of Transylvania, and DAHR president Hunor Kelemen.</p>
<p>“And out of the two, it is Kató whose relationship with Viktor Orbán is of the kind that he can meet with the PM whenever he wants” – says one of our sources, a social sciences expert.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31766" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31766" style="width: 632px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31766" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orba_maszol-1.jpg" alt="Orbán Viktor és Kató Béla, az Erdélyi Református Egyházkerület püspöke. Fotó: maszol.ro" width="632" height="419" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orba_maszol-1.jpg 632w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orba_maszol-1-300x199.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 632px) 100vw, 632px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31766" class="wp-caption-text">Viktor Orbán and Béla Kató (right), the Bishop of the Reformed Diocese of Transylvania. Photo: maszol.ro</figcaption></figure></p>
<h2><strong><b>“There must be someone who takes them inside”</b></strong></h2>
<p>As we are told, the projects with a lower budget of between 500 million and 1 billion (1,5-3 million EUR) are decided by Zsolt Semjén, Deputy Prime Minister responsible for national politics. “However, there must be someone who takes them to Semjén, and they usually check those projects with Hunor Kelemen”. Minor projects can be chosen by Árpád Potápi, State Secretary for national politics of the Prime Minister’s Office.</p>
<p>The small projects are collected by Réka Brendus, Deputy Head of the Transylvanian Department of the State Secretariat for National Politics, and it is probably her who decides who gets the support and who doesn’t. “This circle is for almost anyone, if they are in good or neutral relationships with the government.” – our source reported.</p>
<p>If the Hungarian government initiates a project, they try to find partners across the borders depending on the available budget. A good example of this is the nursery school building programme, for the first stage of which Viktor Orbán set apart a sum of 8.9 billion HUF (28.8 million EUR) in the last days of December 2016.</p>
<p>One of our sources who has a close knowledge of the working of the Gábor Bethlen Fund said that this decision about an extremely high sum on one of the last workdays of the year came as a surprise to everyone.</p>
<p>But since the money had to be spent by the end of the year, they hastened to phone partners across the borders to submit applications so that they can sign agreements and transfer the money. However, there was no previous need assessment, therefore the places for the construction of nursery schools were chosen more or less randomly.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31769" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31769" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-31769" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo-1024x768.jpg" alt="" width="885" height="664" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo-300x225.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo-295x222.jpg 295w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo-768x576.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo-101x75.jpg 101w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai03ufo.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31769" class="wp-caption-text">The building of an old typography in the center of Kolozsvár/Cluj has been demolished. A cultural center will be built here. Photo: Zoltán Egyed Ufó</figcaption></figure></p>
<h2><strong><b>The DAHR as an investor, just like the churches</b></strong></h2>
<p>Today, the foundations close to the DAHR handle as much money coming from Hungarian funding, if not more, than the Romanian governmental support for the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, handled by the DAHR.</p>
<p>The Iskola Alapítvány (School Foundation), a foundation of the DAHR, is one of the institutions that has lately become even more important than the Eurotrans Foundation. This was founded by the DAHR in 2004 to handle the educational grants program coming from Hungary. Later it started a still operating flat rental programme for higher education teaching staff in Cluj, and it also offered a controversial loan for the restaurant of the president’s wife in the downtown of Cluj.</p>
<p>After 2017, the School Foundation has received significant amounts of Hungarian funds (on the chart below the grants are given in EUR).</p>
<p><script id="infogram_0_231d8f64-53e1-4da1-af35-58cf46b9c46f" title="Copy: Copy: RMDSZ vs. Iskola Alapítvány" src="https://e.infogram.com/js/dist/embed.js?j7c" type="text/javascript"></script></p>
<p>It may be accidental, but it is an interesting detail nevertheless that the decision on the first support of 300 million HUF (970,000 EUR) came just at the time of the big money distribution in late December 2016 (this money was later wired back, as the ownership of the real estate they sought to buy was unclear).</p>
<p>A week later, in the first days of January 2017, it became public that the Progress Foundation discontinued the <i>Erdélyi Riport</i> because of financial reasons, and fired some of the journalists of maszol.ro, critical of the Hungarian government.</p>
<p>Our overviews show that apart from this 300 million grant from 2016, in the 2017-2020 time period, the School Foundation received some 6.6 billion HUF (19.9 million EUR) from the Gábor Bethlen Fund. With this funding, it became one of the top recipients of Hungarian funding in Romania, along with the Sapientia private university and the Reformed Diocese of Transylvania.</p>
<p>A part of this money is used to finance cultural and educational programmes such as the centenary programme series <i>1000 years in Transylvania, 100 years in Romania</i>, or the <b>afternoon educational programme</b> functioning in 33 schools. Most of the money, however, is used for real estate investments.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31737" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31737" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31737" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/39957115_1779822868767315_4248218312149827584_o.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="536" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/39957115_1779822868767315_4248218312149827584_o.jpg 800w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/39957115_1779822868767315_4248218312149827584_o-300x201.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/39957115_1779822868767315_4248218312149827584_o-768x515.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31737" class="wp-caption-text">One of the few pictures of Zoltán Nagy to be found online. Despite the fact that the Head of the DAHR President’s Cabinet is present on nearly every event, he appears extremely rarely on photos, and has no social media presence. Photo: the Facebook page of the DAHR</figcaption></figure></p>
<h2><strong><b>Zoltán Nagy, who takes care of things</b></strong></h2>
<p>In 2018, the Foundation bought and demolished a building in the city centre of Cluj – the former Minerva typography – to build a cultural centre in its place. In the same year, it bought the Sonnenfeld palace in Oradea/Nagyvárad, also with the purpose to renovate it and turn it into a cultural centre.</p>
<p>In 2019, the Foundation acquired an art nouveau-style building in the centre of Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda, and a turn-of-the-century villa in Tușnad-Băi/Tusnádfürdő. Both buildings need restoration works.</p>
<p>The President of the Board of both the Eurotrans and the Iskola Foundations is Zoltán Nagy (nicknamed BigZé), one of Hunor Kelemen’s long time team members. His current function is the Head of the DAHR President’s Cabinet. Actually: his right hand.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31772" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31772" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-31772" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai47ufo-1024x683.jpg" alt="A Nagyvárad központjában található Sonnenfeld-palota. Fotó: Egyed Ufó Zoltán" width="885" height="590" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai47ufo-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai47ufo-300x200.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai47ufo-768x512.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/202101iskolaalapitvanyingatlanai47ufo.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31772" class="wp-caption-text">The Sonnenfeld palace in the centre of Nagyvárad/Oradea. Photo: Zoltán Egyed Ufó</figcaption></figure></p>
<p>He is loyal, pragmatic, and “rough as needed in conflicts”: this is how his acquaintances characterise Zoltán Nagy. The former biologist and bat researcher works with the Iskola Foundation from the early 2000s, and after a short digression as state secretary he found the role that fits him best. Away from the limelight, he is very efficient in handling the things that Hunor Kelemen has no time and energy for.</p>
<p>Zoltán Nagy holds in his hands everything connected to the management of DAHR projects and the Hungarian government, and the administrative details of political negotiations. He is the driver of the DAHR President on his trips to Budapest, and he is also the contact person with the Hungarian state administration.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31740" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31740" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31740" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orban-kelemen.png" alt="Orbán Viktor és a magyar kormány tagjai az RMDSZ Ügyvezető Elnökségén Kolozsváron 2017 szeptember 30.-án. Az asztalnál Orbán Viktor és Kelemen Hunor ülnek egymással szemben, RMDSZ részről Porcsalmi Bálint ügyvezető elnök és Cseke Attila szenátor vannak jelen. Orbán Viktort Németh Zsolt, a külügyi bizottság elnöke és Balog Zoltán, az Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériumának vezetője kísérik. Az asztalfőn Nagy János, Orbán Viktor személyi titkára ül - vele szemben (a fotósnak háttal) Nagy Zoltán kabinetigazgató látható. Fotó: RMDSZ Facebook-oldala" width="800" height="535" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orban-kelemen.png 800w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orban-kelemen-300x201.png 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/orban-kelemen-768x514.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31740" class="wp-caption-text">Viktor Orbán and the members of his cabinet at the DAHR Executive Presidency in Kolozsvár/Cluj on September 30, 2017. Hunor Kelemen and Viktor Orbán are facing each other, the DAHR is represented by Bálint Porcsalmi executive director and Attila Cseke senator. Near Viktor Orbán sits Zsolt Németh, the head of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and Zoltán Balog, Minister of Human Resources. At the end of the table sits János Nagy, the personal secretary of Viktor Orbán, and facing him, with his back to the camera, Zoltán Nagy can be seen. Photo: the Facebook page of the DAHR</figcaption></figure></p>
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<h2><strong><b>“He goes as many times and needed, he talks as many times as needed”</b></strong></h2>
<p>“On Orbán–Kelemen meetings, there is János Nagy (Orbán’s personal secretary – editor’s note) with his notebook, writing down what they agreed. János Nagy forwards the PM’s instructions to the legal department, and these become the government decrees. In parallel, Kelemen also tells his Head of Cabinet what they agreed, and Zoltán Nagy starts out. He goes as many times and needed, he talks as many times as needed, János Nagy also makes a phone call, if needed.” – detailed a DAHR politician.</p>
<p>“The Hungarian financial support only interests Hunor Kelemen to the extent that he takes the projects to Viktor Orbán. As soon as the decision is taken, everything is left for Zoltán Nagy: the details of a programme, how an investment goes is not of interest for the DAHR President, everything is solved by the Head of Cabinet and his team. He gives political ammunition, solves problems, and the financial reports are also in order” – says our source.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>Nothing is known about the affairs of the Iskola Foundation</b></strong></h2>
<p>The Iskola Foundation is an institution completely separate from the DAHR. Although its yearly budget rivals that of the DAHR, the affairs that go on in there are unknown to anyone – even the board of the foundation, or the DAHR’s economic director. “He is humanly affected by having such a huge amount of money at his disposal.” – said a source who has known Zoltán Nagy for a long time.</p>
<p>According to his former colleagues, Zoltán Nagy does not complicate things unnecessarily: he allocates the job, then checks whether it’s done, he is not interested in other details. “He is a party soldier: he does his job, the price paid for it doesn’t matter. He solves problems, he’s not a philosopher” – our source characterises him.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_31743" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-31743" style="width: 960px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-31743" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/11159447_788627887886823_1832855423177422317_n-1.jpeg" alt="" width="960" height="639" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/11159447_788627887886823_1832855423177422317_n-1.jpeg 960w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/11159447_788627887886823_1832855423177422317_n-1-300x200.jpeg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/11159447_788627887886823_1832855423177422317_n-1-768x511.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-31743" class="wp-caption-text">Zoltán Nagy together with his wife, Nagy-Debreczeni Hajnalka, the former press aide of Hunor Kelemen, currently the publisher of one of the largest internet news portals of the Hungarian community, maszol.ro. Photo: the Facebook page of the DAHR</figcaption></figure></p>
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<p>An important ingredient of Zoltán Nagy’s success is that he and his wife, Hajnalka Nagy Debreczeni, managed to become indispensible for Hunor Kelemen and his family. The Head of Cabinet is Kelemen’s driver; his wife controls the entire editorial staff of the maszol.ro news website as their publisher, and in addition to that, she does the shopping or even babysits the children of the Kelemen family.</p>
<p>Kelemen Hunor has been “taken hostage”, some people say, meaning that the DAHR president can only be reached through the Head of Cabinet.</p>
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<h2><strong><b>So is there a great project then?</b></strong></h2>
<p>Is there any kind of plan that the Hungarian government would like to achieve in Hungarian communities across the border, such as Transylvania?</p>
<p>The aim is the institutional and individual integration of the Hungarian-inhabited territories of the Carpathian basin, the building of a parallel society, and the preservation of the break between the majority and minority society. However, apart from this, there doesn’t seem to be any other written strategy, Tibor Toró explains.</p>
<p>The political scientist also adds that the Fidesz provides the framework and the money, and within this framework everybody is free to do what they want, to lobby as they want. The various interest groups compete with each other, and this suits the basic nature of the Hungarian society of Transylvania, that’s why they prefer Viktor Orbán.</p>
<p>Although there is no clear strategy as to what can be funded, it is still clear to everyone what is considered taboo: there are no Hungarian-Romanian joint programmes, ethnically mixed institutions, or programmes for sexual minorities. However, few people feel that these are limitations, because the conservative Hungarian society of Transylvania generally rejects these as it is.</p>
<p><strong>Translation: Emese Czintos</strong></p>
<p><em>The article was published <a href="http://hungarianmoney.eu/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">as part of a crossborder cooperation project</a> aiming to map the influence of the Orbán government in the Hungarian communities living in neighboring countries. The project was supported by<strong><a href="https://www.investigativejournalismforeu.net/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> Investigative Journalism for Europe</a></strong> (IJ4EU).</em></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-32082" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IJ4EU-Logo@3x.png" alt="" width="596" height="298" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IJ4EU-Logo@3x.png 596w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IJ4EU-Logo@3x-300x150.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 596px) 100vw, 596px" /></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/marriage-of-convenience-sweetened-with-millions-how-fidesz-persuaded-the-largest-hungarian-party-in-transylvania/">Marriage of convenience sweetened with millions – how Fidesz persuaded the largest Hungarian party in Transylvania</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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		<title>A Communist Show Trial: How Dániel Bánffy Became a War Criminal</title>
		<link>https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/a-communist-show-trial-how-daniel-banffy-became-a-war-criminal/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Szabó Tünde]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2019 10:55:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Important]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dániel Bánffy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[forest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[forest restitution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[land]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nationalized land]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restitution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restitution case]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Romania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[show trial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war crimes]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dev2.atlatszo.exot.hu/?p=28304</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Romanian State to hang on tooth and nail to Bánffy forests: it relitigates what it had given back 12 years ago. The renationalisation is based on a genuine communist show trial from 1952. The People’s Republic of Romania sentenced Dániel Bánffy, then 59, to eight years of forced labour and confiscation of all property in [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/a-communist-show-trial-how-daniel-banffy-became-a-war-criminal/">A Communist Show Trial: How Dániel Bánffy Became a War Criminal</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Romanian State to hang on tooth and nail to Bánffy forests: it relitigates what it had given back 12 years ago. The renationalisation is based on a genuine communist show trial from 1952.</strong></p>
<p>The People’s Republic of Romania sentenced Dániel Bánffy, then 59, to eight years of forced labour and confiscation of all property in 1952. At that time, he had been living in Hungary for more than ten years: first in his villa in Rózsadomb, the elite district of Budapest, as an aristocrat and a minister, then evacuated by the Hungarian state to a meat warehouse in Jászapáti, a small town in the Hungarian Alföld. This is where he lived at the time of the second trial and sentence, whether being aware of it or not.</p>
<p>The files of the trial are archived in file P007028 at the National Council for the Study of Securitate’s Archives (CNSAS). Details of the files prove that</p>
<h2><strong>the criminal action against the former politician was a show trial in all its aspects:</strong></h2>
<ul>
<li>it was initiated illegally, since he was acquitted for the same charges in 1946 with a legally binding sentence, and no new evidence was found;</li>
<li>no real efforts were made to interrogate Bánffy, proving that it was never a priority for the state to find out the truth about the events;</li>
<li>the prosecution claimed in the retrial request that the statement of the defence’s witnesses should not have been taken into account at all;</li>
<li>the witnesses of the prosecution confessed that their knowledge of how Bánffy received the Hungarian soldiers marching into Palotailva/Lunca Bradului was only hearsay as they knew very little or no Hungarian at all;</li>
<li>the court only heard the witnesses of the defence on condition that their statement cannot change the statements of facts, and they would only be taken into account in judging mitigating circumstances at best.</li>
</ul>
<p>The fact that Dániel Bánffy was convicted for the charge of instigation to war crimes to forced labour and property confiscation</p>
<h2><strong>has had its long-lasting consequences reaching to this day: </strong></h2>
<p>it was a precedent used by the Giurgiu County Court in 2018, when it took the legally binding decision to return to state ownership the more than 9300 hectares forest in Maros County, which had once been given back to the heirs of Dániel Bánffy in 2007, after a trial that had been going on for years. In the 11 year’s time that passed between the two sentences, the state refused to execute the legally binding decision, and the forest has never been registered in the cadastre under the name of the inheritors.</p>
<p>Baron Bánffy’s grandson, Farkas, who lives in the village of Fugad/Ciuguzel, Fehér/Alba County, manages the restitution trials and estates of the extended family in Romania (800 hectares of forests and arable lands). By mid-2018, this amount was less than 5 percent of what the family reclaimed, <a href="https://kronika.ro/erdelyi-hirek/bnem-a-kastely-a-lenyegr-n-banffy-farkas-a-visszaszolgaltatasok-akadalyozasarol-szubjektiv-igazsagrol-a-bmodern-szekuritaterol" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">he stated to the newspaper Krónika</a>. The family reclaimed 35 thousand hectares of woods on the Kelemen/Calimani Mountains alone.</p>
<p>On the basis of the 2018 court decision, in 2019 the prefect of Fehér/Alba County started to win new lawsuits against Farkas Bánffy nullifying his certifications of property for some smaller territories (45 hectares of pasture, 23,75 hectares of forest, arable lands of 9 and 40 hectares). The restitution of <a href="https://kronika.ro/erdelyi-hirek/ujabb-visszaszolgaltatott-banffy-vagyonokra-tette-ra-a-kezet-a-roman-allam" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">three other forests (35 hectares altogether)</a> was also nullified by court decisions not yet legally binding.</p>
<p>The initiator of the renationalisation was the prefect of Maros/Mures County, Vasile Oprea. After the 2007 final judgment favourable for the Bánffys, Oprea asked for retrial on the highest level four times, and finally succeeded in 2014. The basis he referred to was that the 9300 hectares of forests in the neighbourhood of Ratosnya/Rastolita, Gödemesterháza/Stanceni and Palotailva/Lunca Bradului were not expropriated by the Romanian state during the communist nationalisation, but were confiscated as a result of a court sentence from 1952.</p>
<p>(What’s more, the prefect had the trial relocated from the court of Szászrégen/Reghin in Maros/Mures County to Giurgiu saying that the Hungarians living in Maros county reclaimed 9323 hectares of forests claiming that they were the descendants of the Bánffy Counts, <a href="https://kronika.ro/erdelyi-hirek/giurgiuba-kerult-at-a-banffy-orokosok-erdopere" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Krónika writes</a>. That is, the prefect and the highest court which accepted his justification regard the Hungarian community living in the area as a possible source of danger.)</p>
<p>We need to follow up several threads in order to see how valid it was to justify the 2014 retrial and the 2018 sentence by a formal confiscation of property in 1952:</p>
<ul>
<li>Whether the single difference between the four unsuccessful and the final successful retrial attempts was the reference to the trial and sentence from 1952;</li>
<li>Why the Giurgiu County Court, in July 2018, considered a show trial from 1951-52 relevant?</li>
<li>When and under what circumstances did the Romanian state confiscate the estates of Dániel Bánffy</li>
<li>What is it that proves even for an outsider that the 1951-52 trial was a show trial?</li>
</ul>
<p>Let’s start with the last one: Átlátszó Erdély requested and received <a href="https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1k5ekP1YVSt3k5TGhYjrBc-XAVFrxnYlj?usp=sharing" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the documents of the trial from CNSAS</a>. In this trial the prosecutor accused Bánffy (of the Losonc branch of the family) and two of his employees that they gave instigating speeches at Palotailva/Lunca Bradului in the autumn of 1940, when the Hungarian troops marched into Transylvania. As a result of these speeches that</p>
<blockquote><p>“caused hatred against the cohabiting populations, Romanians were imprisoned, tortured and expelled.”</p></blockquote>
<p>The 1946 trial documents contain a more detailed description. The prosecution alleged that Dániel Bánffy, Ernest Páter, the engineer of his sawmill, and Ida Páter, the latter’s wife, welcomed the Hungarian soldiers arriving to the settlement in the beginning of September, and the Baron and Ida Páter said to the soldiers and the people gathered round that the Romanians had humiliated the Hungarians and they depleted the region during the twenty years of Romanian rule, but that the time of revenge and payback had arrived – that is, they instigated the Hungarians against the Romanians.</p>
<p>In order to make a greater impact – the indictment says – Ida Páter also burst into tears and kissed the Hungarian officers. Ernest Páter was accused of making a similar address to the people gathered in the yard of the Bangra sawmill: we have suffered enough for 22 years, the time of revenge has arrived.</p>
<p>The Hungarians incited by these speeches ganged up with the Hungarian soldiers and began arresting and assaulting Romanians. The indictment lists nine people who were arrested, taken to the sawmill yard and lined up against the wall to make them think they would be shot. Half an hour later they were surrounded by soldiers, lined in columns and marched to a settlement called Valea Ilvei (Ilva valley). [This was not a settlement, as the indictment suggests, but the valley of Ilva stream which flows into the river Maros/Mures &#8211; Farkas Bánffy’s clarification].</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" style="border: 0;" src="https://www.google.com/maps/embed?pb=!1m18!1m12!1m3!1d67201.00990271074!2d25.093393802331757!3d46.95375416709626!2m3!1f0!2f0!3f0!3m2!1i1024!2i768!4f13.1!3m3!1m2!1s0x474a6ec46f80ec69%3A0xf48ae823f729e031!2sPalotailva+547380!5e0!3m2!1shu!2sro!4v1561363217636!5m2!1shu!2sro" width="600" height="450" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p>They got there by midnight, the territory was already swarming with Hungarian soldiers and civilians, they were lined up facing away from the river. One of them, Vasile Cif, was removed from the line and taken to an island a couple of hundred meters away, where Hungarians were waiting for him with shovels, ropes and buckets. Vasile Cif was undressed to his shirt, and while he was begging for mercy, he was continuously beaten. Two defendants were pushing him around, and since Cif thought they were going to hang him, he escaped and vanished in the dark. They shot at him, but missed.</p>
<p>The others were tied with their hands at the back, and hanged by their hands to the trees around. If they fainted, water was sprinkled onto them. After these abuses, they were taken back in the morning to the Bangra sawmill yard, where they were locked up in a room and beaten again. Two persons died from the abuses. When the others were transported to another settlement (does not say where), two named defendants and other unidentified people shouted at them not to give them water and to hang them.</p>
<p>The charges claimed that the abuses continued later on as well: on September 26, Pavel Croitoru was summoned to the sawmill office where one of the defendants, Ferenc Buta, and another person who was not in the trial, Ferenc Poitinger, hit him with stones and wood.</p>
<h2><strong>The Romanian law in the 1950s automatically punished such actions and incitement to such actions as war crimes with confiscation of property. </strong></h2>
<p>However, the enforcement of the 1952 court sentence does not contain anything about the confiscation of Dániel Bánffy’s property.</p>
<p>This, on the one hand, is an extra enforcement that the trial was a show trial, while on the other hand it also signals that the Romanian authorities knew there was no one to arrest as Bánffy had not been in the country for years, and that there was nothing to confiscate from him. His estates and castles were in the country, but the Romanian state had expropriated those years before:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/34" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the land reform of 1945</a> expropriated every estate larger than 50 hectares, and only left one castle or mansion as residence for the owner;</li>
<li>the constitution of 1948 stipulated that forests (just like underground natural resources, springs, rivers and lakes, etc.) <a href="http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=1574" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">are all state property</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>The administrative negligence does not stop at the enforcement not containing any reference to confiscation of property or the legal status of the Bánffy estates at that time. Both in 1946 and in 1952, the Court failed to show any interest in using a correct or at least consistent form of the names of Bánffy and the Páters. The couple’s name was in turns written as Pater, Páter or Peter. Bánffy’s name was spelt as Bamfi Daniel, Bánfy, Banfi, Bandi and Banfii. [Farkas Bánffy said that Ernest Páter only used this first name in his documents, otherwise he was known as Ernő].</p>
<h2><strong>Who was Dániel Bánffy?</strong></h2>
<p><figure id="attachment_28305" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-28305" style="width: 471px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-28305" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/banffydaniel.jpg" alt="Dániel Bánffy" width="471" height="420" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/banffydaniel.jpg 471w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/banffydaniel-300x268.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 471px) 100vw, 471px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-28305" class="wp-caption-text">Dániel Bánffy. Source of the picture: Wikipedia</figcaption></figure></p>
<p>Dániel Bánffy was born in 1893 in the village of Fugad/Ciuguzel, not far from Nagyenyed/Aiud. From 1917 to 1940 he lived on his Transylvanian estates. Besides his extended forests, he had a sawmill in Palotailva/Lunca Bradului, he rebuilt the family’s castle in Fugad/Ciuguzel, and he built a summer mansion for the extended family in Maroshéviz/Toplita.</p>
<p>During the 1940 political changes, when Romania lost and Hungary regained Northern Transylvania, he was one of the 35 politicians called from Transylvania to the Hungarian National Assembly, where they founded the Transylvanian Party. He was appointed Minister of Agriculture on 30 December, in office through several successive governments until the German occupation of Hungary on 22 March 1944.</p>
<p>Following Romania’s leaving in August 1944, in Budapest Bánffy called for immediate armistice in favour of Transylvania. Members of the far-right Arrow Cross (Nyilas) Party arrested and sentenced him to death, eventually his friends got him out of prison. Not long after, he was also arrested by the Red Army. The Hungarian communists deported him with his family to a meat processing factory in Jászapáti in 1951. Later he suffered an accident and got paralysed. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A1niel_B%C3%A1nffy" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">He died in Budapest in 1955.</a></p>
<p>Clearly Bánffy had not been in Transylvania during the Red Army invasion in 1944. According to the files of the trial, the Romanian authorities knew he was living in Hungary, the citations addressed to him were always posted on the door of the People’s Council of Dés/Dej.</p>
<h2><strong>The trial of 1951 </strong></h2>
<p>against Dániel Bánffy, Ernest Páter, the warden of his former sawmill enterprise, the Bangra Company, and his wife was restarted because the chief prosecutor requested, in July 1950, the revocation of the exculpatory verdict from Cluj in 1946. In that trial, 24 persons were charged, and two of them were sentenced; in 1951, accusations were only brought against the “instigators”.</p>
<p>Dániel Bánffy did not show up at any of the trials, did not have a lawyer, and except for the useless citations, the verdict enforcement was the only document in the trial that showed any interest in Bánffy’s person, stating to arrest him and send him to the Jilava prison.</p>
<p>The trial of 1946 happened at an incredibly fast pace according to our current expectations: the prosecutor compiled the file in September, and the Cluj Court of Appeal debated on 4 and 8 of October, already passing a verdict on the second hearing at 8 October. Dániel Bánffy was acquitted with quite a simple justification: there were much more witnesses who claimed that it was Endre Bánffy [we used to translate the name Andrei from the trial files as András, but Farkas Bánffy said he always used the Endre form of the name] or both of them who welcomed the Hungarian soldiers arriving to Palotailva in 1940 than who said that it was Dániel Bánffy who made the address. (During the 1951-52 trial even the Páters claimed that it was Dániel Bánffy who welcomed the soldiers).</p>
<p>The 1946 court claimed that the atrocities against the Romanian inhabitants with the help of Hungarians were committed on the night of 11 September 1940 (in the second trial of 1951-52, the Páters argued that these were committed a couple of days after the invasion, and not by the regular army which marched into and out of the settlement, but by the intelligence units who came later, who could not hear the welcoming speeches), but during this trial only two of the local aggressors could be identified for certain, and they were convicted.</p>
<p>The two most important defendants of both trials, Ernest Páter and his wife, were also acquitted in the 1946 trial of the charge of instigation, claiming that, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, the words they uttered were not adequate to instigate to war crimes. The Court also said that their words could not have been accurately rendered because their lawyer proved that</p>
<h2><strong>the prosecution’s witnesses hardly understood any Hungarian, and their knowledge about the speeches was only based on rumours.</strong></h2>
<p>Testimonies of the three witnesses of the prosecution, now only focussing on the speeches, recorded in March 1952, betray the same thing. All of them unanimously claim that the Hungarian soldiers arrived to Palotailva on 7 September 1940. Speeches were delivered on the occasion at the gate of the sawmill in front of the inhabitants of the village and the soldiers, forester Radu Alexandru related in his testimony. The first two speakers were Dániel Bánffy and Endre Bánffy, but he could not say which of the two was the first to talk. They were followed by Ida Páter, but the forester mentioned that none of these speeches were instigative. A part of the soldiers remained in the village, another part moved on.</p>
<p>Interestingly the forester also maintained his testimony from March 1947, claiming that Baron Bánffy was also one of the initiator of the tortures, but saying that he only heard rumours about it, and couldn’t say who the source of this information was.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-28309" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu1-1024x641.jpg" alt="Testimony of Radu Alexandru" width="885" height="554" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu1-1024x641.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu1-300x188.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu1-768x481.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu1.jpg 1134w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /></p>
<p><figure id="attachment_28312" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-28312" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-28312" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu2-1024x646.jpg" alt="Testimony of Radu Alexandru" width="885" height="558" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu2-1024x646.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu2-300x189.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu2-768x485.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/alexandruradu2.jpg 1163w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-28312" class="wp-caption-text">Testimony of Radu Alexandru</figcaption></figure></p>
<p>Grigore Cif, a local farmer, the other witness of the prosecution in 1952, said that the first speaker was Endre Bánffy, followed by Dániel Bánffy and the others. “I don’t really know Hungarian, and I don’t remember what Baron Dániel Bánffy was speaking about. As far as I remember, Endre Bánffy said that he lived in the woods for 22 years for fear of Romanians. I think this is not true, because he had a house in the forest, in Zsirka valley, because he was a heavy drinker, which was oftentimes visible, when he came to the village, he always got drunk. I don’t remember defendant Ernest Páter giving a speech, but I remember that Ida Páter gave a speech in which she said that she had suffered because of the Romanians for 22 years. I couldn’t understand what exactly she suffered from, because I don’t speak well Hungarian” – Grigore Cif states in his testimony.</p>
<p>He also maintained the testimony he made at Marosvásárhely/Târgu Mureș, namely that he only knew what was said from those who stood beside him, because he asked them what the speakers said.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-large wp-image-28315" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif1-1024x718.jpg" alt="Testimony of Grigore Cif" width="885" height="621" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif1-1024x718.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif1-300x210.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif1-768x538.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif1-336x236.jpg 336w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif1.jpg 1094w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /></p>
<p><figure id="attachment_28318" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-28318" style="width: 885px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-28318" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif2-1024x682.jpg" alt="Testimony of Grogore Cif" width="885" height="589" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif2-1024x682.jpg 1024w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif2-300x200.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif2-768x511.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/grigorecif2.jpg 1086w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-28318" class="wp-caption-text">Testimony of Grigore Cif</figcaption></figure></p>
<p>The worker Pavăl Croitoru said in his testimony in 1952 that the people who gave speeches when the Hungarian army arrived were Endre Bánffy, Ida Páter and the Orthodox priest Eftimie. He also stated that Endre Bánffy complained about having to live in the forest and eat polenta because of the Romanians, but he also said that he didn’t believe it: he lived there because his brother Dániel Bánffy had him stay in the forest house because of being ashamed of his drinking. Croitoru also said that Endre Bánffy’s speech wasn’t instigative. [Endre and Dániel Bánffy were not brothers, but second-degree relatives, Farkas Bánffy clarified].</p>
<p>The witness also said that Dániel Bánffy also spoke, but by that time he had left the scene, and did not know whether or not Ernest Páter addressed the people as well. He heard Ida Páter’s speech nevertheless, of which he remembered the salute and that she was persecuted by the Romanians, that was all he understood of the speech. He maintained his testimony from 1947 and his opinion that everything happened with the knowledge of the Barons and the leaders of the sawmill. He supported his opinion with the fact that the civilians and soldiers who made the arrests and committed the tortures met in the offices of the sawmill, started from there and that was also where they took the people they arrested.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-28321" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru1.jpg" alt="Testimony of Pavăl Croitoru" width="984" height="675" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru1.jpg 984w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru1-300x206.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru1-768x527.jpg 768w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru1-351x241.jpg 351w" sizes="(max-width: 984px) 100vw, 984px" /></p>
<p><figure id="attachment_28324" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-28324" style="width: 980px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-28324" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru2.jpg" alt="Testimony of Pavăl Croitoru" width="980" height="696" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru2.jpg 980w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru2-300x213.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/pavalcroitoru2-768x545.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 980px) 100vw, 980px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-28324" class="wp-caption-text">Testimony of Pavăl Croitoru</figcaption></figure></p>
<h2><strong>The story of the Páter family </strong></h2>
<p>is important in the case because, while the 1952 sentence of Dániel Bánffy who was away the whole time couldn’t do more than just set an example, the Páters who lived in Marosvásárhely/Târgu Mureș could be arrested and imprisoned, and as political prisoners, they were not released during <a href="http://adatbank.transindex.ro/html/cim_pdf981.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the 1953 amnesty</a>.</p>
<p>Since they had a lot to lose indeed, they hired a lawyer both in 1946 and 1951, who also tried to defend their case with procedural arguments, which drew the attention even more to how much of a show trial the 1951-52 trial was.</p>
<p>(In case of criminal trials with a final verdict the retrial can only be requested by the defendent and not by the prosecution – this was the criminal law argument that lawyer József Rózsa, the legal representative of the Bánffy-heirs used more than sixty years later <a href="https://kronika.ro/erdelyi-hirek/giurgiuba-kerult-at-a-banffy-orokosok-erdopere" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">in the Krónika newspaper</a>, when the Maros County prefect renewed the civil lawsuit which renationalized the 9323 hectares of forest.)</p>
<p>The chief prosecutor justified his request for retrial in 1950 saying that the court in 1946 should not have reached a verdict based on the fact that the testimonies were contradictory, but</p>
<blockquote><p>should have only given credit to the witnesses of the prosecution whose testimony was consistent with the defendants’ provocative behaviour, political views and social status:</p></blockquote>
<p>Dániel Bánffy was a “landowner, member of the chauvinist exploiter class”, Ernest Páter was member of the management of the Banga sawmill, and Ida Páter was the passionate leader of the “chauvinist fascist Women’s Society”.</p>
<p>The prosecutor stated in his justification that it was unjust that they, who were clearly identified as instigators by the witnesses of the prosecution, and whose words betrayed their hostile feelings towards the Romanian state before 1940, should get away with the deaths of two people and torture of several others.</p>
<p>At the beginning of the 1951 retrial, the lawyer of the Páters intended to bring up technical arguments in order to ensure taking new evidence to court if the case once finalized in 1946 would be retried. These arguments also show that the retrial of the case in 1950 might not have been completely legitimate either:</p>
<ul>
<li>The legal clause from 1946 which was the basis of the lawsuit against them and their acquittal had been erased in the meantime;</li>
<li>The clause which replaced it was more complicated and stricter about establishing the crime and the punishment for it (for this reason the lawyer requested that the alleged actions be classified as a different category of criminal law).</li>
<li>And, above all: the procedural rules from 1946 did not regulate the ways of retrial (therefore he asked to validate the procedures of the hearing and hear the witnesses of both the prosecution – not taking only their written statements into account – and of the defence).</li>
</ul>
<p>In 1951, the court was only willing to hear the new witnesses of the defence on the condition that their testimony cannot disprove the accusations, and the judge would at most consider their statements mitigating circumstances.</p>
<p>The last paragraph of the defendants’ acquittal request, in addition to the statement of facts formulated in favour of the defendants, despite all the ideological phrases and loyalty declarations, and</p>
<h2><strong>while not saying exactly so, meant in fact that this whole retrial is a show trial. </strong></h2>
<p>They argued that, although the law of justice does not regulate how to handle such a retrial and most importantly, it says nothing on the guiltyness of the defendants, if the Cluj Court of Appeal thinks it is constrained by the Supreme Court’s ruling on retrial and for this reason must convict the defendants, their request is that it changed their crime to false news distribution, and gave the minimum sentence with suspension. That is to say, they explicitly assumed that they would be found guilty because the Supreme Court ruled a retrial and by this, a quasi-compulsory sentence.</p>
<p><figure id="attachment_28327" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-28327" style="width: 956px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-28327" src="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/paterek-felmentesi-kerelme.jpg" alt="War crimes show trial Romania" width="956" height="520" srcset="https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/paterek-felmentesi-kerelme.jpg 956w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/paterek-felmentesi-kerelme-300x163.jpg 300w, https://atlatszo-ro.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/paterek-felmentesi-kerelme-768x418.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 956px) 100vw, 956px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-28327" class="wp-caption-text">Final lines of the aquittal request of the defendants</figcaption></figure></p>
<p>The Court of Appeal of Cluj failed to listen to their request, and transferred the case for sentence to the jurisdiction of the Bucharest Court of Law. The final phase happened in Bucharest in the second half of 1952. The Páters were held in custody during the trial, they were taken to the hearings from the Jilava prison, and they were appointed a lawyer ex officio. The files betrayed at this point that they didn’t speak Romanian well either, because the Bucharest Court asked the Ministry of Justice for an interpreter.</p>
<p>On 3 December 1952, the Court sentenced Ernest Páter for three years, and Ida Páter for four years of maximum security prison, and Dániel Bánffy for eight years of forced labour and ten years of loss of civil rights. In case of all three defendants, the Court ruled full confiscation of property, and the payment of one hundred lei each as legal costs.</p>
<p>The last document in the file is the verdict from 16 April 1953 of the criminal law department of the Supreme Court, in which the five members of the council of judges reject Ida Páter’s request of appeal. The hearing in this matter happened two days before in the presence of Ida Páter, when the prosecutor stated that the request was unfounded, and the appointed lawyer did not justify the request because he was unable to find a legal justification to annul the sentence from 1952. In addition to the rejection, the Court obliged Ida Páter to pay fifty lei for legal costs.</p>
<p>It had probably never occured to the judges who gave these verdicts that several decades later the Romanian state would deny the retrocession of Bánffy’s forests based precisely on these. We are attempting to disclose the peculiarities of current trials in a new set of articles. The Bánffy-heirs plan to attack the verdicts of renationalisation at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.</p>
<p><strong>Translated by Emese Czintos</strong></p>
<p><em>Original article:</em></p>
<p>[irp posts=&#8221;27151&#8243; name=&#8221;Kommunista kirakatper: így lett Bánffy Dániel háborús bűnös&#8221;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/english/a-communist-show-trial-how-daniel-banffy-became-a-war-criminal/">A Communist Show Trial: How Dániel Bánffy Became a War Criminal</a> appeared first on <a href="https://atlatszo.ro/en/">Átlátszó Erdély</a>.</p>
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